SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

23CV007918: SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al. 04/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf' First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Frankenstein Motors, Inc.’s (“Frankenstein”) and Bruce McClaskey’s (McClaskey”) demurrer to Plaintiff Kelly Silva’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is overruled.

In this Law action, Plaintiff allege a cause of action for negligent supervision against Frankenstein and negligence per se against Frankenstein and McClaskey. Plaintiff alleges that McClaskey is the “chief executive officer, secretary, chief financial officer, sole director, employee, principal, manager, and sole stockholder” of Frankenstein. (FAC ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that since 2017, Joshua Teagarden has helped McClaskey with the marketing of Frankenstein. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acquired a 1963 Chevrolet C10 (“Truck”) and planned to restore it and brand it as a Frankenstein product. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.)

Plaintiff alleges that McClaskey posted videos on Frankenstein’s Facebook page starting in June 2021 which showed the Truck and discussed work that needed to be done on the Truck and work that has been done (Id. ¶¶ 16-34.) Teagarden was given keys to the Truck at the Frankenstein premises on August 25, 2021. (Id. ¶ 35.) On September 5, 2021, Teagarden was driving the Truck to a truck show with Plaintiff as the passenger. (Id. ¶ 39.) Due to his lack of training, knowledge and skill regarding operation of the Truck, Teagarden caused a motor vehicle collision which injured Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff alleges that McClaskey knew Teagarden was unfit to drive the Truck. (Id. ¶ 57.)

The complaint was filed on September 5, 2023, and the FAC was filed on October 10, 2024.

Defendants demur to the FAC on the basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007918: SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al. 04/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf' First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

Statute of Limitations

According to Defendants, the FAC is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in CCP § 335.1 because the FAC was filed on October 10, 2024, more than two years after the September 5, 2021, accident. Defendants contend that the FAC does not relate back to the complaint because the FAC does not arise out of the same general facts or instrumentality of the complaint. As explained below, the Court disagrees.

Relation-back applies when the amended pleading: (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) rests on the same instrumentality. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409. “In determining whether the amended

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007918: SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al. 04/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf' First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently similar to those alleged in the original complaint, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) A court must determine “whether the original complaint gave the defendant enough notice and scope of the plaintiff’s claim that [the defendant] shouldn’t have been surprised by the amplification of the allegations of the original complaint in the amended one.” (Id. at 279.)

The complaint alleged causes of action for negligence and negligent entrustment against McClaskey and respondeat superior against Frankenstein. The complaint was expressly premised on harm that Plaintiff suffered as a result of being a passenger in the Truck that was in a collision on September 5, 2021. (Comp. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleged that McClaskey performed repairs on the Truck, that McClaskey was negligent with respect to the management of his property, and Plaintiff was injured as a result when the Truck was in a collision. (Id. ¶¶ 13-19.)

Plaintiff alleges that McClaskey negligently allowed Teagarden to drive the Truck despite knowing that Teagarden was unfit to drive the Truck. (Id. ¶¶ 20-25.) Plaintiff also alleged that Frankenstein was responsible for McClaskey’s conduct based on respondeat superior. (Id. ¶¶ 30-36.) The FAC provides additional details regarding how Defendants obtained the Truck, performed repairs, and marketed the Truck. The FAC also provides additional details regarding Teagarden. However, the FAC still alleges that Plaintiff was injured in the collision while a passenger in the Truck on September 5, 2021.

Defendants refers to the fact that the complaint contained causes of action for negligence, negligent entrustment, and respondeat superior while the FAC alleges causes of action for negligent supervision and negligence per se. However, “[a]n amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if it is based on the same general set of facts, even if the plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action.” (Pointe, supra, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 277 [emphasis added].) Indeed, relation back is proper “when recovery under an amended complaint is sought on the same basic set of facts as the original pleading.” (Id. [citation s omitted].)

This test is easily met here. Both the complaint and the FAC seek recovery for injuries that Plaintiff suffered as a result of a collision while riding as a passenger in the Truck which had been restored by Defendants. In each pleading, Plaintiff alleges that Teagarden was negligently permitted to drive the Truck despite his lack of knowledge and training and that Teagarden’s lack of fitness to drive the Truck caused the collision. (Comp. ¶¶ 22- 25; FAC ¶¶ 56-58.) While Plaintiff has added details to the FAC, the FAC seeks recovery on the same basic facts as the complaint.

