DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al.

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C in the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Richard C. Miadich presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

(833) 568-8864

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendants Nicole Valentine and Goyette & Associates (collectively, “Goyette Defendants”) demurrer to Plaintiff in pro per Dr. Kristine Kristoff, PhD’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition without obtaining leave of court. This is despite Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempting to obtain leave via ex parte applications that were denied due to failure to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1200

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

et seq., as well as the Court’s statement in its order continuing this matter to today’s date that no further briefing was permitted absent leave of court. However, the opposition was filed with sufficient time before the continued hearing date for Goyette Defendants to file a reply, so the Court has considered the opposition and the reply in making its ruling.

Goyette Defendants’ request for judicial notice is unopposed and granted. In considering the documents submitted with Goyette Defendants’ request, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted in such documents, nor does the Court take judicial notice of any matter not relevant to the dispositive issues presented in this demurrer. (Guarantee Forklift, Inc. v. Capacity of Texas, Inc. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1075; see also Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090.)

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on July 8, 2025. On January 14, 2026, the Court sustained Goyette Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint with leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. Plaintiff filed the FAC on February 9, 2026.

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that she retained Goyette Defendants in May 2016 in connection with proceedings before the California Board of Registered Nursing (the “Board”). Goyette Defendants were retained to assist Plaintiff with an application for a registered nurse license that had been challenged due to expunged misdemeanor DUI convictions. Plaintiff further alleges that Goyette Defendants failed to provide competent legal representation by coercing her to execute a stipulated settlement agreement with the Board in 2017 prior to an administrative hearing.

Plaintiff alleges that the agreement was backdated to February of 2016, and that it was never presented to her for approval but was submitted by Goyette Defendants to the Attorney General’s office to resolve the proceedings before the Board. Plaintiff also alleges that in 2018, Goyette Defendants advised Plaintiff that the Deputy Attorney General was now Plaintiff’s counsel and directed Plaintiff to proceed at an administrative hearing in 2019 without counsel. Plaintiff asserts that this constituted abandonment and a breach of the duty of loyalty.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice includes several documents from the Attorney General of California and the Board related to the proceedings before the Board involving Plaintiff described in the Complaint. Relying on these documents, Defendants submit additional facts not clearly alleged in the Complaint. As noted above, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted in any of the documents submitted with Defendants’ request. Thus, some of the facts recounted in Defendants’ brief are not properly before the Court for the purposes of this demurrer. Additionally, other facts are not relevant to the Court’s disposition of this matter. The properly considered judicially noticed facts are as follows. On October 11, 2016,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for a Registered Nurse License. On or around February 2, 2017, Plaintiff, then represented by Defendants, entered into the aforementioned Stipulated Settlement Agreement with the Board. The settlement called for Plaintiff’s application to be granted upon successful completion of the licensure examination. The license was to be immediately revoked, but the order of revocation would be stayed pending completion of a threeyear probationary period. (See RJN, Exh.

D.) On July 3, 2018, the Board filed a Petition to Revoke which alleged that Plaintiff had violated the terms of her probation. The proposed decision on the Petition was issued by Administrative Law Judge Ed Washington on March 6, 2019. (See RJN, Exh. F.) On April 3, 2019, the Board adopted Judge Washington’s proposed decision, effective May 3, 2019. Additional proceedings followed through July 3, 2024, the precise details of which are not relevant here.

Plaintiff’s original Complaint did not include clearly labeled causes of action but instead alleged that Goyette Defendants breached various duties applicable to attorneys. Thus, in its ruling on the prior demurrer, the Court applied the statute of limitations governing legal malpractice claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which is the earlier of one year after actual or constructive discovery or four years after occurrence. In its ruling, the Court stated:

The face of the Complaint indicates that the statute of limitations expired before Plaintiff filed suit. The wrongful acts alleged in the Complaint occurred in sometime between Plaintiff’s retention of Defendants in June of 2016 and the execution of the settlement agreement in February of 2017. The Complaint contains no allegations of any wrongdoing by Defendants after February of 2017. Thus, the statute of limitations would have expired in February of 2021, four years after the alleged wrongful act. Moreover, from the judicially noticed documents, it is apparent that Plaintiff suffered harm from the alleged wrongful acts by no later than May 3, 2019, when the Board’s decision to revoke Plaintiff’s probation became effective. Thus, even if the tolling provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1) applies, it does not provide sufficient tolling to make the Complaint timely.

(01/14/2026 Minute Order, pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff also alleged in the original Complaint that she did not and could not have reasonably discovered Goyette Defendants’ wrongdoing until July 3, 2024. On this issue, the Court stated:

Additionally, there are no allegations to support a delayed discovery theory that would make the Complaint timely. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations belie this possibility, as Plaintiff alleges she did not and could not reasonably have discovered the facts constituting the alleged wrongful acts until July 3, 2024, but she did not file her

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

Complaint until July 8, 2025, more than one year later. Thus, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and inferring that she indeed did not and could not have reasonably discovered the wrongful acts until July 3, 2024, her Complaint is still untimely under section 340.6(a).

