Campas v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

section 1793.2(b).)” (Ramos v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 220, 224– 225.) In Ramos, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding that defendant manufacturer had violated section 1793.2(b) even though the car was not in for service for more than 30 days on any single repair attempt, and the manufacturer failed to repair the defect so as to conform to the warranty within 30 days. However, the Ramos court also found that the plaintiff was not entitled to replacement of the car or restitution of all amounts he paid to lease the car, as the defect did not substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the car. (Ramos v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, supra, at p. 228.) On the other hand, the Ramos decision does not address the issue of whether a plaintiff could state a claim under section 1793.2(b) where the car was never out of service for more than 30 days on any single repair attempt. The court was only concerned with the type of remedies that plaintiff could obtain where plaintiff only proved up a technical violation under section 1793.2(b), but there was no evidence that the defect substantially impaired the use, value, or safety of the car. (Id. at p. 228.) Defendant did not appeal from the jury’s finding that it violated the 30-day repair requirement under section 1793.2(b), so the Court of Appeal did not consider the issue of whether there must be a single attempt to repair that goes on for more than 30 days in order to violate the statute. Cases are not authority for propositions that they do not consider. (McConnell v. Advantest America, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 596, 611.) Thus, plaintiff’s citation to Ramos is not dispositive of the question of whether a plaintiff can prevail on a section 1793.2(b) claim where their car was never in for service for more than 30 days on any single repair attempt. Defendant cites to Schick v. BMW of North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2020) 801 F. App’x 519, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, “[u]nder California Civil Code § 1793.2(b), BMW was obligated to ‘service[] or repair[] [the car’s windows] so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.’ Schick and Huber claim that BMW violated this statutory provision because the car windows did not work for a total of more than 30 days. However, under any reasonable reading of the statute, § 1793.2(b) requires only that BMW complete any single repair attempt within 30 days. Because BMW never took longer than 30 days to complete any single repair attempt, this claim fails as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 521.) Defendant also cites to the United States District Court’s decision in Dean-Adolph v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (C.D. Cal. 2022) 2022 WL 815856, which followed Schick’s holding that, in order to state a claim under section 1793.2(b), a single repair attempt must take defendant more than 30 days to complete. (Id. at * 3.) However, federal court decisions are not binding on California courts as to matters of California law, so this court is not obligated to follow the federal courts’ decisions here. Instead, the court must decide for itself whether the plain language of the statute allows plaintiff to state a claim under section 1793.2(b) where no single attempt to repair took more than 30 days. Also, there is another recent decision of the United States District Court, Guzetta v. Ford Motor Company (C.D. Cal. 2023) 2023 WL 5207429, which held that the plaintiffs could state a violation of section 1793.2(b) even where no single repair attempt took

more than 30 days. “Ford contends that because no single repair visit took more than 30 days, the Guzzetta Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for violation of Section 1793.2(b) for failure to service or repair the Vehicle within thirty days. ... Although the Guzzetta Plaintiffs have not alleged that any single repair attempt took more than 30 days, this does not render the FAC deficient. Rather, the statute requires that the Vehicle ‘shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.’ The plain language of the statute does not state, as Ford argues, that it is sufficient to attempt service or repair, be unsuccessful in doing so, and return the Vehicle within 30 days.” (Id. at *6–7, citations omitted.) “The Court therefore finds that the Guzzetta Plaintiffs properly pleaded a violation of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(b) for failure to service or repair the Vehicle within thirty days.” (Id. at *7.) Thus, there is a split of authority in the federal courts as to whether section 1793.2(b) requires a single attempt to repair the vehicle that lasts for more than 30 days, or multiple attempts that extend over the course of 30 days. Again, section 1793.2(b) states, “Unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b).) Examining the plain language of the statute, there is nothing in section 1793.2(b) that requires there to be a single attempt to repair that takes more than 30 days in order to violate the statute. The statute only requires the goods to be “serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” Thus, a manufacturer might make a single attempt or multiple attempts to repair or service a product, and if it fails to repair the product so that it conforms to the warranty within 30 days, then it would have violated section 1793.2(b). There also does not appear to be any policy reason why the Legislature would limit the scope of the statute to only a single repair attempt over 30 days, as opposed to multiple attempts that stretch over 30 days. In fact, if defendant’s interpretation were correct, then the manufacturer could make many unsuccessful repair attempts over the course of months or years without violating the statute, as long as no single attempt took more than 30 days. Such a result would not be consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to protect consumers and ensure that manufacturers make timely and good faith efforts to repair their products under warranty. Therefore, the court intends to find that section 1793.2(b) does not require a plaintiff to prove that there was a single repair attempt that took more than 30 days. A series of repair attempts that cumulatively cover more than 30 days would be enough to show a violation of the statute. Here, there is no dispute that defendant attempted to repair plaintiff’s vehicle on multiple occasions over the course of more than 30 days. 2 Thus, defendant has not met its burden of showing that it is entitled to summary adjudication of plaintiff’s third cause of action, and the court will deny defendant’s motion for summary adjudication.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order

2 Defendant has objected to plaintiff’s declaration submitted in opposition to the motion. The

court intends to overrule the objections. 8

adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: DTT on 5/6/2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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