Defendants’ reliance upon Coronet Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 342, does not assist them. In that case, a complaint was filed alleging that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007918: SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al. 04/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf' First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

the plaintiff was electrocuted by a hair dryer and then filed an amended complaint alleging that the electrocution was caused by a lamp. The amended complaint did not relate back because the “difference between being electrocuted by a hair dryer and being electrocuted by a table lamp is as great as being electrocuted by the hair dryer and being poisoned by some improperly processed food . . .” (Id. at 347.) Defendants argue that the difference between the complaint and the FAC is just as great because the complaint alleged that Plaintiff was injured when an unqualified driver was permitted to drive the Truck and the FAC now alleges that Plaintiff was injured as a result of McClaskey not complying with consumer regulations.

However, the reason the amended complaint in Coronet did not relate back was that “[a]lthough they relate to a single death at a single location they are different ‘accidents’ and involve different instrumentalities.” (Id.) That distinction does not exist here. While true that the FAC alleges that McClaskey “engaged in acts that circumvented industry regulations designed for the safety of the consumer”, the FAC, like the complaint, is premised on allegations that Plaintiff was injured while riding in the Truck driven by a driver that was not qualified to drive the Truck.

The pleadings here involve the same accident and same instrumentality.

Likewise, Defendants’ citation to Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, is also inapplicable. There, an amended complaint did not relate back because it asserted a discrimination claim and “the wrongful conduct described in the discrimination claim does not arise out of the same set of facts that support Kim’s contractual and overtime claims.” (Id. at 169.) To that end, “[t]here was nothing in the first three pleadings concerning disparate treatment, intentional discrimination, Kim’s age or comments or actions related to her age—and no facts concerning replacement hires, let alone their relative ages.” (Id.) By contrast, here both the complaint and FAC allege that the accident occurred after the Truck was repaired/restored and that negligence in allowing Teagarden to drive the Truck caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

As a result, the Court concludes that the FAC relates back to the filing of the complaint. Thus, Defendants’ demurrer on the basis that the FAC is barred by the two year statute of limitations in CCP § 335.1 is overruled.

Second Cause of Action (Negligence Per Se)

It is true that a negligence per se cause of action is not itself a separate cause of action. “Accordingly, to apply negligence per se is not to state an independent cause of action. The doctrine does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute. Instead, it operates to establish a presumption of negligence for which the statute serves the subsidiary function of providing evidence of an element of a preexisting common law cause of action.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285- 86.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007918: SILVA vs FRANKENSTEIN MOTORS, INC., et al. 04/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to plf' First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Defendants argue that this cause of action fails because it is only asserted to create an evidentiary presumption for the first cause of action for negligent supervision which is barred by the statute of limitations. However, the Court overruled Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC premised on their statute of limitations argument and thus the demurrer to the second cause of action on this basis musty be overruled as well.

To the extent Defendants argue that the cause of action fails because it is not a separate cause of action, the demurrer must be overruled. Indeed, while labeled as a cause of action against Frankenstein and McClaskey for negligence per se, as noted by Plaintiff in opposition, the cause of action can be interpreted as setting forth a negligence cause of action against McClaskey in his individual capacity. The label of a cause of action in a complaint is not determinative. (Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511.) “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established.

They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [citations omitted]) The second cause of action alleges that McClaskey owed a duty to reasonably foreseeable guests, that he engaged in acts which circumvented industry regulations, knew Teagarden was unfit to drive the Truck without training, and that McClaskey’s conduct caused Plaintiff’s injuries. (FAC ¶¶ 55-59.)

These allegations are sufficient to set forth a negligence cause of action against McClaskey, despite the label of the cause of action. Defendants make no argument to the contrary.

Defendants’ demurrer is overruled in its entirety.

The Court will not direct Defendants to answer the FAC at this time given the Court’s concurrent ruling granting in part their motion to strike with leave to amend.

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendants’ counsel is ordered to notify Plaintiff’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Plaintiff’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.