LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C in the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Richard C. Miadich presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line for Department 8C at (916) 874-8380, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

(833) 568-8864

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendant Regional Management Corporation’s (“Defendant”) motion to compel Plaintiff in pro per Stephen Lohbeck (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate his claims is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact Plaintiff and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

counsel is unable to contact Plaintiff prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on January 15, 2026. Plaintiff alleges that he obtained a consumer loan from Defendant secured by Plaintiff’s vehicle title. The interest rate on the loan was allegedly “extremely high, significantly above what is reasonable or customary for similar consumer loans.” (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that after he missed a single payment due to financial hardship, “Defendant began placing repeated, excessive, and harassing phone calls to Plaintiff.” (Complaint, ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the calls were made multiple times per day, often at inconvenient times, and that Plaintiff’s attempts to confer with Defendant were ignored. The Complaint appears to allege three causes of action: (1) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (2) unfair business practices; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

The subject loan was obtained on May 26, 2023 when Plaintiff executed a Promissory Note and Security Agreement. The 2023 agreement identifies the lender as “Regional Finance Company of California, LLC d/b/a Regional Finance.” (Aguilera Decl., Exh. 1, p. 1.) The 2023 agreement includes an arbitration provision that states, in part:

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. Read this Arbitration Agreement carefully. The Arbitration Agreement will have a substantial impact on the way you and we resolve any dispute which you or we have against each other now or in the future, if you do not reject it. You and we agree to this Arbitration Agreement. Instead of litigation in a court, if any Dispute (as defined below in the section captioned “Types of Claims Covered”) arises between the parties, you and we will resolve the Dispute by binding arbitration if either party elects arbitration.

IF YOU OR WE ELECT TO ARBITRATE A DISPUTE, YOU AND WE WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PURSUE THAT DISPUTE IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY DECIDE THE DISPUTE. ALSO, YOUR AND OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION FROM THE OTHER PARTY IS MORE LIMITED IN AN ARBITRATION THAN IN A LAWSUIT. OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU OR WE WOULD HAVE IN COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION.

Types of Claims Covered. “Dispute” shall have the broadest possible meaning. It includes any claim, dispute, or controversy between you (which shall include any co- signers under this Note) and us that in any way arises from or relates to the loan, the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

Collateral, this Note, or the relationships resulting from any of the foregoing. This includes disputes arising from actions or omissions on or prior to the date of this Note. As solely used in this Arbitration Agreement, the terms “we,” “us”, and “our” mean any of the following (1) the Lender, (2) any subsequent holder of this Note, and (3) each of their parent companies, wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries, affiliates, commonly-owned companies, successors, assigns, and any of these entities’ employees, officers, directors, and agents.

For purposes of this Arbitration Agreement, these terms also mean any third party providing any goods and services in connection with the origination, servicing, and collection of the loan, this Note, or the Collateral, if you name that third party and us as defendants in a single proceeding. “Dispute” includes initial claims, counterclaims, cross- claims, and third party claims. It includes disputes based upon contract, negligence, fraud and other intentional torts, constitution, statute, regulation, ordinance, federal and state law, common law, and equity 9including any claim for individual injunctive or declaratory relief. “Dispute” does not include disputes about the validity, enforceability, coverage, or scope of this Arbitration Agreement or any part thereof (including, without limitation, this sentence, the section captioned “Class Action Waiver,” or the section captioned “Severability”)[;] all such disputes are for a court and not an arbitrator to decide.

However, any dispute or argument that concerns the validity or enforceability of the Note as a whole is for the arbitrator, not a court, to decide.

(Aguilera Decl., Exh. 1, p. 6, emphasis in original.[1])

The arbitration provision also includes an opt-out clause that states:

Right to Reject Arbitration Agreement. You may opt out of this Arbitration Agreement by sending a written notice to us of your election to opt out. Such notice, to be effective, must be sent to us at Regional Finance, Attn: Legal Department, 979 Batesville Road, Suite B, Greer, SC 29651. You must send this notice by certified mail, and it must be received by us not later than 45 days after the date of the Note. Rejecting this Arbitration Agreement will not affect any other provision of this Note. Your rejection of this Arbitration Agreement will not be deemed to be a rejection of this Arbitration Agreement by any person or entity other than you.

(Aguilera Decl., Exh. 1, p. 7, emphasis in original.)

Defendant contends that the arbitration provision is valid and enforceable under both the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”). Defendant asserts that the arbitration provision’s broad definition of covered disputes encompasses Plaintiff’s claims in this action, as they arise out of the loan agreement.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant cannot enforce the arbitration provision because it is not a party to the agreement, since the agreement identifies the lender as “Regional Finance Company of California, LLC d/b/a Regional Finance” (hereafter, “Regional Finance”), while Defendant’s legal name is “Regional Management Corporation.” Plaintiff also contends that the arbitration provision is unenforceable on unconscionability grounds. In a related argument, Plaintiff argues that he did not assent to the arbitration provision.

