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Amended DEMURRER to COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
SF Superior Court - Law & Motion / Discovery Dept 302 - CGC24618908 - December 1, 2025 Hearing date: December 1, 2025 Case number: CGC24618908 Case title: ELBA VAZQUEZ ET AL VS. DAVE'S BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC. ET AL Case Number: | | CGC24618908 | Case Title: | | ELBA VAZQUEZ ET AL VS. DAVE'S BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC. ET AL | Court Date: | | 2025-12-01 09:00 AM | Calendar Matter: | | Amended DEMURRER to COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION | Rulings: | | On the Law & Motion/Discovery calendar for Monday, December 1, 2025, Line 5, DEFENDANT DAVE'S BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC.'S AMENDED DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION.
Defendant Dave's Building Maintenance's first amended demurrer to Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc.'s complaint-in-intervention is OVERRULED.
Elba Vasquez and her spouse Francisco Gonzalez sued Dave's Building Maintenance, Inc. ("DBM") alleging that on November 18, 2022, "Enrique," a DBM employee mopped the stairs at the Yves Saint Laurent, Inc. ("YSL") space and left them wet, and, while she was working as a YSL salesperson, Vazquez slipped and fell on the stairs, suffered injuries and incurred damages. (See Compl. at paras. 9-16.) Vazquez brought claims for negligence and respondent superior. She and Gonzalez brought a claim for loss of consortium.
Subsequently, YSL filed a form complaint in intervention against DBM for general negligence and "[w]orkers' [c]ompensation [s]ubrogation.," As for negligence, YSL alleges the following: "[DBM], themselves or through their agents, negligently created, or through inaction caused to be created, an unsafe condition by mopping stairs and floors and failing to adequately dry the stairs and floors, and failing to place signs or otherwise warn against the wet surfaces. This unsafe condition caused [YSL's] insured's employee injury. [YSL] provided workers' compensation insurance for Elba Vazquez." (CII at p. 4.)
YSL alleges it:has become obligated to pay and has paid to the persons entitled to payment under said policy at least $322,069.21, or an amount to be proven at trial." (Ibid.) "[YSL] has a right of subrogation against Defendant for its payments under its policy of insurance, and pursuant to Labor Code sections 3852 and 3853." (Ibid.) YSL's allegations on the workers' compensation subrogation" are substantially similar. (See CII at p. 5.)
Section 3852 authorizes two types of subrogation claims after workers' compensation benefits have been provided: (1) an employee may sue a negligent third party for damages resulting from an injury and (2) simultaneously, the employer who paid workers' compensation benefits may also bring a claim or lawsuit against that same third party to recover their costs. Section 3853 provides that where an employee or employer involved in a workers' compensation claim brings a civil action against a third party, the other may join the lawsuit as a plaintiff or consolidate their own action with the other before the facts are tried.
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DBM demurs to YSL complaint in intervention under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e). The issue under section 430.10(e) is, taking the facts properly pleaded and properly noticed as true, does the challenged cause of action necessarily fail to state a claim for relief. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
In assessing whether the complaint states a cause of action, the court accepts all properly pleaded material facts, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1161.) The court liberally construes the complaint pursuant to CCP section 452. "[W]hen a complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating that [the Workers' Compensation] Act applies, no civil action will lie, and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer unless it states additional facts that negate application of the exclusive remedy rule." (Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1060.)
(Part 1 of 2, tentative ruling continues in next entry) | |