Ashley Loza vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing

34-2022-00329635-CU-BC-GDS: Ashley Loza vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 05/29/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories in Department 53

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs Ashley and John Loza’s motion to compel Defendant American Honda Motors Co., Inc.’s further responses to special interrogatories (set one) is ruled upon as follows.

This Lemon Law action arises out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2017 Honda Pilot (the “Vehicle”). Plaintiff bring a cause of action for violations of the Song-Beverly Act— breach of express warranty. Plaintiffs allege the Vehicle’s transmission is defective.

At issue on this motion is Defendant’s response to special interrogatory (“SROG”) no.

13. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s response is deficient and contains meritless objections.

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that [...] [a]n answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete ..[or] [a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (CCP § 2030.300(a)(1), (3). Evasive and incomplete responses violate the responding party's duty to provide responses that are “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (CCP § 2030.220(a).)

SROG No. 13 asks: If YOU contend the SUBJECT VEHICLE does not qualify for repurchase under the provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, please state all facts supporting YOUR contention.

Defendant interposed numerous boilerplate objections and subject to the objections stated: a response to this interrogatory would necessitate the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of documents, the burden or expense of which is substantially the same for Plaintiffs as it is for AHM. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030.230, AHM refers Plaintiffs to and will produce the following documents applicable to the SUBJECT VEHICLE during Plaintiffs’ ownership: the nonconfidential portion of the service records received from AutoNation Honda Roseville, a business entity separate from and independent of AHM.

Also pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, section 2030.230, AHM refers Plaintiffs to and will produce its Tech Line Contact Report and the confidential portion of the service records received from AutoNation Honda Roseville, which contain information that is confidential, commercially sensitive, and/or proprietary, pursuant to the entry of an appropriate protective order.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329635-CU-BC-GDS: Ashley Loza vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 05/29/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories in Department 53

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a further response is required.

Initially, Defendant contends in opposition that Plaintiffs failed to show good cause for a further response. However, unlike motions to compel further responses to requests for production, the statute allowing Plaintiffs to make this motion does not require a threshold showing of good cause for a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.300.) In any event there is certainly good cause for Plaintiffs to seek a further response regarding Defendant’s own contentions in this action.

To the extent that the substantive portion of Defendant’s response relies on the option set forth in CCP § 2030.230, the response is deficient. CCP § 2030.230 only applies where answering the interrogatory would in fact require the responding party to provide a compilation, abstract, audit or summary of records to answer, that no such compilation exists, and that the burden of preparing the compilation would be substantially the same for the propounding party. (CCP § 2030.230.) Further, the response must refer to the documents “in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (CCP § 2030.230.) “A broad statement that the information is available from a mass of documents is insufficient.” (Deyo v.

Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 784.) Even assuming that Defendant demonstrated that a response to SROG 13, which only calls for facts supporting Defendant’s contention, required a compilation, abstract, audit or summary of records to answer, the burden of preparing that compilation certainly is not the same for Plaintiffs. This is true because the SROG asks for the facts that Defendant contends support Defendant’s own contention that Plaintiffs’ vehicle did not qualify for repurchase. Plaintiffs have no way of knowing what facts Defendant contends support Defendant’s own contention.

These facts are entirely within Defendant’s knowledge and control. In addition, simply referring to repair records is not sufficient because this does not describe the documents “in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (CCP § 2030.230.) Defendant’s use of CCP § 2030.230 is improper in this context. Defendant must provide a substantive response to the SROG which does not rely on CCP § 2030.230.

In addition, Defendant failed to justify even a single objection. As the party opposing the motion to compel further responses, Defendant had the burden to substantiate the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Defendant failed to discuss any of its objections and boilerplate objections must be removed from any further response.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00329635-CU-BC-GDS: Ashley Loza vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 05/29/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories in Department 53

No later than June 12, 2025, Defendant shall provide a further verified response to SROG no.

13.

Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is granted in part as the Court finds that Defendant’s opposition was not substantially justified. As indicated above, Defendant’s reliance upon CCP § 2030.230 is misplaced and Defendant did not justify even a single one of its boilerplate objections. Plaintiffs are awarded monetary sanctions against Defendant, and its counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $810 ($500/hr x 1.5 hrs + $60 filing fee). The monetary sanction is to be paid on or before June 29, 2025. If the sanction is not paid by that date, Plaintiffs may prepare for the Court’s signature a formal order granting the sanctions, which may itself be enforced in the same manner and with the same force and effect as a money judgment. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615 [“monetary sanction orders are enforceable through the execution of judgment laws”].)

Defendant’s request for sanctions is denied as Plaintiffs’ motion was substantially justified as it was granted.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.