Plaintiff further contends that Defendant cannot enforce the arbitration provision because it materially breached the loan agreement through its conduct alleged in the Complaint. Finally, Plaintiff argues that public policy supports refusing to enforce the arbitration provision, because Plaintiff’s claims include statutory consumer protection claims and thus a public interest would be served by permitting Plaintiff to proceed in the court.

In reply, Defendant contends that it is the parent company of Regional Finance Company of California, LLC (hereafter, “Regional Finance”), and thus may enforce the arbitration provision by its own terms. Defendant also asserts that it has standing to enforce the arbitration provision on equitable estoppel grounds. Defendant also challenges Plaintiff’s unconscionability, mutual assent, and material breach defenses. Finally, Defendant contends that public policy favors arbitration, and that Plaintiff’s authorities for the proposition that arbitration of statutory consumer protection claims is disfavored are misplaced.

Discussion

Defendant’s Standing

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) If the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, then it must order the case to arbitration unless grounds exist for revocation of the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; 9 U.S.C. § 2.) Thus, “the threshold question presented by every petition to compel arbitration is whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.) This question is governed by state contract law. (Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 402; Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701.)

“Although there is a strong public policy in favor of contractual arbitration, there is no policy compelling anyone to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, the basic rule is that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be bound by it or invoke it—with limited exceptions.” (Soltero v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

Precise Distribution, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 887, 892-893, citations omitted.) The exceptions permitting a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration provision have been summarized as follows:

Nonsignatory defendants may enforce arbitration agreements “where there is sufficient identity of parties.” Enforcement is permitted where the nonsignatory is the agent for a party to the arbitration agreement, or the nonsignatory is a third party beneficiary of the agreement. In addition, a nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The doctrine applies where, for example, a signatory plaintiff sues a nonsignatory defendant for claims that are based on an underlying contract. In such instance, the plaintiff may be equitably estopped to deny the nonsignatory defendant’s right to enforce an arbitration clause that is contained within the contract that the plaintiff has placed at issue.

(Marenco v. DirecTV LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417, citations omitted.)

In its reply, Defendant argues:

Plaintiff asserts claims based on a contractual relationship that he agrees he entered into with Regional Finance – a promissory note. If he intends to assert those claims against the proper party, Regional Finance, he plainly must arbitrate them. If Plaintiff instead intends to assert claims against Regional Management, he could not do so because, as he concedes, his relationship was with Regional Finance, and Regional Management is merely Regional Finance’s parent company[2] that did not enter into an agreement with Plaintiff. But even if he intends to proceed against Regional Management, he would still need to arbitrate those non-existent claims against Regional Management.

(Reply MPA, p. 1:16-23.)

The Court agrees with the general tenor of this argument. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not differentiate between Defendant and Regional Finance; indeed, it appears to treat the entities as one and the same. For example, at one point in the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to Defendant as “Defendant Regional Finance Corporation.” (Complaint, p. 2:33, capitalization altered.) In the caption on the fourth page of the Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the defendant as “Regional Management Corporation d/b/a Regional Finance,” (Complaint, p. 4, capitalization altered), but Defendant’s moving papers do not identify Defendant with a d/b/a signifier.

Plaintiff later alleges, “Defendant Regional Management Corporation, doing business as Regional Finance (‘Defendant’), is a foreign corporation authorized to conduct business in California, including Sacramento County.” (Complaint, p. 4, ¶ 2.) After defining the term, “Defendant” in this manner,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

Plaintiff alleges, “Plaintiff obtained a consumer loan from Defendant secured by Plaintiff’s vehicle title.” (Complaint, p. 4, ¶ 5.) The wrongdoing described in the Complaint is alleged to have been done by “Defendant” only. (See Complaint, pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 6-19.)

“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement, the defendant may enforce the agreement even though the defendant is not a party thereto.” (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614; see Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759 766 [allegations that nonsignatory parties were agents of signatory parties constituted judicial admissions].) Here, Plaintiff’s allegations go beyond agency; Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is the entity from whom he obtained the subject loan. (Complaint, p. 4, ¶ 5.) Thus, Plaintiff essentially alleges that Defendant is a party to the loan agreement containing the arbitration provision. Plaintiff is bound by these allegations and cannot disclaim them to avoid arbitration.

Unconscionability

In California, “the party seeking to avoid the contract must establish both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly-harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results. [Citation.]” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 143-144 [emphasis in original] [internal quotations omitted].) The degree of each type of unconscionability is assessed on a sliding scale, meaning “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to a conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz v.

Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) “Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them. [Citation.] The substantive element has to do with the effects of the contractual terms and whether they are overly hard or one-sided.” (Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 853.)

“The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)

Plaintiff has not met his burden to prove unconscionability. Plaintiff contends that the arbitration provision is adhesive. A contract of adhesion is “a ‘standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492.) Although the arbitration provision seems to be a standardized contract imposed by Defendant, there is no evidence that it was presented to Plaintiff on a takeit-or-leave-it basis. Indeed, the arbitration provision includes an opt-out provision that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

specifically provides that a rejection of the arbitration provision does not affect any other aspect of the loan agreement. (See Aguilera Decl., Exh. 1, p. 7.) The Court finds the present case analogous to the following from the Fifth District Court of Appeal:

In this case, plaintiff failed to show any procedural unconscionability at all. “‘The procedural element focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise. Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a “prolix printed form” drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.’ ” (Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 621 [55 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 818].) Plaintiff did not introduce or rely on any evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, so he could not show inequality of bargaining power, lack of negotiation, or lack of meaningful choice based on those circumstances. He has not presented us with any reason to suppose substantially unequal bargaining power was inherent in his relationship with the seller. Nor does the form of the document itself show procedural unconscionability. The Arbitration Addendum was not set in small type or hidden in a prolix form.

