Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No.: VCU314185 Date: May 19, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman Motion: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion
Facts
In this matter, Defendant moves for summary judgment as to both causes of action for violation of Magnusson Moss Warranty Act and breach of warranty under the California Commercial Code. Defendant states the vehicle at issue is a model year 2020 GMC Sierra 1500 VIN 3GTU9BET0LG318951 ("Subject Vehicle" or "Sierra"), which Plaintiffs John Hernandez, Jr. and Tammy A. Uranday ("Plaintiffs") bought on January 5, 2022. (UMF No. 1.)
Plaintiffs did not buy the Sierra new; Plaintiffs bought it used, with 32,183 miles on the odometer, from Visalia Kia ("Kia") (UMF No. 2.) GM was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Kia, and Kia is not a GM-authorized dealership. (UMF No. 3.) Plaintiffs were not the Sierra's original owner(s). (UMF No. 4.) Fresno Buick GMC delivered the Sierra to its original owner(s) on June 13, 2020, with 3 miles on its odometer. (UMF No. 5.)
In connection with that delivery to the Sierra's original owner, GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty with bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 3 years or 36,000 miles and powertrain coverage for the earlier of 5 years or 100,000 miles. (UMF No. 6.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that the warranty's time-and-mileage limits eliminate Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs' Dispute to UMF No. 6.)
The Warranty's coverages began when Fresno Buick GMC originally delivered the Sierra on June 13, 2020. (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that Plaintiffs' repair presentations were outside all applicable warranty coverage or that GM complied with its warranty obligations. (Plaintiffs' Dispute to UMF No. 7.)
GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the Sierra when Plaintiffs bought the Sierra used in January 2022; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that GM issued back in June 2020. (UMF No. 8.) Plaintiffs dispute that this fact establishes that receiving the balance of warranty coverage bars Plaintiffs from enforcing GM's written warranty as subsequent owners. (Plaintiffs' Dispute to UMF No. 8.)
No timely opposition appears filed. On May 7, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a late opposition and responses to separate statement, adding that "After purchasing the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle to GM-authorized repair facilities on multiple occasions for diagnosis and repair" (AUMF No. 1.) Further, that despite multiple repair attempts, the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit nonconformities. (AUMF No. 2.) Further, that despite multiple repair presentations, the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit concerns requiring further diagnosis and repair. (AUMF No. 3.) Additionally, that Plaintiffs suffered diminution in value and loss of use as a result of GM's failure to repair.
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The Court notes that Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint in response to this Court's ruling on January 27, 2026 as to requiring a commercial code claim to support a claim under Magnusson-Moss.
Authority and Analysis
A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(a).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.)
In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, "[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment..." (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) "In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true." (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.)
However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion "may not be denied on grounds of credibility," except when a material fact is the witness's state of mind and "that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness's] affirmation thereof." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(e).)
Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party "to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c(p)(1).) "[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor." (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)
Second Cause of Action - Breach of Warranty under California Commercial Code
Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated the California Commercial Code, which applies to both express and implied warranties under sections 2313 (express), 2314 (implied warranty of merchantability) and 2315 (implied warranty for fitness of purpose.) However, Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 1187, 1201 notes: "As a general rule, a cause of action for breach of implied (or express) warranty requires privity of contract; 'there is no privity between the original seller and a subsequent purchaser who is in no way a party to the original sale.'" While the Jones court noted exceptions to the rule, none of which appear to be relevant here. (Id.)
Further Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, 1216 notes that "The California Uniform Commercial Code's express warranty provisions are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer" and "Similarly, implied warranties arise under the California Uniform Commercial Code only for a merchant or seller in privity with the buyer." Ballesteros notes that claims under Song Beverly do not require privity, as Song Beverly governs manufacturers warranties.
However, as noted above, there is no claim under Song Beverly here and, as such, the Court finds the privity requirement unmet via the purchase of a used vehicle from a nonauthorized retailer. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle used and therefore is a "subsequent purchaser" who was not a party to the original sale. As such, Plaintiffs lack privity with Defendant GM and the Court finds Defendant has met its initial burden on summary judgment.
First Cause of Action - Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act "authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson-Moss 'calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,' except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule." (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832-833.)
Further, the "...failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitutes a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss." (Id. at 832.) However, Ngo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (9 th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942, 945 notes that these claims "...stand or fall with [the] express and implied warranty claims under state law." The opposition notes that the Commercial Code warranty claim is the basis for the Magnusson Moss Act claim. Having found no express or implied warranty claim above, the Court grants summary judgment as to the first cause of action.
Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings. Re: LVNV Funding LLC vs. Hernandez, Luis