Premier Liberty Development LLC v. Nguyen

involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.”’ (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

Plaintiff Premier fails to establish its initial burden under CCP 437c.

Rather than plainly addressing elements 1 and 2 for each of the 3 issues for “determination”, Plaintiff merely suggests there can be no triable issue of any material fact because the signature of the beneficiary and substituted trustee was forged. Plaintiff then goes on to argue why the Court can award monetary relief. Notably, these arguments are not raised until page 18 of the motion. Finally, to wrap everything up, Plaintiff concludes, “The practical effect of a judgment for Premier is straightforward: The court would declare that Premier’s trust deed is senior to Velocity’s trust deed, Velocity would repay what it owes from the May 2022 foreclosure sale, and the current owner would retain title free and clear of Premier’s then extinguished lien.” [Motion page 21: 10-13] However, the Court does not find the arguments to be nearly as straightforward as Plaintiff suggests.

Initially, this motion is difficult to analyze. Despite being a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff seeks determination of three issues. But Plaintiff has lumped all the facts and issues together in both the memorandum of points and authorities and the separate statement. Making the analysis more difficult, there is no reference to any undisputed material facts or evidence in either party’s briefing. That is, neither party makes any effort to direct the Court to the facts or evidence it contends supports its claims.

Without such direction, the Court is left to rummage through the papers to construct the evidence in support of the arguments. When faced with a procedural default which makes it more difficult for the trial court to efficiently resolve a summary judgment motion, the court is not required to simply ignore the defect. It is a party’s “duty to direct the court to evidence that supports their claims. It is not the court's duty to rummage through the papers

to construct or resuscitate their case.” (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 75.)

Even if Plaintiff did make arguments relating to each element of each of the three “determinations”, it fails to cite to any evidence in support of those arguments.

Even if Plaintiff had sustained its initial burden on this motion, Defendant has established triable issues of material fact by raising several affirmative defenses.

Defendant argues that the issues as to which Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief all fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff seeks declarations concerning completed historical events, not the resolution of any present controversy. Defendant cites to Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848: “[D]eclaratory procedure operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs. It serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs; in short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather than execute them.”

Here, arguably, as to the first two issues to be “determined”, these have already occurred. No preventative benefit is possible by a Court’s determination relating to issues 1 and 2. This creates a triable issue.

Also, there are triable issues of material fact as to whether a declaration/determination as to the money sought is a proper subject for declaratory relief. As cited by Defendant, “Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs. [Citation.] Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim. [Citation.]” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.)

Furthermore, this Court cannot say WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th

881 requires judgment in favor of Plaintiff as a matter of law.

When Judge Sherman granted a motion for summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiff and denied a motion for Defendant (which was reversed by the appellate court procedurally, NOT on the merits), he relied heavily on the WFG case. “The case of WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, is on all fours with this case and compels a ruling in plaintiff’s favor. The court held that a forged deed is void, and that any deed of trust derived from the forged deed does not result in the new owner or its lender having any valid interest in the property.

Rather, the prior lender still maintains its interest, and cannot be found negligent for failing to monitor the status of title to the property and discover the forged documents earlier. The fact that a new buyer is a bona fide purchaser and its lender acted in good faith without knowledge of the wrongdoing does not change the outcome. The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires the original lender to have been negligent, but the lender was not negligent in failing to discover the forged documents earlier because it had no duty as a matter of law to check the record.”

Here, in opposition, Defendant argues that although a forged instrument is generally void and cannot convey title, California recognizes an exception where the true owner's own negligence contributed to the loss. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, an innocent party may rely on a forged instrument if the original owner's negligence enabled the forgery or otherwise caused the harm. (Civ. Code, § 3543; WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 881; Wutzke v. Bill Reid Painting Service, Inc. (1985) 151 Cal.App.3d 36, 44-45; Crittenden v. McCloud (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 42, 50.

In WFG, the Court did not hold otherwise. Rather, it simply found negligence by the owner of record cannot be predicated on a failure to monitor the public records or to make known the existence of a forgery in some way to prospective grantees or the public generally.

