Bryson Burpo v. General Motors LLC

In a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden always rests on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that no material factual issues are in dispute. [Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 453.] When a defendant files for summary judgment, they satisfy their initial burden if they prove that at least one element of the cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).] Failure to meet this burden results in denial of the motion, ending the inquiry. [Id.]

To meet the burden of proving that a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, the needed evidence. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 854.] Merely pointing out the lack of evidence is not enough. [Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.] This supporting evidence may include affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters subject to judicial notice. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 855.]

Even if the moving defendant meets their burden, the opposing plaintiff can still defeat a summary judgment motion by presenting evidence that raises a triable issue of fact. [Aguilar, 25 Cal. 4th at 849-850.] The plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations or denials in its pleadings; instead, it must present specific facts indicating the existence of a triable issue of material fact concerning the cause of action. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Choochagi, 60 Cal.App.5th at 453.] If the plaintiff fails to do so, summary judgment should be granted. [See Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.]

The court must liberally construe the evidence presented by the party opposing summary judgment, resolving all doubts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of that party [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 844-845]. When reviewing such a motion, the court must consider what inferences a factfinder could reasonably draw that favor the opposing party. [Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.] The main role of the court is to identify issues, not to decide them; only clear and indisputable inferences can lead to a legal resolution. [Ibid.] If evidence conflicts, factual disputes must be resolved during trial. [Ibid.] Furthermore, the trial court cannot weigh evidence as a factfinder would to determine credibility, nor can it grant summary judgment based on credibility assessments. [Id. at 840.]

Discussion.

1. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections.

All of Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the Declarations of Bryan Jensen (Objection Nos. 1-5) and Kyle Robal (Objection No. 6) are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. Even if the Court ruled differently, it would not alter its denial of Defendant’s summary-judgment motion.

2. First and Second Causes of Action.

The motion is DENIED because Defendant has not demonstrated the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Although Defendant has shown it was not the direct seller of the Sierra to Plaintiff [Defense Facts 1-2], this alone does not satisfy its burden for summary judgment.

Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff can sue a third-party manufacturer, such as Defendant here, for breach of an express warranty even in the absence of privity. [Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, 1216-127 (“In other words, while express warranties apply under the Commercial Code only to a seller in privity with the buyer, the buyer may sue a third-party manufacturer for breach of an express warranty in the absence of privity.”); Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 225 (Although a plaintiff who purchased a used vehicle is not entitled to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act’s “refund-or-replace remedy, the beneficiary of a transferrable express warranty can sue a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty to repair defects under the California Uniform Commercial Code.”); Davis v.

Nissan North America, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 825, 838-839 (“[A]lthough the [California Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’)]’s express warranty provision applies only to a seller in privity with the buyer, the UCC does not disturb non-UCC case law allowing a buyer to sue a manufacturer for breach of express warranty even in the absence of privity.”); Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 927, and authorities cited therein (“Strict adherence to privity rules for express warranty causes of action has not been required in the products liability context”).]

The undisputed material facts confirm that Plaintiff bought the Sierra about five months after the initial sale, when it had 6,365 miles on it — both well within the limits of Defendant’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty. [Defense Facts 1-2, 4, 6-9; Plaintiff’s Facts 1-4.] These facts also show that at the time of purchase from Cardinale on August 14, 2023, Plaintiff received the remaining coverage specified in Defendant’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty. [Defense Facts 2, 6-8; Plaintiff’s Facts 1-3.]

A privity of contract is not required for a breach of express warranty claim, and not dealing directly with Defendant does not prevent the claim. Consequently, Plaintiff can pursue a breach of warranty claim under the Commercial Code based on the express warranty issued to the original Sierra owner, which was transferred to Plaintiff upon purchase. [Ibid.; Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 225; Davis, 100 Cal.App.5th at 838-839; Ballesteros, 109 Cal.App.5th at 1216-127.] Further, Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim survives summary judgment because there is a predicate state law violation. [Complaint at ¶ 16.]

Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendant has not fulfilled its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

3. Third Cause of Action.

Defendant moved only for summary judgment and did not move alternatively for summary adjudication. [Defendant’s Notice of Motion at 1:25-2:15.] Because the Court denied the motion relating to the First and Second Causes of Action, the Court must also deny the motion as to the Third Cause of Action. [Homestead Savings v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498 (“Summary judgment is a device for narrowing issues for trial, not a trap for an unwary opponent. If a party desires adjudication of particular issues or subissues, that party must make its intentions clear in the motion...Any gain in efficiency the court might make by adjudicating subissues not targeted by the motion is outweighed by the unfairness to the defending party who has not been properly notified of the danger of such a ruling.”); Jimenez v.

Protective Life Ins. Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 528, 534-535 (trial court erred in entering

judgment on single cause of action where party moved for summary judgment, not summary adjudication); Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 949 (“[B]ecause [defendant] did not move in the alternative for summary adjudication of specified issues, we will not address whether [defendant] may have prevailed on some issues in this case.”).]

Conclusion.

Defendant’s motion is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling.

NOTE RE TENTATIVE RULING

This tentative ruling becomes the court’s order, and no hearing shall be held unless one of the parties contests it by following Rule 3.1308 of the California Rules of Court and Monterey County Local Rule 7.9. Those parties wishing to present an oral argument must notify all other parties and the Court no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing; otherwise, NO ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE PERMITTED, AND THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL BECOME THE ORDER OF THE COURT AND THE HEARING VACATED. You must notify the court by email or by calling the Calendar Department at 831-647-5800, extension 3040, before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing.

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