PATRICIA JEFFRIES, ET AL vs. OLIVER HOSPITALITY, LLC, ET AL

Paragraph 13 alleges: “The CORPORATE DEFENDANT’s allowing their employee, an unlicensed and unqualified driver, to carry passengers on their property with knowledge of Defendant TROUT and DOES 1 through 10’s unlicensed and unqualified status, and

the SUBJECT VEHICLE’s unlicensed status, is a conscious disregard of the law designed to protect foreseeable passengers, including Plaintiffs, from injury.”

Paragraph 21 alleges: “As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs claim prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs do not know the reasonable value thereof but pray that the same may be inserted herein when ascertained.”

Paragraph 22 alleges: “Defendants acted with malice with an intent to cause injury and/or Defendants conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants conduct was despicable in that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages.”

Paragraph 30 alleges: “Defendants acted with malice with an intent to cause injury and/or Defendants conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants’ conduct was either 1) committed by one or more officers, directors or managing agents of Defendants acting on their behalf; 2) authorized by one or more officers, directors or managing agents of Defendants; and/or 3) one or more of Defendants officers, directors, or managing agents of Defendants knew of the conduct and adopted or approved the conduct after it occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages.”

Prayer Paragraph 3 prays for “prejudgment interest, according to law” and paragraph 4 prays for “punitive damages.”

These allegations address two distinct subjects: prejudgment interest and punitive damages. The Court will address each in turn.

A. Prejudgment Interest

To the extent Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), such interest is not available for personal injury claims. To the extent Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest pursuant to section 3288, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a claim for punitive damages. (See discussion below.) To the extent Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest pursuant to section 3291, such interest must be claimed by memorandum of costs. (Jones v. John Crane, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 990, 1012.)

B. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) An award of punitive damages requires “despicable conduct,” meaning behavior that is “vile,” “base,” or contemptible” and that would be “looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people,” in addition to willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others. (College Hospital, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)

A person acts with willful and conscious disregard of the other’s rights when he is aware of the probable harmful consequences of his conduct, and willfully and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896; Spinks v. Equity

Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.) The complaint “must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citations omitted.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

C. Facts in the SAC.

The SAC alleges that Defendant Trout sped down a steep grade, ignored calls to slow down, attempted a drift maneuver. (SAC, ¶ 7.) The SAC goes on to conclude that this “drift” movement was an extreme and dangerous driving maneuver, for which no competent driver would undertake with passengers onboard. (SAC, ¶ 8.)

This is not “conduct that is ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by most ordinary decent people,’” and it is not conduct which has “the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.) With respect to the “conscious disregard” requirement, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing that Trout “’”was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and...willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.”’” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations that Trout did not have a driver’s license, was unfit and incompetent,” and was “not trained or qualified to operate” the vehicle (SAC, ¶ 4) are not facts which show that Trout acted with conscious disregard. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing that one must have a driver’s license or be trained to operate an Evolution Forester or that Trout’s lack of a driver’s license and training contributed to the accident. Further, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing the nature of Trout’s unfitness and incompetence and how it contributed to the accident.

Finally, although they allege the legal conclusion that he violated certain Vehicle Code sections, they do not allege that he was cited for violating those sections. Even if he was, this would not rise to the level of the circumstances which courts have found to be sufficient to support punitive damage claims. (See Taylor, supra, at p. 900, Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 162, and Sumpter v. Matteson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 928, 936.)

As to the Business defendants and respondeat superior liability, Plaintiffs still offer no facts showing that a license and training were required to operate the vehicle. Even if they were, Trout’s unlicensed status, like the vehicle’s lack of registration and licensing, has no apparent connection to the accident, and there are no facts showing that the Business defendants knew that Trout’s lack of training would probably have dangerous consequences. There are no facts alleged showing that the Business defendants were personally guilty of malice when they allowed Trout to operate the vehicle.

Alleging that Trout was permitted to operate the vehicle was “despicable” and with a “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Further, Plaintiffs have not offered any facts as to the nature of Trout’s “incompetence and unfitness” such that it could be said that allowing him to drive the vehicle was malicious. As for the requirement for seeking punitive damages against a corporate employer, Plaintiffs use of “and/or” allegations which the court already ruled were insufficient.

And Plaintiffs also continue to allege no facts as to how the Business defendants authorized or ratified Trout’s conduct.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to strike the following portions of the SAC:

• Pages 4-5, paragraph 13, in its entirety;

• Page 6, paragraph 21, in its entirety;

• Page 6, paragraph 22, in its entirety;

• Pages 7 – 8, paragraph 30, in its entirety;

• Page 8, prayer, paragraph 3;

• and Page 8, prayer, paragraph 4;

is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(A), (B), which provides that if a party wants to present oral argument, the party must contact the Court at (415) 444-7046 and all opposing parties by 4:00 p.m. the court day preceding the scheduled hearing. Notice may be by telephone or in person to all other parties that argument is being requested (i.e., it is not necessary to speak with counsel or parties directly.) Unless the Court and all parties have been notified of a request to present oral argument, no oral argument will be permitted except by order of the Court. In the event no party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the tentative ruling shall become the order of the court.

IT IS ORDERED that evidentiary hearings shall be in-person in Department L. For routine appearances, the parties may access Department L for video conference via a link on the court website. Kindly turn your camera on when your case is called and make sure the party or lawyer making the appearance is properly identified on the screen.

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are responsible for ensuring that they have a good connection and that they are available for the hearing while using the virtual remote courtroom. If the connection is inadequate, the Court may proceed with the hearing in the party’s absence. If it is determined that you are driving your car during the hearing, you will be removed from the virtual courtroom. (Yes, this happens).