DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Nicole Valentine and Goyette & Associates’ (collectively, “Defendants”) demurrer to Plaintiff in pro per Dr. Kristine Kristoff, PhD’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is unopposed and granted. In considering the documents submitted with Defendants’ request, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the matter asserted in such documents, nor does the Court take judicial notice of any matter not relevant to the dispositive issues presented in this demurrer. (Guarantee Forklift, Inc. v. Capacity of Texas, Inc. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1075; see also Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090.)

Defendants are admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires electronic exhibits to include electronic bookmarks linking to the first page of each exhibit. Failure to comply with this rule in the future may result in a motion being dropped or an opposition not being considered.

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s untimely filed opposition in its ruling. The Court also

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 01/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 28

observes that there is no proof of service accompanying the opposition. However, Defendants filed a reply on the merits on January 7, 2026.

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on July 8, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that she retained Defendants in June 2016 in connection with proceedings before the California Board of Registered Nursing (the “Board”). Defendants were retained to assist Plaintiff with an application for a registered nurse license that had been challenged due to expunged misdemeanor DUI convictions. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to provide competent legal representation by coercing her to execute a stipulated settlement agreement with the Board in February of 2017 prior to an administrative hearing.

Plaintiff alleges that the agreement was backdated to February of 2016, which was before the Board had issued a Statement of Issues. Plaintiff alleges that she was not advised of her right to an administrative hearing under Business and Professions Code section 485 as well as the existence of Business and Professions Code section 480(c), “which prohibit[s] denial of licensure based solely on expunged misdemeanors.” (Complaint, p. 2:4-5.) Plaintiff further alleges, “These breaches directly and proximately caused the denial of Plaintiff’s RN license prior to obtaining the RN license (October 2017) and/or the eligibility, resulting in substantial and ongoing economic, professional, and emotional harm with the most recent date of injury effective July 3rd, 2024.” (Complaint, p. 2:11-13, bold in original.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges, “Plaintiff did not and could not reasonably have discovered the legal malpractice and negligence in administrative violations until her Petition for Reinstatement was denied on July 3, 2024, when [the Board’s] counsel explicitly reaffirmed the causation link to the defective stipulation. This tolls the statute of limitations under the delayed discovery rule (Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 340.6(a)(3).” (Complaint, p. 2:14-16, bold in original.)

Defendants’ request for judicial notice includes several documents from the Attorney General of California and the Board related to the proceedings before the Board involving Plaintiff described in the Complaint. Relying on these documents, Defendants submit additional facts not clearly alleged in the Complaint. As noted above, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted in any of the documents submitted with Defendants’ request. Thus, some of the facts recounted in Defendants’ brief are not properly before the Court for the purposes of this demurrer.

Additionally, other facts are not relevant to the Court’s disposition of this matter. The properly considered judicially noticed facts are as follows. On October 11, 2016, the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for a Registered Nurse License. On or around February 2, 2017, Plaintiff, then represented by Defendants, entered into the aforementioned Stipulated Settlement Agreement with the Board. The settlement called for Plaintiff’s application to be granted upon successful completion of the licensure examination.

The license was to be immediately revoked, but the order of revocation would be stayed pending completion of a threeyear probationary period. (See RJN, Exh. D.) On July 3, 2018, the Board filed a Petition to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 01/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 28

Revoke which alleged that Plaintiff had violated the terms of her probation. The proposed decision on the Petition was issued by Administrative Law Judge Ed Washington on March 6, 2019. (See RJN, Exh. F.) On April 3, 2019, the Board adopted Judge Washington’s proposed decision, effective May 3, 2019. Additional proceedings followed through July 3, 2024, the precise details of which are not relevant here.

Discussion

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

“[A] statute of limitations defense may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action.” (Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of Transportation (2020 46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1116.) However, “‘[i]n order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.’” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.)

The statute of limitations for an action against an attorney is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which provides in part:

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 01/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 28

arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a).)

“Section 340.6 states two distinct and alternative limitation periods: One year after actual or constructive discovery, or four years after occurrence (the date of the wrongful act or omission), whichever occurs first.” (Britton v. Girardi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 732.) The statute of limitations may be tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1) if the plaintiff has not sustained actual injury. (Id. at p. 733.) Under that provision: “Actual injury occurs where the plaintiff suffers any loss or injury legally cognizable as damages based on the asserted errors or omissions of an attorney.

The fact of injury or damage need not be recognized or noticed by the plaintiff. Nor does the fact that damage may be difficult to calculate or prove prevent the legal malpractice statute of limitations from running.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) The harm must be appreciable and not speculative to constitute actual injury. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 750.) “‘The cause of action arises, however, before the client sustains all, or even the greater part, of the damages occasioned by [the] attorney's negligence.

Any appreciable and actual harm flowing from the attorney's negligent conduct establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue.’” (Ibid., italics in original.)

The face of the Complaint indicates that the statute of limitations expired before Plaintiff filed suit. The wrongful acts alleged in the Complaint occurred in sometime between Plaintiff’s retention of Defendants in June of 2016 and the execution of the settlement agreement in February of 2017. The Complaint contains no allegations of any wrongdoing by Defendants after February of 2017. Thus, the statute of limitations would have expired in February of 2021, four years after the alleged wrongful act. Moreover, from the judicially noticed documents, it is apparent that Plaintiff suffered harm from the alleged wrongful acts by no later than May 3, 2019, when the Board’s decision to revoke Plaintiff’s probation became effective. Thus, even if the tolling provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1) applies, it does not provide sufficient tolling to make the Complaint timely.

Additionally, there are no allegations to support a delayed discovery theory that would make the Complaint timely. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations belie this possibility, as Plaintiff alleges she did not and could not reasonably have discovered the facts constituting the alleged wrongful acts until July 3, 2024, but she did not file her Complaint until July 8, 2025, more than one year later. Thus, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and inferring that she indeed did not and could not have reasonably discovered the wrongful acts until July 3, 2024, her Complaint is still

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV016585: DR. KRISTINE KRISTOFF, PHD vs VALENTINE, et al. 01/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 28

untimely under section 340.6(a).

Plaintiff’s opposition contains discussion of irrelevant issues and Plaintiff appears to rely on facts not included in the Complaint, including documents submitted to the Court on December 29, 2025. The Court has not considered these extraneous facts or documents, as they are not properly before the Court. Plaintiff’s opposition does not address the deficiencies described in the preceding paragraphs.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Leave to amend is GRANTED as this is the first challenge to the pleading.

The Court observes that Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on January 12, 2026. A party may amend a pleading once without leave of court after a demurrer is filed so long as “the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 472(a).) The due date for Plaintiff’s opposition was December 31, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff’s January 12, 2026 filing is untimely. Since the filing was not otherwise authorized by the Court, the First Amended Complaint was “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b); see Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.) Accordingly, the Court orders Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on January 12, 2026 STRICKEN pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436(b).

Plaintiff may refile and serve a First Amended Complaint by no later than February 11, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)