Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
25CV012535: DAVIS vs JACKSON, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16C
Tentative Ruling
Defendants Joseph Michael Jackson (Jackson) and Patrick Cancillas (collectively, Defendants) motion to strike the punitive damages claim from plaintiff Justin Lawrence Davis (Plaintiff) First Amended Complaint (1AC) is DENIED.
Defendants request for judicial notice is GRANTED insofar as the Court accepts the fact of the documents existence, not the truth of their contents. (See Professional Engineers v. Dept of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590; Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121.)
This is a personal injury action arising from a car accident. Plaintiff alleges that Jackson struck the back of an individuals vehicle, which then struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed the original Complaint alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and negligence on May 27, 2025. The Complaint included a prayer for punitive damages.
On December 2, 2025, the Court granted Defendants motion to strike the punitive damages allegations with leave to amend. The Court found that Plaintiffs Complaint is currently silent on whether Defendants consumption was voluntary, whether he knew he would then operate a motor vehicle, or drove while intoxicated knowing the safety hazards and probable consequences of this conduct. (Minute Order, 12/02/2025.)
Plaintiff filed the 1AC on December 11, 2025.
Defendants again move to strike the punitive damages allegations on the ground that the 1AC fails to allege facts showing that Jacksons intoxication was voluntary, that Jackson intended to drive after drinking, or that Jackson subjectively appreciated and consciously disregarded a probable risk of injury.
In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pleaded by a plaintiff. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962- 963.) In assessing such a motion, the Court notes that the allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike are read as a whole, all parts in their context, and their truth is assumed. (Courtesy Ambulance Service v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1519; Dawes v.
25CV012535: DAVIS vs JACKSON, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16C
Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 91.) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
Punitive damages are available in personal injury actions against one who drives while knowingly intoxicated. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.) There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [citation omitted] One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental facilities with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.
The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver has a history of drunk driving incidents. (Id. at 897-898.) A claim for punitive damages can be premised on despicable conduct involving the consumption of alcoholic beverages. (Id. at 899.) Such alleged conduct demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. (Id.; see also Burg v. Municipal Court, (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 262.)
The 1AC alleges the following:
On June 1, 2024, Defendant Joseph Michael Jackson voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of legal intoxication despite knowing he would operate a motor vehicle on public roadways in Sacramento County. Defendant was fully aware of the extreme dangers associated with driving while intoxicated and nevertheless made a deliberate decision to drive a 2021 Ford Mustang in an erratic, reckless, and dangerous manner at unsafe speeds.
Defendant Jacksons decision to drink and drive was particularly egregious given that he had previously been convicted of [a] Felony DUI on June 15, 2012[,] in the 25th Judicial Circuit Court. This prior conviction placed Defendant on explicit notice of the lethal risks associated with driving under the influence, the criminal consequences of such conduct, and the foreseeable harm to others. Despite this heightened awareness, Defendant willfully chose to disregard the known dangers and again operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Defendants prior felony DUI conviction demonstrates that he not only understood the severe risks posed by drunk driving[,] but had personally experienced the criminal justice systems warnings.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV012535: DAVIS vs JACKSON, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16C
Taken together Defendants voluntary intoxication, his knowledge he would drive, his prior DUI conviction, his willfully reckless operation of a high-powered vehicle, and his conscious disregard of predictable, dangerous consequences Plaintiff alleges Defendant acted with the malice, oppression, and willful disregard required to impose punitive damages.
(1AC, Exemplary Damages Attachment.)
In opposition, Plaintiff contends the 1AC cures the deficiencies the Court identified in its December 2, 2025, Order as the 1AC now alleges Jackson voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of impairment, knowing he would thereafter operate a motor vehicle on public roadways, and that despite his awareness of the dangers of impaired driving including a prior conviction for Felony DUI he willfully drove at unsafe speeds. (1AC, at pp. 5-6.)
On reply, Defendants maintain the allegations are conclusory and unsupported by actual facts to demonstrate Jacksons state of mind before the accident. Defendants also contend the 1AC still fails to allege facts concerning where Defendant drank, the quantity consumed, when he decided to drive, facts demonstrating he appreciated his level of impairment before driving, or facts demonstrating conscious disregard independent of the accident itself. (Reply at 6:6-8.) Defendants insist that nothing in the 1AC differs from the initial Complaint. Further, Defendants argue that if the Court accepts Plaintiffs position, every alleged DUI collision would automatically support punitive damages.
The Court concludes Plaintiff has cured the deficiencies found in the prior pleading. The 1AC now alleges that Jackson voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication despite knowing he would drive and that he was aware of the extreme dangers and safety hazards associated with such conduct. Case law has held that allegations that a defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol, knowing he would then operate a motor vehicle, and drove while drunk, knowing the safety hazard he created and aware of the probable consequences of his conduct which he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid are sufficient under Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d 890. (Busboom v.
Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 550, 552-553.) The 1AC now alleges more than just intoxication. The pleading alleges voluntary intoxication combined with the knowledge of intended driving and awareness of the associated safety hazards, which is sufficient. The Court disagrees with Defendants that something more is required at this stage,
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV012535: DAVIS vs JACKSON, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16C
such as facts regarding where Jackson consumed alcohol, how much was consumed, or when he decided to drive. Only ultimate facts are required at the pleading stage, and the specific facts Defendants cite to, such as where and how much Jackson consumed, would likely not be known to a victim until there is an opportunity to conduct discovery.
Defendants insist the 1AC does not sufficiently allege Jackson knew of the probable dangerous consequences of driving while under the influence because the factual details regarding the 2012 DUI are not alleged; namely, whether the DUI involved alcohol or caused injury. The Court disagrees that such details are required at the pleading stage. The 1AC alleges Jackson was fully aware of the extreme dangers associated with driving while intoxicated and alleges the 2012 DUI served only to heighten that awareness.
Defendants motion to strike is DENIED.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.
NOTICE:
Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:
To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.
Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV012535: DAVIS vs JACKSON, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16C
telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.
The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.
Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.
A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Courts Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporters Office and an official reporter will be provided.
*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”