JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al.

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff Joel Japlit’s (“Plaintiff”) Fifth Cause of Action is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendants’ 12 Undisputed Material Facts, which of Plaintiff’s 12 Additional Material Facts, and/or which written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendant’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1116(b) and (c), requiring deposition testimony offered as an exhibit include “only the relevant pages of the transcript” and be highlighted in a manner that calls attention to the cited testimony.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(f)(2)-(3) requiring citations to supporting and opposing evidence include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(f)(2), requiring the separate statement in opposition to provide a brief description of the “nature of the dispute” for each fact which is “disputed.” (See, e.g., Pl. Resp. to UMF No. 7.)

Moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires that “electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.”

Factual Background

In this “lemon law” action, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a warranty contract relating to a 2022 Honda Civic (“Vehicle”) on April 5, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 6.) He contends that the Vehicle suffers from various defects, including those related to computerized driver-assisting safety system (including lane departure warnings and steering inputs and autonomous braking systems), which can lead to “various subsystems within it to malfunction dangerously while the vehicles are driven,” as they impede “the systems' ability to reliably and accurately detect and appropriately respond to conditions on the roadway, causing malfunctions of the adaptive cruise control, the lane-departure system, and — most severely — the CMBS (the Collision Mitigation Braking System).” (Id., ¶¶ 45, 46.) Plaintiff refers to the alleged defect as the “sensing defect.” (Id., ¶ 46.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant was aware or should have been aware of the sensing defect prior to his purchase of the Vehicle, based on sources not available to consumers, including pre-production and post-production testing data, consumer complaints, aggregate warranty data compiled from Defendant’s network of dealers, testing conducted in response to complaints, and warranty and repair and part replacement data. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant actively concealed and failed to disclose the sensing defect at the time of the sale. (Compl., ¶¶ 49-58.)

Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (2) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (3) violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) fraudulent inducement - concealment.

This matter is currently set for trial on March 15, 2027.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

Moving Papers. Defendant now moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action in the Complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement — Concealment fails as a matter of law because AHM had no direct dealings with Plaintiff and therefore had no duty to disclose additional information to him.

2. Alternatively, Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement — Concealment fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot prove any damages caused by AHM’s alleged fraudulent concealment.

As support for these grounds for summary adjudication, Defendant relies on Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-12.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that he can show triable issues of material fact with respect to Defendant’s assertion that it did not have any “direct dealings” with Plaintiff, and because Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prove damages.

Standards for Summary Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382). The evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must address the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary adjudication “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also, Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is cited above: CRC Rule 3.1350(b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, the Court of Appeal explained that a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

Guided by these principles, the Court will now consider the merits of the present motion and the specific contentions advanced therein.

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff’s objections to evidence are overruled.

Discussion

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant “designed, manufactured, tested, warranted, advertised, distributed, sold, and leased the Honda vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle, which contain a defective computerized driver-assisting safety system” (the “HONDA Sensing” system). (Compl., ¶ 45.) This HONDA Sensing system allegedly “suffers from a defect that causes the various subsystems within it to malfunction dangerously while the vehicles are driven.” (Compl., ¶ 46.) Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment alleges that Defendant had full knowledge of the defects in this system, but instead of finding a solution for the defect, Defendant has acted to conceal the defect from the general public. (Compl., ¶¶ 50-54.)

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.)

“There are 'four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.'” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336, quoting Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 646, 651.) The latter three circumstances, where there is no fiduciary relationship, “presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.” (Id. at pp. 336-337.) “[W]here material facts are known to one party and not to the other, failure to disclose them is not actionable fraud unless there is some relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty to disclose such known facts.” (Ibid.)

The Court addresses each of Defendant's issues for adjudication in turn.

Issue 1 – Direct Dealings Between Plaintiff and Defendant

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot prove that it owed him a duty to disclose for fraudulent concealment because there was no direct transaction between the parties in which information could be disclosed. Defendant argues, in part, that “Plaintiff and AHM had no direct dealings, which is required to impose a duty to disclose on AHM.” (Mov. MPA, p. 14:5-6.) Relying primarily on the case Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, Defendant argues that the allegations in the complaint did not arise from direct dealings between Plaintiff and Defendant, and thus, there is no fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant which would give rise to any duty to disclose.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant marketed Honda Sensing directly to consumers through marketing materials. Plaintiff relies upon Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 for the proposition that a vehicle manufacturer’s warranty relationship with a buyer, formed through the purchase at an authorized dealership, is sufficient to establish the transactional relationship from which a duty to disclose known defects arises. (Opp., p. 6:20-22 [citing Dhital, supra, at p. 844].)

