HENDERSON vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

subsequent email, rejecting Plaintiff’s request for terms of confidentiality and nondisparagement. (Id., Exh. B.) Thereafter, on February 9, 2026, Flyer replied, “We accept the mutual settlement you have outlined.” (Id., Exh. C.) The next day on February 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Notice of Settlement.

However, here it is undisputed that the proposed Agreement was never signed by either party. (See Assanti Decl., Exh. E (“Proposed Agreement”).) The parties’ attorneys also did not sign the proposed Agreement. (Id.) Moreover, there is no evidence of any oral stipulation before the court. All parties to be bound must agree to the material terms and thus, absent oral assent in open court, a written agreement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 only if signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought and by the party seeking to enforce it. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 305; Gallo v. Getz (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 329, 333.)

Although Defendant relies on BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1220 in seeking enforcement of the unsigned Proposed Agreement, this case is factually distinguishable because the parties there signed a Settlement Term Sheet Agreement after telemediation. (Id. at 1222.)

While Flyer communicated that the parties agreed to a settlement, the parties never finalized the settlement agreement or terms therein. A trial court cannot apply the summary procedure for a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement where not all of the parties signed the settlement agreement. (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 992 [finding error where the trial court enforced a settlement agreement under § 664.6 based on it being “more likely than not” a party had agreed to settle after sending an email indicating acceptance but never signing a formal settlement agreement].)

While Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subdivision (b)(2) does indicate a signature from a party’s attorney will suffice, there is no such signature – only an email mentioning a settlement. There is no enforceable settlement agreement for the Court to enter judgment upon. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME HENDERSON vs CVRI2407151 AMERICAN HONDA MOTION TO COMPEL MOTOR CO., INC. Tentative Ruling:

Moving party: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Responding party: Plaintiff Amber Henderson

Complaint & Allegations. Plaintiff Amber Henderson brings this Song-Beverly action regarding a 2024 Honda Accord Hybrid (the “Vehicle”) that developed defects and nonconformities during the applicable warranty period. On December 31, 2024,

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (or “Honda”) for 3 causes of action:

(1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b)

Court’s May 27, 2026 Order (the “Order”). The Court granted Honda’s motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories (“FROGs’) Nos. 2.6, 12.1, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 17.1, and 50.2, special interrogatories (“SROGs”) Nos. 1-27, 30-33, and Requests for Production (“RFPs”) Nos. 1-31.

On July 10, 2026, this Court denied Honda’s motion to compel a vehicle inspection as untimely due to it being past the discovery cutoff date.

Motion. Honda now moves to compel Plaintiff’s compliance with the Court’s Order. Honda asserts Plaintiff has refused to cooperate, serving unverified, incomplete, and deficient supplemental responses on June 17, 2026. (Williams Decl., ¶5.) Honda also seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,000 per day until Plaintiff complies.

In opposition, Plaintiff points out Honda’s motion is untimely as it was filed after the June 10, 2026 discovery cutoff date. On the merits, Plaintiff maintains she fully complied with the Court’s Order because she served verified supplemental responses. Plaintiff points out the Court’s Order did not require her responses to be served without objections.

In reply, Honda generally repeats its arguments set forth in its moving papers. As to the discovery cut off argument, Honda points out it was impossible for Honda to act diligently because the Court gave Plaintiff until June 27, 2026 to serve further responses, 8 days before the discovery cutoff date. Honda further argues Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050 expressly gives the Court discretion to rule on this motion. However, this is impermissible new evidence in reply and is disregarded. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 [under general rule of motion practice new evidence is not permitted with reply papers and is only allowed in exceptional cases].)

Trial is currently set for August 28, 2026. Hearing on Motion to Reopen Discovery is set on October 15, 2026. On July 15, 2026, this Court denied Honda’s ex parte application to advance the hearing dates on its motion to re-open discovery.

Analysis

III. Standard

Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a section 2031.320 compliance motion does not require a separate statement or meet-and-confer declaration. (Standon Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320, subdivision (a) authorizes the Court to compel compliance where a party that served a statement of compliance “thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (e) authorizes the Court to compel compliance with an order compelling furthering responses to interrogatories.

The moving party’s burden is narrow: once the responding party has agreed to supplement, the only question is whether the responding party has done what it promised. (Standon Co., supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at 903.) Mandatory sanctions are mandatory against the unsuccessful party absent substantial justification or other circumstances making sanctions unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.320, subd. (b), 2030.300, subd. (e).)

IV. Merits

a. Timeliness of Motion/Discovery Cut-Off

Generally, a party is entitled to complete non-expert discovery on or before the 30th day, and motions concerning that discovery are heard on or before the 15th day, before the initial date set for trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a).) Similarly, expert discovery is to be completed on or before the 15th day, and motions concerning expert discovery is to be completed on or before the 15th day, and motions concerning expert discovery are to be heard on or before the 10th day before the initial trial date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (b).)

The parties do not dispute that the discovery cut-off dates and deadlines are based on the July 10, 2026 jury trial date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a).) Thus, the discovery cut off in the present case was July 10, 2026, and the motion should have been heard by Thursday June 25, 2026. “[A] continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (b).) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is UNTIMELY.

Nevertheless, under section 2024.050, subdivision (a), a party may seek leave of court to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. The granting or denial of a motion to reopen is at the Court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050, subd. (b).)

In the published portion of Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1571, the court concluded the trial court “botched its responsibilities under the Civil Discovery Act and prejudicially abused its discretion in granting [plaintiff’s] motion to compel after the discovery motion cutoff date when [plaintiff] had not moved to reopen discovery under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050.” The Court further held that a trial court’s discretion to hear a discovery motion after the discovery motion cutoff date “is governed by section 2024.050, which requires the court to consider various factors in determining whether to hear a discovery motion after the cutoff date. Because the trial court [] did not require [plaintiff] to file a motion to reopen discovery under section 2024.050 before, or

simultaneously with, filing its motion to compel, there is no indication in the record that the court considered any of the relevant factors.” (Ibid.)

Given it is past the discovery cutoff date and there is no motion pending before trial to reopen discovery, it would be an abuse of discretion for the Court to consider Honda’s motion. The motion is DENIED as untimely.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS CVRI2504018 ROWLEY. vs BAILEY COUNSEL FOR DENNIS ROWLEY Tentative Ruling:

Counsel is ordered to appear in person or via Zoom for an in-camera hearing.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MAGDALENO vs JETRO MOTION TO COMPEL CVRI2601771 HOLDINGS, LLC ARBITRATION Tentative Ruling:

Moving party: Defendant Jetro Holdings, LLC Represented by: O’Hagan Meyer LLP

Responding party: Plaintiff Aaron Magdaleno Represented by: Laurel Employment Law

On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff Aaron Magdaleno began his employment with Defendant Jetro Holdings, LLC as a Forklift Driver at their facility in Jurupa Valley. Plaintiff disclosed he had a back issue due to a prior car accident. He was required to work in extreme freezer conditions and move heavy boxes, which exacerbated his back condition. In December 2024 he requested disability leave, which was verbally approved. In August 2025, while on leave, he was terminated with no notice. He was cleared to return to work in December 2025 and in January 2025 when he contacted Defendant to return, he was informed he had been terminated.

On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed his complaint for: 1.) Disability Discrimination (Gov. Code, § 12940(a)); 2.) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation (Gov. Code, § 12940(m)); 3.) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process (Gov. Code, § 12940(n)); 4.) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(h)); 5.) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; 6.) Failure to Provide Employment Records