Zhang vs. Chen

file a motion for judgment on the pleadings passed long ago.

As the court stated previously, Section 438 of the Code of Civil Procedure states inter alia,

“No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 438(e). See also 8/2/26 Minute Order.)

Here, the court issued its pretrial order on 3/11/24 and the initial trial date was 11/10/25. (See 3/11/24 Minute Order.) The instant motion was not filed until 6/11/26, well after the deadline described in Section 438.

In sum, the motion and joiner are DENIED.

Moving Defendants to give notice.

15 Zhang vs. Chen Motion for Summary Judgment

The court DENIES the motion filed by Cross-Defendants CH MARKET CENTER, INC., d/b/a KW VISION (“KW Vision”) and YUANYUAN SAI, aka OLIVIA SAI (“Sai”) for summary judgment of the First Amended Cross-Complaint (FAXC) filed by Cross-Complainants AMIR NATHAN DAWOOD and SANDY DAWOOD (the “Dawoods”).

RJN: Although unnecessary, the court GRANTS the Dawoods’ request to take judicial notice of the court’s 3/8/24 Minute Order.

The FAXC alleges the following causes of action against Defendants and Cross-Defendants ZHENJIAN CHEN (default entered), XIAOYU WANG (voluntarily dismissed), Sai, LIANG GUO (voluntarily dismissed), Thomas J. Blank aka Tom Blank, Worldwide Signings, Inc. (WS), and ASHANTI N. CLAR and KW Vision:

1. Negligent Misrepresentation (against Chen) 2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation (against Chen) 3. Unjust Enrichment (against Chen) 4. Conversion (against Chen) 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (against Sai and KW Vision) 6. Negligent Misrepresentation (against Sai, Guo, and KW Vision) 7. Fraudulent Misrepresentation (against Sai, Guo, and KW Vision) 8. Violation of Civil Code § 2079 (against Sai, Guo, and KW Vision) 9. Conspiracy (against Chen, Wang, Sai, and Guo) 10. Negligence (against Blank, WS, Clark)

As against the moving cross-defendants, the following causes of action of the FAXC remain pending:

• 5th C/A (breach of fiduciary duty) • 6th C/A (negligent misrepresentation) • 7th C/A (fraudulent misrepresentation) • 8th C/A (violation of Civil Code § 2079)

Moving Cross-Defendants argue that each cause of action asserted against them is merely a disguised indemnity claim and because Sai obtained a judgment against Plaintiff, all cross-claims for indemnity and contribution fail as a matter of law.

The court disagrees.

First, all causes of action alleged against Moving Cross- Defendants appear to be direct liability claims. Cross- Complainants allege that the Moving Cross-Defendants owed Cross-Complainants a duty, which was breached. The duty alleged involves a direct relationship between Cross-Complainants and the Moving Cross-Defendants. The alleged duty was owed to Cross-Complainants and not to Plaintiff Li Zhang.

Second, as noted in the opposing papers, Cross- Complainants are not alleged to be joint tortfeasors with the Moving Cross-Defendants in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. The third amended complaint alleges a conspiracy between Defendants Zhenjian Chen, Xiaoyu Wang, Thomas J. Blank aka Tom Blank, Worldwide Signings, Inc. Ashanti N. Clark, Yuanyuan Saki aka Olivia Sai, and Lian Guo to commit fraud by forging a deed that resulted in the sale of the property to the Dawoods. (TAC, ¶ 77-79.) Plaintiff alleges that the Moving Cross-Defendants are joint-tortfeasors with other defendants.

Plaintiff however does not allege that the Dawoods were joint-tortfeasors with the Moving Cross-Defendants. The Dawoods are named as the current title-holder on deeds that Plaintiff wishes to cancel due to the torts of others. “It is wellsettled in California that equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s injury.” (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Med. Grp. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040.) The Dawoods and the Moving Cross-Defendants are not alleged by Plaintiff to be joint tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.

