Do vs. Pham

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants William and Jennifer Young shall give notice of this ruling.

12 Do vs. Pham TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons set forth below, Cross-Defendant Nguyen Nhu Nguyen’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication is DENIED.

Defective Proof of Service

As a preliminary matter, Cross-Defendant Nguyen only filed a proof of service for the separate statement, which shows that it was served on 10/31/26. (See ROA 185). There is no proof of service for the motion, the memorandum of points and authorities, or the declaration of Mr. Nguyen. Nevertheless, Cross-Complainant Pham opposed the motion on the merits and did not raise this defect. Thus, the court will address the merits.

Statement of Law

“Summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at 851.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies the initial burden by submitting undisputed evidence “showing that a cause of action has no merit [because] one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-51.) However, “[t]he defendant must indeed present ‘evidence’."”(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 855, italics original.)

In addition, if a plaintiff has pleaded several theories, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889.) If a defendant fails to meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Dix v.

Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 590, 604 [where the evidence presented by defendant does not meet its burden, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff.]).

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to show, by reference to specific facts, the existence of a triable, material issue as to a cause of action or an affirmative defense. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855; Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.)

The nonmoving party must present substantial evidence in order to avoid summary judgment. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) “In some instances . . ., ‘evidence may be so lacking in probative value that it fails to raise any triable issue.’” (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083- 1084, quoting Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Great American Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 791, 795.) “‘If the plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of proof regarding an essential element of her case, all other facts are rendered immaterial.’” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780, quoting Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 482.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the court must ‘consider all of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom, and must view such evidence and such inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843, citations omitted.) Courts “‘construe the moving party's affidavits strictly, construe the opponent's affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it.’” (Unilab Corp. v.

Angeles-IPA (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 622, 636, quoting Seo v. All–Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201–1202.) A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, and all evidentiary conflicts are to be resolved against the moving party. (McCabe v. American Honda Motor Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1119.) “The court . . . does not resolve issues of fact. The court seeks to find contradictions in the evidence, or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, which raise a triable issue of material fact.” (Johnson v.

United Cerebral Palsy, etc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 754, citation omitted.) “[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted when the facts are susceptible [of] more than one reasonable inference . . .” (Rosas v. BASF Corp. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1392.)

Pham’s Cross-Complaint

“A summary judgment motion is directed to the issues framed by the pleadings”. (Canales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268). The court looks to the pleadings as “the outer measure of materiality” in a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381.)

Pham alleges the following in his Cross-Complaint:

Cross-Defendant Nguyen Nhu Nguyen is a resident of Gardena who offered himself as the artificial spouse for profit to Plaintiff/Cross- Defendant Kim Lien Do. (CC, ¶ 4). Pham discovered Do was in an artificial marriage with Nguyen as part of plot to obtain citizenship for her, her children, and Cross-Defendant Quang. (CC, ¶ 4). Do and Nguyen were married in Vegas on 11/15/15. (CC, ¶ 10).

In May of 2023, Pham was served with the Complaint by Do in this action. The Complaint filed by Do asserts three causes of action for partition of real property, money had and received, and promissory estoppel. According to the Complaint, Do and Pham are the owners of the subject real property commonly known as 13958 Anita Place, Garden Grove, CA 92843, and title to the Anita Place property is currently held as follows: “Kim Lien Thi Do, a single woman as to undivided 60 % interest and Paul B. Pham as to undivided 40% interest, as tenants in common”. (CC, ¶ 27; Compl., ¶¶ 3, 4).

Do alleges that she requested Pham pay $90,000.00, which accounts for Pham’s 40% share of the total deposit of $225,000.00 toward the purchase price of the Property, and to date, Pham has refused to pay his portion of the deposit and has refused to cooperate with Plaintiff’s desire to sell the Property. (Compl., ¶ 15).

In the Cross-Complaint, Pham now seeks reformation of the deed. Pham alleges that Nguyen was legally married to Do at the time the deed was issued. (CC, ¶ 34). He alleges that he must join as defendants in the partition action all persons having or claiming interests of record or actually known to the plaintiff or who is reasonably apparent from an inspection of the property, in the property as to which a partition is sought, pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 872.510. (CC, ¶ 35). He alleges that Nguyen’s acts, omissions, and marriage to Do render him an indispensable and necessary party for the partition and reformation actions. (CC, ¶ 37). Grounds exist for reformation of the deed which Plaintiff asserts for partition (Exhibit B) so that Do, Quang and Nguyen have no interest in the property. (CC, ¶ 39). The deed is allegedly false on its face as

it states “Kim Lien Thi Do, a single woman” when she was married. (CC, ¶ 40).

The only cause of action against Nguyen is the cause of action for reformation. Pham also asserts causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Cross-Defendant Do, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Cross-Defendant Quang, fraud against Cross-Defendants Do and Quang, and unjust enrichment against Cross-Defendant Do.

Reformation

Civ. Code § 3399 states as follows:

When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value.

Pham seeks reformation of the deed, and alleges that Nguyen has been named in this cause of action as a necessary and/or indispensable party because he is legally married to Do, and may have an interest pursuant to the laws governing community property.

Code Civ. Proc. § 762.010 provides as follows: “The plaintiff shall name as defendants in the action the persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.” In Wilson v. Shea (1924) 194 Cal.653, 658, the court held that “in actions for the reformation of agreements all persons whose interests in the subject-matter, legal or equitable, will be affected by the decree are necessary parties. If they do not appear as parties plaintiff they should then be joined as parties defendant.”