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, no transactional relationship between a vendor and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent omission claim because a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860; see also Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 43, fn. 13 [“Suppose, for example, a seller negligently manufactures and delivers a product under warranty without being aware of a latent defect. Later, the seller learns of the defect, knows it poses a risk of serious harm beyond the parties' reasonable contemplation when they formed their warranty contract, and knows these

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

facts are unknown or not reasonably discoverable by the buyer. If the seller fails to disclose this information or actively conceals it, the buyer may assert an independent tort for fraudulent concealment during performance against the seller, assuming all the other elements of the cause of action can be established. . .”].).) Those are the allegations here, in addition to the allegation that Defendant has a warranty relationship with Plaintiff.

The case law cited by Defendant does not involve such a scenario. In fact, the cited case dealt with the scenario where the manufacturer was not aware that its device was provided to the plaintiff. (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 312-313.) Bigler-Engler made no pronouncement that a warranty does not create a transactional relationship or a direct dealing with the buyer. “It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7.)

Additionally, as recognized by Defendant, a duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judikins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

Accordingly, Defendant fails to meet its initial burden to establish regarding concealment of a material fact. Likewise, Defendant fails to meet its burden regarding duty, to the extent Defendant relies on its assertion that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate concealment of a material fact.

Considering the theory of duty set forth by the allegations in the complaint, Defendant fails to satisfy its initial burden. As such, the motion for summary adjudication on this ground is DENIED.

Issue 2 – Plaintiff’s Damages as the Result of Alleged Fraudulent Concealment

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove fraud damages because he lacks evidence to establish the difference in the market value of the Subject Vehicle and the value of the vehicle he received. According to Defendant, pursuant to Civil Code section 3343, “the measure of damages for a fraud claim is 'the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person has parted and the actual value of that which he received.” (Mov. MPA, p. 16:7-9.) In this regard, Defendant avers that “here, Plaintiff has simply produced no evidence of any damages he allegedly suffered as a result of AHM’s alleged concealment.” (Mov. MPA, p. 17:15-16.)

Defendant further argues that “A defendant moving for summary adjudication ‘may rely on factually devoid discovery responses’ from the nonmoving party to establish a claimant’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

inability to prove an essential element of its claims.” (Mov. MPA, p. 17:11-13 [citing Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal App.4th 582, 587].) Defendant therefore relies on Plaintiff's purportedly “factually devoid” discovery responses in seeking summary adjudication.

In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that: (1) Plaintiff is not required to have a formal appraisal at the summary adjudication stage (citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826, 854); (2) the evidentiary record establishes the need for a damages finding, and the absence of an expert report on damages does not warrant dismissal at the summary judgment stage; (3) Defendant’s case law citations are not persuasive as Defendant relies upon unreported federal law decisions based on federal summary judgment standards; and (4) Plaintiff’s purchase price alone is sufficient to make a showing of damages.

California law generally limits a defrauded party to recovering out-of-pocket damages as provided in section 3343. (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1240.)

Section 3343, subdivision (a) provides:

(a) One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together with any additional damage arising from the particular transaction, including any of the following:

(1) Amounts actually and reasonably expended in reliance upon the fraud. (2) An amount which would compensate the defrauded party for loss of use and enjoyment of the property to the extent that any such loss was proximately caused by the fraud.

“[A]ctual value” within the meaning of section 3343, subdivision (a) ordinarily means “market value.” (Nece v. Bennett (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 494, 497, citing Bagdasarian v. Gragnon (1948) 31 Cal.2d 744, 753 (Bagdasarian).) “[I]n deceit cases the value of an article 'is normally determined by the price at which it could be resold in an open market or by private sale if its quality or other characteristics which affect its value were known.' “ (Bagdasarian, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 753, emphasis added, citing Rest., Torts, § 549, com. c.)

The Court finds that Defendant fails to satisfy its initial burden on summary adjudication of this issue. In this case, under Bagdasarian, the value of the Subject Vehicle in this case would generally be the price at which it could be sold in an open market if all of its defects and limitations were known at the time of sale. Further, Plaintiff may show damages in the form reasonably expended in reliance on the fraud or for losses proximately caused by the fraud. Here,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

Defendant provides no evidence, and no UMFs in its separate statement (see UMFs 7-12), which would persuade the Court that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence of the Subject Vehicle's market value, if Plaintiff had known of all the defects, at the time of purchase, damages incurred in reliance on the fraud, or other out of pocket losses.[1]