Finally, given that Cross-Defendants moved for summary judgment, Cross-Defendants bore the burden of completely disposing of every cause of action alleged against them in the First Amended Cross-Complaint. Cross- Defendants failed to identify each element of each cause of action alleged against them, failed to establish how each cause of action was an indemnity claim, and failed to negate an element of each cause of action. To the extent that Cross-Defendants are arguing that they could not be liable to Cross-Complainants and/or that Cross- Complainants did not suffer damages since Sai is not liable to Plaintiff, Cross-Defendants failed to offer sufficient facts or legal analysis as to each cause of action to so establish. “[T]he court cannot summarily adjudicate other issues or claims, even if a basis to do so appears from the papers.” (Schmidlin v.

City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 744). Further, even if Sai is not liable to Plaintiff, there is no explanation as to why KW Vision may not be held liable on each cause of action asserted against it.

None of the cases that Cross-Defendants cite appear applicable:

• In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1159, the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying summary adjudication on the issue of an indemnity cause of action because petitioner was not liable to plaintiff. Unlike here, in Allis-Chalmers Corp., an indemnity cause of action was expressly alleged and summary adjudication was expressly sought.

• In Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens Corning Fiberglas (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, “[f]ollowing a settlement between Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc., and Seaward Properties, Ltd., the plaintiff in the underlying action, the trial court made a good faith determination and barred all cross-complaints against Owens-Corning, including that of Norco Delivery Service, Inc., under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.” (Id. at 959.) Norco challenged that good faith determination and also argued that in addition to erroneously dismissing Norco's indemnity and contribution claims, the trial court also improperly barred its independent, direct claims against Owens-Corning.” (Id.)

The court of appeal found no error as to the trial court’s good-faith determination. (Id. at 964.) “Following a good faith determination, the judge doubtless may dismiss disguised or artfully pleaded claims for indemnity or contribution—i.e., causes of action purporting to state direct claims but which, in fact, seek only to recover derivative damages.” (Id.) But Norco, even after five years of litigation, failed to adduce any evidence of other-than-derivative damages. (Id.) “[N]onsettling defendant challenging good faith settlement bears the burden of adducing evidence the settlement was not in good faith....” (Id.) “And Norco's failure to adduce any such evidence is dispositive.” (Id.)

In Norco, Norco bore the burden of showing that there was sufficient evidence to support Norco’s direct liability claims. Here, on the other hand, the burden is on the moving party to negate an element of the Cross-Complainants’ causes of action. The Moving Cross-Defendants do not move on the basis of a “lack of evidence” for each of the Cross-Complainants’ affirmative claims. The cases are factually distinguishable.

Similarly, the remainder of Cross-Defendants’ legal citations deal with claims that were barred by a good faith determination under section 877.6, the statute of limitations for a cause of action that is misnamed, the notion that a complaint that is sustainable on any theory is not vulnerable to a general demurrer, the extent of a res judicata bar to claims, and whether certain claims fall within the boundaries of a particular legislative declaration that a validation statute applies. (Citing Gackstetter v.

Frawley (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1274 [Good-faith determination bar]; County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1326 [statute of limitations]; Campbell v. Veith (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 729, 732 [general demurrer standard]; Owl Drug Co. v. Bryant (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 296, 302 [res judicata bar]; and Davis v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 911, 930 [whether validation statute applies].)

None of these cases directly discuss the burden of a moving party on summary judgment and/or whether or not the moving party can circumvent the initial burden of proof by categorically concluding that each cause of action was a disguised indemnity cause of action without legal analysis of each cause of action alleged and/or offering facts for each cause of action.

In sum, the court finds that moving parties failed to meet their burden and the motion is DENIED.

Cross-Complainants to give notice.

16 Chaudhary vs. Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication Lakeside Maintenance (Continued from 8/21/26) Association The court DENIES, in its entirety, Defendants LAKESIDE MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION (“Lakeside”) and MARK WARD’s (“Ward”) motion for summary adjudication on the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed by Plaintiff TARIQ CHAUDHARY.

Evidentiary Objections:

The court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objections to Exhibit C in Defendants’ index of documentary evidence and to paragraph 7 of the Mark Ward Declaration (stating “Attached as Exhibit C to the Index of Documentary

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