Further, Defendant distinguishes WFG by arguing that in WFG, Wells Fargo was the senior lienholder who was entirely unaware of and had no connection to the fraudulent transaction; the fraud was perpetrated entirely by third parties acting without any nexus to Wells Fargo's conduct. Here, by contrast, Premier's own borrowers, Jimmy Phan and Stephen Nguyen, were the perpetrators of the forgery, and Premier had ongoing, active dealings with these parties, including receiving monthly mortgage payments through March 2017 from parties other than its original borrowers.

Premier's receipt of payments from unknown third parties without inquiry, combined with the fact that title to the Property had been transferred multiple times, created circumstances that a prudent lender in Premier's position would have investigated. Unlike Wells Fargo in WFG, Premier had a direct contractual relationship with the forgers and was receiving the economic benefit of the fraudulent scheme's proceeds.

Defendant further argues that the negligence question, whether Premier's failure to investigate the identity of the parties making payments, enforce the due-on-sale clause, or inquire into the chain of title constituted a breach of a duty of reasonable care, presents a triable issue of material fact that cannot be resolved on MSJ.

A triable issue of material fact exists as to the issue of equitable estoppel/negligence. Although the 2017 case was dismissed while the 2018 case was on appeal, Judge Horn’s order that there was a triable issue of material fact “regarding whether the failure to discover the fraudulent conveyances earlier was negligent is still the law of the case.

There being no objection to either request for judicial notice, both parties’ requests are granted to the extent the documents exist, but not to the truth of the contents therein.

In ruling on the motion, the court need only rule on those evidentiary objections that it deems material to disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).) Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections to

Defendant’s evidence are immaterial to the disposition of the motion.

Defendant to give notice.

109 Quiroz v. Cable Tech Motion to Consolidate Corp., 2023-01340996

110 Shelton v. Children’s Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication – Hospital of Orange GRANTED IN PART County, 2025-01451163 In October 2021, then 15-year-old Makyla Shelton underwent surgery at CHOC to remove a carcinoma on her neck. Doctors Kevin Huoh, M.D. and Gurpreet Ahuja, M.D. informed Makyla and her parents, Rodger and Jill Shelton, that the entire tumor had been removed and the margins were clean or clear. In April or May 2022, an MRI showed a tumor recurrence. Makyla obtained a second opinion at UCLA, where she underwent a second surgery and received radiation treatment.

Makyla, Rodger and Jill Shelton sued doctors Huoh and Ahuja for medical malpractice. These defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment and/or adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) The motions are generally identical and rely on the exact same expert declaration and evidence.

Plaintiffs oppose the motions but request a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery including: the depositions of Dr. Huoh and Dr. Ahuja, the depositions of the pathologists who reported the frozen sections and the final margin status, a person-most-knowledgeable deposition of CHOC concerning the Tumor Board's composition and deliberations, the deposition of the oncologist alleged to have described the situation as "political," and the production of pathology slides and

blocks and imaging studies in a form permitting independent expert review.

First, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs Rodger Shelton and Jill Shelton. In the opposition, Plaintiffs appear to concede that they do not have standing to assert a medical malpractice cause of action against Defendant. Notably, even if Plaintiffs had standing to bring the first cause of action, the cause of action is barred by the one year after discovery of the injury statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5; Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897, fn. 10.)

The Court finds, however, that Defendants have not established that Plaintiff Makyla Shelton is barred from bringing the first cause of action for medical malpractice by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. As a minor, Makyla’s claim is not subject to the one year statute of limitations discussed in the moving papers. (Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883) Summary judgment on Makyla’s claim is DENIED as to this argument.

As to Defendants’ remaining arguments that (1) the care and treatment he rendered to Makyla was well-within the standard of care at all times and (2) no act or omission by them caused Makyla’s claimed injuries, Makyla requests a continuance pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(h). Makyla’s counsel’s declaration identified specific depositions and specific materials her expert witness needed to review. The declaration states that all of this discovery was scheduled to be completed in August 2026. Defendants’ counsel’s declaration states that none of the discovery was even requested before Plaintiffs’ opposition to the MSJ was due.

At the hearing, counsel shall be prepared to provide the Court with the following:

1. A detailed list of the discovery necessary for Plaintiffs’ expert witness to provide a declaration in opposition to the MSJ.

2. Copies of documents (discovery request with proofs of service; copies of letters or emails, etc.)