SYNCHRONY BANK v. CREAM CABAHUG

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

SYNCHRONY BANK, Case No.: CIVSB2607793 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS, FILED BY CREAM CABAHUG, DEFENDANT CREAM CABAHUG Defendant.

VIII. INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff Synchrony Bank filed a complaint against Defendant Cream

Cabahug alleging a single cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges Cabahug

entered into a contract for a credit card but has failed to pay the principle sum of $8,707.80 due

and owing on the card.

Now before the Court is Cabahug’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the

proceedings arguing that Plaintiff’s claim is subject to an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff opposes

arguing that Cabahug has waived her right to arbitration and that arbitration would be too costly.

Cabahug did not reply. After issuing a tentative ruling and holding a hearing on the motion, the

Court now issues its final ruling.

IX. EXPLANATION OF THE COURT’S RULING A. FAA Applies

The evidence shows that the arbitration agreement is subject to the FAA. The provided

arbitration agreement states, “This Arbitration section is governed by the FAA.” (Cabahug Decl.

Exh. A, [resolving a dispute with arbitration, (11. governing law)].) Further, the agreement states

“This Agreement has been accepted by [Plaintiff] in Utah.” (Id., Exh. A, [important information

about this agreement, (governing law)].) Plaintiff does not dispute the applicability of the FAA.

B. An Agreement to Arbitrate Exists

Cabahug meets her burden to show an arbitration agreement exists that covers Plaintiff’s

claim. In California, general principles of contract law determine whether the parties have

entered a binding agreement to arbitrate and the party seeking arbitration bears the burden of

proving the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014)

232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 (Ruiz).) Providing an executed copy of the arbitration agreement

satisfies a defendant’s initial burden. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group

(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058-60 (Espejo).) Upon providing the agreement, “the burden

shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s

existence [such as] by disputing the authenticity of their signature[].” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group

(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere).)

With her motion, Cabahug provides a copy of the Account Agreement she asserts

governs her credit card account. This agreement is the same agreement attached to Plaintiff’s

complaint in support of its breach of contract claim against Cabahug. The agreement states: “If

either you or we make a demand for arbitration, you and we must arbitrate any dispute or claim

between you [...] and us [...] that directly or indirectly arises from or relates to your account,

your account Agreement or our relationship.” (Cabahug Decl. Exh. A [resolving a dispute with

arbitration, (1. claims and parties)].)

Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement or that it relates to

Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff attached the arbitration agreement to its complaint and seeks payment

from Cabahug under the terms of the agreement. (Compl ¶ 6, Exh. A.) The evidence establishes

that Plaintiff’s claim is covered by the arbitration agreement.

Thus, Cabahug has shown that an arbitration agreement exists between the parties that

covers Plaintiff’s claim.

C. Lack of Defense to Arbitration Obligation

Finally, Plaintiff does not present evidence establishing a defense to enforcement of the

arbitration provision. Plaintiff, not Cabahug, bears the burden to establish any defense to

arbitration, including that Cabahug waived her right. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.)

Plaintiff argues that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.5, subdivision (b),

Plaintiff was required to file and serve her motion to compel arbitration within 30 days after

service of Plaintiff’s summons and complaint. Plaintiff is mistaken. Section 1281.5 applies to the

arbitration requirements associated with enforcement of “a claim of lien.” (Code Civ. Proc.

¶ 1281.5, subd. (a).) Section 1281.5 has no general applicability to the time in which a party

must file a motion to compel arbitration beyond lien enforcement. Plaintiff does not seek to

enforce a lien so the 30-day filing requirement of section 1281.5 is inapplicable.

Plaintiff has also failed to provide evidence that Cabahug has otherwise waived her

arbitration rights. While a party’s litigation conduct may result in a waiver of the right to compel

arbitration, such waiver must be shown by “clear and convincing evidence that the waiving party

knew of the contract right and intentionally relinquished or abandoned it.” (Quach v. California

Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 584 (Quach).)

To establish Cabahug’s waiver, evidence is required to show “conduct that is so

inconsistent with an intent to enforce the contractual right as to lead a reasonable fact finder to

conclude that the party abandoned it.” (Ibid.) Other than arguing that Cabahug waited to file the

motion which caused “prejudice to Plaintiff,” Plaintiff makes no evidentiary showing in support

of this argument. Plaintiff does not identify any statements or conduct by Cabahug showing she

intended to relinquish or abandon her right to arbitrate this dispute. Plaintiff filed the complaint

on March 11, 2026. Cabahug filed her motion on May 26, 2026. These facts do not establish

waiver.

Plaintiff also asks that the Court to deny Cabahug’s motion arguing that because it is only

seeking to recover $8,707.80, and the cost of arbitration would be disproportionate to Plaintiff’s

potential recovery. Plaintiff provides no evidence to establish what the costs of arbitration would

be, nor does it provide any authority establishing that cost considerations are a valid contract

defense to an arbitration agreement. Thus, Plaintiff does not meet its burden to establish a

defense to enforcement of the arbitration provision contained in its agreement.

X. CONCLUSION

Defendant Cream Cabahug’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. These

proceedings are STAYED pending completion of the arbitration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court