Rather, while Plaintiff’s responses to discovery were somewhat factually limited, Plaintiff has identified a measure of damages which has resulted from Defendant’s fraudulent inducement: the value of the vehicle. (See Def’s Ex. 3, pp. 100:15-101:25 [“Yeah, I think it's, from how much I purchased it with the two recalls and what’s happening, and being worried about my safety, if the car will just stall sometime because of the cruise control, I think the value diminished, yeah, pretty much. And it's not worth what I paid for it.”].) Based on these responses, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has failed to identify any measure of damages, nor does the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot reasonably identify further damages. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)

Further, the caselaw relied upon by Defendant does not stand for the proposition that a Plaintiff must identify all damages with specificity in order to survive summary judgment. (Collin v. CalPortland Co., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 587 [finding that factually insufficient discovery responses established that the plaintiff could not obtain evidence which would establish exposure to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product]; Simmons v. Superior Court (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1124 [reiterating the rule that a defendant may rely on factually deficient discovery responses to show that a plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a claim, but not relying on this rule in its findings]; In re Ford Motor Co.

DPS6 Powershift Transmission Products Liaiblity Litigation (C.D. Cal., Oct. 29, 2019, No. 18-ML-2814 AB (FFMX)) 2019 WL 7185524, at *7 [finding that the plaintiff had not established damages on the fraudulent inducement claim where the plaintiff’s moving papers refer only to rescission of the contract, with no discussion of monetary damages]; Nece v. Bennett (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 494, 498 [finding that trial judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be reversed and the matter set for trial where the plaintiff failed to establish the market value of the real property at issue]; In re Ford Motor Co.

DPS6 Powershift Transmission Products Liability Litigation (C.D. Cal. 2023) 689 F.Supp.3d 760, 779 [granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s fraud claims on a separate ground, not as the result of the failure to identify damages].)

The Court finds that Defendant has not met its initial burden to show that Plaintiff cannot establish damages as the result of his claim for fraudulent inducement.

Accordingly, Defendant fails to meet its initial burden, and the motion for summary adjudication on this ground is DENIED.[2]

Disposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

In sum, Defendant's motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] Defendant’s citations to Plaintiff’s deposition and discovery responses which state that Plaintiff had not

yet obtained a formal evaluation are not availing, as this does not establish that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain such information. [2] The Court notes that, in reply, Defendant argues that the economic loss rule bars Plaintiff’s recovery;

such an argument was not clearly articulated in the notice of motion nor the supporting moving papers. Nevertheless, to the extent that Defendant contends that this argument is within the scope of Issue 2, the Court also concludes that it fails.

“[E]conomic loss consists of damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property.” (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.) In some instances, the economic loss rule bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.) “The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise.” (Id. at p. 988.)

As the Supreme Court explained in Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 17 Cal.5th 1, 27:

The guiding and distinguishing principle is this. If the alleged breach is based on a failure to perform as the contract provides, and the parties reasonably anticipated and allocated the risks associated with the breach, the cause of action will generally sound only in contract because a breach deprives an injured party of a benefit it bargained for. However, if the contract reveals the consequences were not reasonably contemplated when the contract was entered and the duty to avoid causing such a harm has an independent statutory or public policy basis, exclusive of the contract, tort liability may lie.

As such, “[a] plaintiff may assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship, if the elements of the cause of action can be established independently of the parties' contractual rights and obligations and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the agreement.” (Id. at 38,)

Nevertheless, the economic loss rule generally does not apply to a claim for fraudulent inducement arising out of precontractual negotiations. (Id. at p. 41 [“[F]raudulent inducement of contract — as the very phrase suggests — is not a context where the ‘traditional separation of tort and contract law’ [citations] obtains. To the contrary, this area of the law traditionally has involved both contract and tort principles and procedures.”]; Dhital, supra,84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 841 [“We now hold that the economic loss rule does not cover such claims” for fraudulent inducement by concealment]; see Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 990; see also Erlich v.

Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 551-552.) Rather, there is independence from the contractual relationship “because a defendant’s conduct in fraudulently inducing someone to enter a contract is separate from the defendant’s later breach of the contract or warranty provisions that were agreed to.” (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 841.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV013523: JAPLIT vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

Here, the Fifth Cause of Action is for fraudulent inducement – concealment, asserting that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced into purchasing the Subject Vehicle. Unlike the facts before the Court in Rattagan, which alleged a fraudulent concealment claim based on the defendant’s performance of a contract, Plaintiff’s claim in this case is based on alleged fraud in the inducement of a contract. Therefore, the fraud claim is not barred by the economic loss rule.