(01/14/2026 Minute Order, p. 5.)

In the FAC, Plaintiff brings causes of action for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by concealment, and unfair business practices. In allegations directed towards the statute of limitations, Plaintiff alleges that she “did not discover the wrongful cause of her injury until July 9, 2024, when correspondence from Department of Consumer Affairs legal counsel revealed that her revocation was based on a Stipulated Settlement she had never authorized.” (FAC, p. 3:22- 25, bold in original.)

Plaintiff further alleges that before that date, “Defendants led Plaintiff to believe the outcome was mandatory and legally unavoidable.” (FAC, p. 3:25-26.) Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges that the statute of limitations was tolled by Goyette Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of the Stipulation and exclusive control over Plaintiff’s client file. Plaintiff alleges that she “did not obtain partial records until 2024, which revealed material discrepancies. Defendants’ concealment tolled the statute of limitations.” (FAC, ¶ 10.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 was tolled through 2024 on a continuous representation theory. (FAC, ¶ 11.)

Discussion

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

“[A] statute of limitations defense may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action.” (Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of Transportation (2020 46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1116.) However, “‘[i]n order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.’” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.)

The statute of limitations for an action against an attorney is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which provides in part:

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a).)

“Section 340.6 states two distinct and alternative limitation periods: One year after actual or constructive discovery, or four years after occurrence (the date of the wrongful act or omission), whichever occurs first.” (Britton v. Girardi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 732.) The statute of limitations may be tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1) if the plaintiff has not sustained actual injury. (Id. at p. 733.) Under that provision: “Actual injury occurs where the plaintiff suffers any loss or injury legally cognizable as damages based on the asserted errors or omissions of an attorney.

The fact of injury or damage need not be recognized or noticed by the plaintiff. Nor does the fact that damage may be difficult to calculate or prove prevent the legal malpractice statute of limitations from running.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) The harm must be appreciable and not speculative to constitute actual injury. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 750.) “‘The cause of action arises, however, before the client sustains all, or even the greater part, of the damages occasioned by [the] attorney's negligence.

Any appreciable and actual harm flowing from the attorney's negligent conduct establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue.’” (Ibid., italics in original.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

In enacting the legislation that resulted in the limitations period for legal malpractice claims stated in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, “the Legislature intended to establish a limitations period that would apply broadly to any claim concerning an attorney’s violation of his or her professional obligations in the course of providing professional services regardless of how those claims were styled in the plaintiff’s complaint.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1235.) Thus, section 340.6 “applies to claims whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.” (Id. at pp. 1236-1237.) “[T]he question is whether the claim, in order to succeed, necessarily depends on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable nonprofessional obligation.” (Id. at p. 1238.)

The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is four years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 343; Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.) However, it is well-settled that “a plaintiff is not permitted to evade a statute of limitations by artful pleading that labels a cause of action one thing while actually stating another.” (Thomson, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) “California courts therefore look to the gravamen of the cause of action” to determine the applicable statute of limitations. (Ibid.) Where a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is rooted in the acts and omissions of an attorney while representing the plaintiff, then section 340.6 applies. (Quintilliani v. Mannerino (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 54, 67-68.)

The statute of limitations for a fraud-based claim is three years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d).) A fraud claim “is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.)

The statute of limitations for an unfair competition claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200 is four years. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208; Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 639.)

However, “where more than one statute might apply to a particular claim, ‘“a specific limitations provision prevails over a more general provision.”’” (Yee v. Cheung (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 184, 195.) Additionally, as noted above, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 governs claims that “necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.” (Lee, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1236-1237.) This rule applies claims for unfair business practices that arise from an attorney’s professional obligations. (Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284, 296.) Here, the basis for Plaintiff’s unfair business practices claim is Goyette Defendants’ marketing and providing of legal services. (FAC, ¶ 24.)

Given these authorities, the Court finds that the limitations period defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 applies to Plaintiff’s causes of action for legal malpractice, breach of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

fiduciary duty, and unfair business practices. The limitations period defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d) applies to Plaintiff’s fraud by concealment claim.

Claims Subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6

Plaintiff’s legal malpractice cause of action is based on allegations that Goyette Defendants (1) failed to rely on Business and Professions Code section 480, which allegedly prohibits denial of licensure based solely on expunged convictions, in proceedings before the Board; (2) executed and submitted the Stipulated Settlement without Plaintiff’s informed consent; and (3) failed to advise Plaintiff of the consequences of the Stipulation. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is based on allegations that Goyette Defendants prioritized administrative expedience over Plaintiff’s rights, concealed the nature and consequences of the Stipulated Settlement, and misrepresented the role of the Deputy Attorney General in the proceedings before the Board. (FAC, ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff’s unfair business practices cause of action is based on allegations that Goyette Defendants marketed and provided “membership-based legal defense services that failed to provide fundamental attorney-client safeguards and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.” (FAC, ¶ 24.)

