Jose Guadalupe Valdes Flores v. Cruz Angel Castro et al

“The appropriate procedural device for challenging a portion of a cause of action seeking an improper remedy is a motion to strike.” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385.)

However, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) As such, in ruling on a motion to strike the Court is required to assume

the truth of the allegations. (See Clausen v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) The Court is to “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Cal., Inc., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 63.) Finally, as to a claim that matters are irrelevant, where a motion to strike is so broad as to include relevant matters, it may be denied in its entirety. (Allerton v. King (1929) 96 Cal.App.230, 234.)

“The civil law is normally concerned with compensating victims for actual injuries sustained at the hands of a tortfeasor. Punitive damages are an exception to this rule. Since 1872, they have been statutorily authorized in actions ‘not arising from contract’ where the tortious event involves an additional egregious component – ‘oppression, fraud, or malice.’ [Citation.] Punitive damages are to be assessed in an amount which, depending upon the defendant’s financial worth and other factors, will deter him and others from committing similar misdeeds. [Citation.] Because compensatory damages are designed to make the plaintiff ‘whole,’ punitive damages are a ‘windfall’ form of recovery. [Citation.]” (College Hospital Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 710-11.)

Thus, to adequately state a claim for punitive damages, a complaint must contain allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civil Code § 3294, subd. (a); Turman v. Turning Point of Central Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Id. at subd. (c)(2).)

Moreover, allegations of these elements must be pled with exactitude. (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Super. Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 27. “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.” (Id. at 29.) Mere conclusory allegations parroting the language of the statute will not suffice to support a prayer for punitive damages. (Smith v.

Super. Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) However, because the Court reads the allegations of the operative pleading as a whole, “[p]leading in the language of the statute is not objectionable when sufficient facts are alleged to support the allegation.” (Perkins v. Super. Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.) An order striking a claim for punitive damages is improper where the complaint provides notice to the defendants of a plaintiff’s “precise claims against them.” (Id. at 7.)

The Court finds that the Complaint contains allegations sufficient to satisfy the applicable pleading standard to support a prayer for punitive damages. (See id. at ¶¶ 2-4, 12, 15-16, 22, 24- 25, 28-31, 34-37, 48-51.) The Court finds that the Complaint also contains allegations sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) that “[w]ith respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (See id. at ¶¶ 4, 12, 15-16, 28-30, 35-37, and 50.)

Entity Defendants variously contend that Plaintiff is unable to “prove” his claims (see, e.g., Support Memo at 8:12-14) and/or “does not present evidence” in support of the motion (see id. at 10:8-11.) At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs is required to neither present evidence nor prove any matters.

Entity Defendants contend that “Plaintiff has not provided any specific facts that the Business Entity Defendants knowingly intended for Defendant CASTRO to cause injury against Plaintiff FLORES. There is no evidence that the Business Entity Defendants had advanced warning that a lawless assault against Plaintiff was actually imminent which the Business Entity Defendants willfully suppressed, or that the Business Entity Defendants had any ability ab initio to stop the assault.” (Support Memo at 8:14-20.)

None of the authority cited by Entity Defendants, however, supports the suggestion that, in order to support a pray for punitive damages, a plaintiff is required to plead that a defendant intended for the injury to occur. While such intention is certainly sufficient to support the prayer, it is not necessary. As the authority cited by Entity Defendants, and the authority discussed above, makes clear, allegations of “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others” or “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civil Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1) and (2).) As noted above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled facts of these elements.

Finally, the Court finds no merit in Entity Defendants’ public policy arguments. Caselaw provides that punitive damages are appropriate in actions against residential landlords and property managers, where “pleadings sufficiently allege facts setting forth long existing physical conditions of the premises which portend danger for the tenants [and] set out that respondents knew of those conditions for up to two years, had power to make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures.” (Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867.) While the details of the allegations here differ in certain respects, the Court finds that the holding in Penner v. Falk is sufficient to foreclose the argument that permitting punitive damages in such circumstances is against public policy.

In The Matter of Cameron Dean Busquaert 26CV001237

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

TENTATIVE RULING: Notice has been properly published and no written objections have been filed. The petition is GRANTED without need for appearance.

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