It was printed on a separate page, in ordinary type, with “Arbitration Addendum” at the top, and was signed separately by plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that, because the Arbitration Addendum was a form contract defendant used with many customers, it must have been a contract of adhesion and therefore procedurally unconscionable. But there is no general rule that a form contract used by a party for many transactions is procedurally unconscionable. Rather, “[p]rocedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the disputed clause is presented to the party in the weaker bargaining position. When the weaker party is presented the clause and told to ‘take it or leave it’ without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation, oppression, and therefore procedural unconscionability, are present.” (Szetela v.

Discover Bank, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.) There is no reason in this case to conclude that plaintiff lacked power to bargain. In general, nothing prevents purchasers of used vehicles from bargaining with dealers, even though dealers use form contracts, and nothing in the record shows that plaintiff could not bargain in this case.

(Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)

Similarly, here, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the loan agreement. While Plaintiff as an individual consumer borrower seemingly has less bargaining power than a commercial lender, this is not certain, since Plaintiff could presumably obtain a loan from a different lender, and Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

argument establishing that he has lesser bargaining power. Additionally, the arbitration provision is not buried in fine print; the print is small, but it is no different than the font size of the rest of the loan agreement, and the arbitration provision is found on two standalone pages, with the terms enclosed in a box, and with certain terms bolded and capitalized. Finally, although the arbitration provision appears to be a standardized, preprinted form agreement drafted by Defendant, it contains an opt-out provision and thus was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that he was precluded from negotiating terms. Like consumers of used cars, nothing inherently prevents a borrower from bargaining with a lender.

Thus, Plaintiff has not established procedural unconscionability. Since Plaintiff’s burden requires establishing both procedural and substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff has not met his burden.[3]

Material Breach

“When a party’s failure to perform a contractual obligation constitutes a material breach of the contract, the other party may be discharged from its duty to perform under the contract.” (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) Brown is the only authority cited by Plaintiff in arguing that Defendant cannot enforce the arbitration provision because it breached the loan agreement through its conduct alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of breach and has not pointed to any term of the agreement that Defendant breached. Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. The arbitration provision is a standalone agreement, and even if Defendant breached the loan agreement, that would not preclude Defendant from enforcing the arbitration provision. (See Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 317-318.)

Public Policy

Plaintiff cites McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, without a specific page number or any explanation of the case and its applicability to this case. The Supreme Court in McGill did state: “Agreements to arbitrate claims for public injunctive relief under the CLRA, the UCL, or the false advertising law are not enforceable in California.” (Id. at p. 956.) Plaintiff does not seek public injunctive relief under his UCL claim, and even if he did, this would not necessarily preclude arbitration of his other claims.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002443: LOHBECK vs REGIONAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings in Department 8C

This case is STAYED in its entirety pending completion of the arbitration.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Ms. Aguilera also submits that, in March of 2026, after this action was filed, Plaintiff executed a second

Promissory Note and Security Agreement. Defendant asserts that the 2026 agreement was obtained to pay off the balance of the 2023 loan. The 2026 agreement also identifies the lender as “Regional Finance Company of California, LLC d/b/a Regional Finance.” (Aguilera Decl., Exh. 2, p. 1.) The 2026 agreement contains an identical arbitration provision. (Aguilera Decl., Exh. 2, p. 6.) Defendant mentions the 2026 agreement only briefly in its moving and reply papers, and the Court does not deem it necessary to discuss it in this ruling. [2] Although Defendant asserts in its reply brief that it is the parent company of Regional Finance, Defendant has not

submitted any evidence of this fact. In a footnote, Defendant asserts “Regional Management’s public Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-k filings show that it is the parent company of Regional Finance.” (Reply MPA, p. 2, fn. 1.) Defendant has not submitted a copy of any of these filings. Even if the Court takes judicial notice of Defendant’s 10-k filings, it would only serve as evidence of the existence of the filings, not the truth of their contents. (See Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 556, 571.)

In other words, the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that Defendant’s 10-k filings list Regional Finance as a subsidiary (assuming such filings actually exist), but not that Regional Finance is in fact a subsidiary of Defendant. Even so, as discussed further in this ruling, Defendant has standing to enforce the arbitration provision. [3] Plaintiff also argues the agreement is unenforceable for lack of mutual assent. Plaintiff cites Pinnacle Museum

Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, a case dealing with unconscionability. Plaintiff supports his argument by asserting, without evidence, that he was not given time to review the arbitration provision; the provision was not explained; it was hidden in boilerplate language; and that he was pressured to sign. (See Opp. p. 6:123-126.) These arguments amount to an unconscionability defense, and thus they are rejected for the same reasons discussed in this section.