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Goyette Defendants’ citation to the sham pleading doctrine. “Under the sham pleading doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408 425.) A court ruling on a demurrer is not obligated to accept as true allegations that are contrary to allegations made in a prior pleading, and the inconsistent allegations in the amended pleading may be disregarded. (Vallejo Development Co. v.

Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946.) A plaintiff “may avoid the effect of the sham pleading doctrine by alleging an explanation for the conflicts between the pleadings.” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 344.) Here, in the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she “did not and could not reasonably have discovered the legal malpractice and negligence in administrative violations until her Petition for Reinstatement was denied on July 3, 2024.” (Complaint, p. 2:14-15, bold in original.)

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that she “did not discover the wrongful cause of her injury until July 9, 2024, when correspondence from Department of Consumer Affairs legal counsel revealed that her revocation was based on a Stipulated Settlement she had never authorized.” (FAC, p. 3:22-25, bold in original.) No explanation for this discrepancy is provided, either in the allegations of the FAC or in Plaintiff’s opposition. Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 8, 2025. Thus, it is apparent that the change of the alleged accrual date for Plaintiff’s claims from July 3, 2024 to July 9, 2024 is an attempt to ensure that the Complaint was filed within one year of the accrual of Plaintiff’s non-fraud claims and thus to avoid the effect of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6.

Thus, the Court disregards the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

allegation in the FAC that Plaintiff did not discover her injury until July 9, 2024 and instead looks to the allegation in the original Complaint that Plaintiff discovered her injury on July 3, 2024. This renders Plaintiff’s claims for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair business practices untimely under the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6.

Even if the sham pleading doctrine did not apply, Plaintiff’s non-fraud causes of action would still be untimely. The alleged wrongful conduct occurred between 2016 and 2019, but Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until July of 2025, and thus the Complaint was not filed within four years of the alleged wrongful acts or omissions. The common law delayed discovery rule does not apply to claims subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6; rather, the delayed discovery rule is codified within that statute through the one-year limitations period. (Ovando v.

County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 66-67.) However, if the four-year limitations period elapses first, then it governs, regardless of whether the plaintiff does not or reasonably could not have discovered the alleged wrongdoing until more than four years later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a).) The tolling provisions in section 340.6 are exclusive. (Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 618.)

Plaintiff has also not established that the statute of limitations was tolled by fraudulent concealment. To invoke this tolling provision, Plaintiff must establish the substantive elements of fraud and an excuse for the late discovery of the facts. (Britton v. Girardi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 734.) Plaintiff was aware of the alleged facts giving rise to her claims when they occurred or not long thereafter. At a minimum, Plaintiff alleges that Goyette Defendants abandoned her as a client in 2018 and that she proceeded unrepresented in a 2019 administrative hearing.

ALJ Washington’s proposed decision dated March 6, 2019 states that Plaintiff was selfrepresented at that time, and the decision, which proposed lifting the stay of revocation ordered in the Stipulated Settlement and revoking Plaintiff’s license, discusses the Stipulated Settlement and Plaintiff’s criminal convictions as a reason for her license being revoked. (RJN Exh. F.) There are no allegations that Goyette Defendants concealed this information from Plaintiff, particularly given that, as Plaintiff alleges, Goyette Defendants abandoned her in 2018.

Similarly, since Plaintiff alleges she was abandoned in 2018, she cannot invoke the continuous representation tolling provision. Under this rule, “representation ends when the client actually has or reasonably should have no expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services.” (Laclette v. Galindo (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 919, 928, emphasis in original.) Plaintiff’s allegation that the action of Defendants continued to “directly affect[]” the status of Plaintiff’s license through 2024 does not support application of the continuous representation rule.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer by Defendant Nicole Valentine to First Amended Complaint in Department 8C

Fraud Cause of Action

Plaintiff bases her fraud by concealment claim on the allegation that Goyette Defendants “concealed the material fact that they had entered into and submitted a Stipulated Settlement on Plaintiff’s behalf without her authorization.” (FAC, ¶ 20.) Again, even accepting this as true, Plaintiff’s own allegation that she was abandoned by Goyette Defendants in 2018, combined with the alleged and judicially noticed fact that she appeared on her own behalf at an administrative hearing in 2019 pertaining to the Stipulated Settlement, means that Plaintiff knew of the alleged fraud by March of 2019. Since Plaintiff did not file this action until July 8, 2025, she failed to file her fraud cause of action within the three-year limitations period.

Disposition

For the reasons discussed above, Goyette Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC is SUSTAINED on statute of limitations grounds.

Leave to amend is DENIED, as Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable possibility that the defects in the FAC can be cured by amendment.

Goyette Defendants shall submit a proposed judgment of dismissal for the Court’s signature.