LUBEN vs DAMCO CUSTOMS SERVICES INC., et al.

inferred that a defendant acted with "oppression, fraud, or malice" against the plaintiff within the meaning of Civil Code Sec. 3294. (Coil. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721; Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317.) Wells Fargo moves to strike punitive and/or exemplary damages allegations from the FAC. California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where "the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . ." (Civ. Code Sec. 3294(a).) Because the Court SUSTAINED the demurrer to the fraud-derived causes of action, the motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

SERVICES INC., et al. CASE NO.: 26NWCV01693 HEARING: 8/26/26 @ 9:30 AM #15

I. Defendant Maersk Agency U.S.A. Inc.'s Demurrer to Plaintiff Anthony Adelaide Luben's Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 10 days. II. A Case Management Conference is scheduled for November 17, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Moving Party to give NOTICE. Defendant Maersk Agency U.S.A. Inc. (Maersk) demurs to Plaintiff Anthony Adelaide Luben's (Plaintiff) Complaint as to second cause of action for negligent hiring and third cause of action for premises liability on the grounds that each fails to state any cause of action and that the premises liability cause of action is uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 430.10 subd. (e) and (f).

Background

Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 21, 2024, Plaintiff was operating a tractor-trailer when he picked up a cargo load from the facility located at or near 12811 Excelsior Drive, Santa Fe Springs, California 90670. (Complaint, P. 12.) Plaintiff further alleges that the subject cargo and/or freight ("SUBJECT LOAD") had been packed, loaded, stacked, secured, inspected, handled, and/or prepared for transport by Defendants DAMCO, MAERSK, DIVERSIFIED, LEXMAR, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and each of them, and/or their respective employees, agents, contractors, subcontractors, and/or representatives. (Complaint, P.13.)

As Plaintiff transported the SUBJECT LOAD to its intended delivery destination in Arizona, Plaintiff opened the trailer door and boxes, packages, and/or other cargo comprising the SUBJECT LOAD suddenly shifted, toppled, and/or fell outward from the trailer and struck Plaintiff. (Complaint, P.16.) Based thereon, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: 1. Negligence 2. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention 3. Premises Liability

Legal Standard

The party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading, by demurrer, on several grounds, including the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP Sec. 430.10(e).) A party may demur to an entire complaint, or to any causes of action stated therein. (CCP Sec. 430.50(a).) The complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Flynn v. Higham (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 679.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.

Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP Sec.Sec. 430.30, 430.70.)

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A "demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law." (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) The burden is on the complainant to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully, to obtain an order allowing leave to amend. (McKenney v.

Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78.) "Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law." (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)

Discussion

2 nd CAUSE OF ACTION Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention: An employer may be liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention where it knew or should have known that hiring or retaining an employee or agent created a particular risk of harm, and that particular harm ultimately materialized. (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139-1140.) Maersk argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts regarding the hiring criteria used by Maersk, or about how he acquired any knowledge upon which he pleads deficient hiring practices.

Moreover, Plaintiff pleads no facts about the allegedly negligent employees' work or performance histories that would support the conclusion Defendant should have terminated them prior to the accident. (Memo., p. 6: 22-24.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient for the pleading stage, where Plaintiff is required to plead ultimate facts, not the evidence by which those facts will ultimately be proved. Defendant's demand that Plaintiff plead the specific hiring criteria, employees' work histories, details of their training and supervision, prior incidents, and the evidentiary basis for Defendant's knowledge improperly seeks discovery-level detail at the demurrer stage.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has plead facts sufficient for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. Plaintiff alleges Maersk, among the other Defendants, "employed, retained, contracted with, supervised, managed, directed, and/or controlled the persons responsible for packing, stacking, loading, securing, inspecting, handling, and releasing the SUBJECT LOAD; that those persons were inadequately trained, supervised, monitored, managed, screened, and retained and were unfit, inexperienced, careless, incompetent, and/or otherwise incapable of safely performing their assigned work. (Complaint, P.P. 7-8, 48-49.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew or should have known that the employees' alleged deficiencies created a particular risk that the cargo would be improperly secured, become unstable, and shift, topple, or fall when the trailer doors were opened. (Complaint, P. 50.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants nevertheless failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring, retaining, training, supervising, managing, and monitoring those persons, and that the precise foreseeable risk materialized, causing Plaintiffs injuries. (Complaint, P. 51-56.)

The Court determines that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that a subordinate employee of Maersk was responsible for Plaintiff's injuries. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges how and/or why Defendant knew or should have known that hiring or retaining the employee created the particular risk of harm from collapsing cargo. Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

3 rd CAUSE OF ACTION Premises liability is a form of negligence in which the property owner owes a duty to use ordinary care in the management of the premises to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) "A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence." (Id.) A plaintiff alleging premises liability must demonstrate that: 1) the defendant had a duty because defendant owned, leased, occupied, or controlled the property; 2) the defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; 3) the plaintiff was harmed; and 4) the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm. (CACI 1000; Ladd v.

County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Maersk argues that Plaintiff fails to allege what feature, fixture or condition of Maersk 's California premises was unreasonably hazardous, and he also fails to allege how the alleged hazard in California manifested itself in Arizona, to cause or contribute to the accident in Arizona. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant places undue significance on the fact that Plaintiff was injured in Arizona. But the location where an injury ultimately occurs does not, standing alone, sever the causal connection between the injury and a dangerous condition created by Defendants in California.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to constitute this cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that while the SUBJECT TRAILER and SUBJECT LOAD were at Defendants' California facility and under Defendants' ownership, possession, operation, management, supervision, and control, Defendants and their agents improperly packed, stacked, loaded, braced, secured, inspected, handled, and released the SUBJECT LOAD. (Complaint, P. 7-8, 13- 14, 61-66.) Plaintiff further alleges that the loading dock area, trailer staging areas, warehouse loading environment, freight-handling systems, and loading dock/trailer interface were operated in a manner that created an unreasonable risk that cargo would shift, topple, collapse, or fall when the trailer doors were opened. (Complaint, P.P. 61-62.)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the risk-producing condition was created while the SUBJECT TRAILER and SUBJECT LOAD were at Defendants' California facility and under their control. Defendants then released the trailer for transportation while the dangerous condition remained. The condition traveled with the trailer to its intended destination. (Complaint, P. 64.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 10 days. A Case Management Conference is scheduled for November 17, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Dept.

SE-C. Plaintiff shall file proof of service upon Defendant DIVERSIFIED DATA SYSTEMS, INC. | Home -->)" -->