Nguyen contends that the reformation cause of action fails because Nguyen has no interest in the property, and provides the following in his separate statement of undisputed material facts (SSUMF):

“I have never met PAUL B. PHAM in person”. (SSUMF 1, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 2). “I have never spoken to PAUL B. PHAM by telephone, video call, or any other verbal medium.” (SSUMF 2, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 2). “I have never corresponded with PAUL B. PHAM via email, text message, social media, or written letter.” (SSUMF 3, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 2). “I never had any discussion or made any representations or

promises to PAUL B. PHAM regarding the real property located at 13958 Anita Place, Garden Grove.” (SSUMF 4, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 3).

“I did not participate in any negotiations, discussions, or agreements involving PAUL B. PHAM regarding the purchase, financing, or maintenance of the Subject” property. (SSUMF 5, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 3). “I never received any funds from PAUL B. PHAM, including but not limited to any portion of the alleged $220,000 down payment or the $150,000 in alleged ‘family support.’” (SSUMF 6, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4). “I am not a party to the Grant Deed for the Subject Property.” (SSUMF 7, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4). “I hold no recorded legal or equitable interest in said property.” (SSUMF 8, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4). “To the extent I may have any interest in the Property by operation of law, I hereby disclaim any and all community property interest, or any other legal or equitable interest, in the Subject Property.” (SSUMF 9, Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4).

However, Pham’s Cross-Complaint does not allege that Nguyen is on the deed. Rather, Pham contends that Nguyen is a necessary party to the reformation cause of action because he is married to Do, who is on the deed. Under such a theory, if the deed were reformed to exclude Do, Nguyen could be a proper party if it can be established that his interest is affected. Nguyen, as moving party, failed to establish why Pham’s claim for reformation fails under such a theory.

In Nguyen’s three-page memorandum of points and authorities, Nguyen only cites to Civ. Code § 3399 in support of his argument that there can be no reformation claim as to him. But Civ. Code § 3399 does not provide that someone such as Nguyen, who is not a party to the deed, is an improper party in a reformation claim. To the contrary, Civ. Code §3399 applies to any “aggrieved party.” Besides Civ. Code § 3399, and his general reference to Code Civ. Proc. § 437c and Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 for the standard on motion for summary judgment, Nguyen cites to no other law or authority in his moving papers.

Under Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(b), the memorandum of points and authorities “must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced.” (CRC 3.1113(b); see Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [holding the trial court is not required to “comb the record and the law for factual and legal support that a party has failed to identify or provide”]; see also Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985 [a court is “not required to examine undeveloped

claims, nor to make arguments for parties”, it is to evaluate “legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made.”]).

Nguyen argues that this cause of action fails because he is not on the deed, has had no communications with Pham, and never received funds from Pham. But Nguyen does not make any argument or cite to any authority challenging Pham’s allegation that Nguyen’s marriage to Do makes Nguyen a proper party to the reformation cause of action.

Nguyen also argues that he has now provided a declaration disclaiming his interest in the property. In support of the instant motion, Nguyen provided a declaration declaring as follows: “To the extent I may have any interest in the Property by operation of law, I hereby disclaim any and all community property interest, or any other legal or equitable interest, in the Subject Property.” (Nguyen Decl., ¶ 4).

However, Nguyen does not ask this court for a judgment stating that he has no interest in the property. Rather, he asks this court to find judgment in his favor and against Pham on the cause of action for reformation. (See Motion, pg. 1).

Pham cites to In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 903, 927, where the court held: “Family Code section 760 [community property statute] does not permit the community property presumption to be rebutted simply by the manner in which a married couple takes title.” In response, and for the first time in his Reply, Nguyen argues that the community property presumption cannot apply because Pham’s own statements establish that Nguyen and Do were not “cohabitating.” However, Nguyen may not raise an entirely new theory for the first time on Reply, particularly where Pham specifically alleged in his Cross-Complaint that Nguyen is a necessary party for the partition action because of the community property presumption under Fam.

Code § 760. (CC, ¶ 8). As the moving party, Nguyen was required to address and develop this theory in his moving papers, and failed to do so. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1538 [“[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.”]).

Pursuant to the foregoing, the court finds that Nguyen failed to meet his initial burden.

Objections

Cross-Defendant Nguyen asserts objections to the declaration of Paul Pham and the declaration of Dale Washington. The court declines to rule on these objections pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (q), as Cross-Defendant Nguyen failed to meet his initial burden.

Cross-Complainant Paul Pham shall give notice.

13 Gillespie vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Ford Motor Company For the reasons set forth below, the unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants Ford Motor Company and Ken Grody Ford is GRANTED.

Requests for Adjudication

The Motion identifies nine issues for adjudication; however, multiple issues are associated with the same causes of action.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), a party may seek summary adjudication as “to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

Additionally, “[i]f summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1350(b).)

As the Notice of Motion does not identify any specific affirmative defense, claim for damages or issues of duty and, instead, only references the causes of action, the court interprets the Notice as seeking adjudication of each cause of action.

Applying the above herein, the Court will rule on each of the six causes of action and need not rule on duplicative issues, asserting the same claims fail for different reasons.

First Cause of Action: Violation of Civil Code §1793.2(d):

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d), a manufacturer who is “unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle...to conform