Demurrer to plaintiff’s Complaint
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
Tentative Ruling
The demurrer of Defendants James L. Arrasmith and the Law Offices of James L. Arrasmith (collectively, Defendants) is ruled upon as follows.
This action arises out of Defendants representation of Plaintiff Abraham Sheriff (Plaintiff) in the underlying civil lawsuit Abraham Sheriff v. St. Anton Multifamily, Inc., Case No. 34-2021- 00310118 (Underlying Action).[1]
Plaintiff, in pro per, filed his complaint on December 3, 2025.[2]
Plaintiff alleges that he initially filed his complaint in the Underlying Action in pro per but realized that he needed legal counsel. He saved his money and on May 31, 2024, he retained Defendants to represent him in the underlying action. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that after paying $4,500 between May 2024 and July 2024, Defendants demanded a second retainer of $5,253.75, which Defendants were aware Plaintiff was unable to pay. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Defendants sent a $375,000 settlement offer to opposing counsel on June 25, 2024.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not discuss the impetus and details of the offer with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff did not understand the settlement. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) He alleges that Defendants represented that the offer was a jumping off point and that they would probably get more. The settlement offer allowed opposing counsel to accept or reject the offer by July 10, 2024. (Id.)
On July 19, 2024, Defendants terminated the attorney-client relationship. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that when the settlement offer was not accepted, Defendants jumped ship because Defendants main goal was to make a quick settlement or extract more funds from Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 20.)
Trial was scheduled for August 2024. Plaintiff was prepared to appear on August 19, 2024; however, on that date, Plaintiff received an email notice that the court had canceled the appearance and that a judgment of dismissal had been entered against Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 18.)
On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff reached out to Defendants for assistance in discussing an appeal. Defendants met with Plaintiff on December 7, 2024 and charged Plaintiff $300 for the meeting. Defendants told Plaintiff that for $9,000, Defendants would look over his appeal, which would be prepared by a paralegal. Defendants would also assist Plaintiff with remanding the civil case to the trial court. Alternatively, for $12,000, Defendants would take over the appeal in its entirety and also assist with remanding the civil case to the trial court. (Complaint, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges his appeal was denied on October 28, 2025. (Complaint, ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the standard of care by:
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
A. Failing to file notice of appearance in the docket in the Underlying Action. B. Failing to conduct reasonable discovery or to adequately prepare for the impending trial date. C. Failing to seek continuances of trial or other dates relevant to preserving Plaintiffs case. D. Causing the dismissal of Plaintiffs underlying action by failing to do any of the above and by terminating the attorney-client relationship only a few weeks before trial. E. Failing to inform Plaintiff of the status of his case so that he could prepare or obtain other counsel before it was too late. F. Failing to properly communicate with, or obtain approval from, Plaintiff regarding the settlement offer. G. Abandoning Plaintiff for purely financial reasons so close to trial as to cause actual prejudice and loss.
(Complaint, ¶ 34.)
The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) professional negligence and (2) breach of fiduciary duty.
Defendants demur to each cause of action on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants demur to the professional negligence cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff fails to allege non-conclusory facts establishing causation and actual injury. Defendants demur to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action on the ground that it is duplicative of the negligence claim and alleges no distinct breach.
Legal Standard
The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)
A demurrer and a motion to strike tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318; William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616 n.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)
A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiffs possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint. (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) [Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded. (Picton v.
Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)
Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that the one-year statute of limitations expired on August 19, 2025 - one year after the Underlying Action was dismissed.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations because he reasonably believed that the underlying case could still be salvaged through the appellate process. (Opposition, 9:4-5.) He adds that actual injury did not occur until his appeal was denied. Plaintiff further argues that the statute of limitations is tolled under the continuing representation doctrine (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a)(2)) because he has alleged that on December 7, 2024, he met with Defendant to discuss the appeal, and paid $300 for the meeting.
An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services, shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, the facts....' (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6.) The statute applies not only to actions for professional negligence but to any action alleging wrongful conduct, other than actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services. (Lee v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1236.)
The limitations period is tolled during the time that plaintiff has not sustained actual injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a)(1).) Pursuant to Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, the statute of limitations began to run at the time the underlying case was dismissed and judgment was entered against the plaintiff. That time was not tolled during the appeal of the Underlying Action. (Id. at 615.) As stated in Laird, [t]he policy behind the limited tolling periods in the statute is clear. If we nonetheless hold that the statute is tolled pending an appeal, we allow clients, with knowledge that they have suffered actual injury, unilaterally to control the commencement of the statute of limitations and hence undermine the legislative goal of resolving cases while the evidence is fresh, witnesses are available, and memories have not faded. (Id. at 618.)
Actual injury occurs when the client suffers any loss or injury legally cognizable as damages in a legal malpractice action based on the asserted errors or omissions. (Jordache Enterprises v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 743, 748.) Consequently, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the statute of limitations accrued when the Court of Appeal dismissed Plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs reliance on Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, for the proposition that actual injury is generally a question of fact, is misplaced. Adams did not concern tolling based on the pendency and outcome of an appeal, but rather when actual injury occurred based on the attorneys failure to file a clients claim or cause of action within the statute of limitations. It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7.)
Plaintiffs reliance on the continuing representation doctrine also does not assist him. The continuous representation rule was adopted in order to avoid the disruption of an attorneyclient relationship by a lawsuit while enabling the attorney to correct or minimize an apparent error, and to prevent an attorney from defeating a malpractice cause of action by continuing to represent the client until the statutory period has expired. (Laird, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 618.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated the attorney-client relationship on July 19, 2024.
Thus, the above-referenced concern is not implicated here. Additionally, even if the statute of limitations were tolled while Defendants purportedly represented Plaintiff, at most, it would only be tolled for two days (December 5-7, 2024). As a result, the one-year statute of limitations would have expired on August 21, 2025.
The Court finds that, on its face, the Complaint shows that Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The demurrer is SUSTAINED. Nonetheless, since this is Defendants first challenge to the complaint, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
Plaintiff may file and serve a first amended complaint (FAC) by no later than July 24, 2026, Response to be filed and served within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the FAC is served by mail. (Although not required by any statute or rule of court, Plaintiff is requested to attach a copy of the instant minute order to the FAC to facilitate the filing of the pleading.)
This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)
NOTICE:
Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:
To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.
If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.
The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.
Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV029050: SHERIFF vs ARRASMITH, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf's Complaint for Legal Malpractice in Department 16C
A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Courts Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.
Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporters Office and an official reporter will be provided.
[1] Plaintiff does not specify where the Underlying Action was venued. [2] Plaintiff is now represented by counsel.
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