Nemmer vs. Renegade RV

“‘[T]he lodestar method vests the trial court with the discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation’ [Citation] and to determine the hourly rates that should be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 246-247.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court . . . . [Citation.]” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.)

Here, it is undisputed that the Song-Beverly Act provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees and that Plaintiffs is the prevailing party. Plaintiffs incredibly request an award of request an order awarding $172,972.56, in a straight forward lemon law case with no law and motion, no substantive motions, no expert discovery, one deposition, and no trial. This amount consists of (1) $112,152.50 in attorney fees; (2) $4,743.61 in costs, and (3) a 1.5 multiplier enhancement.

Lodestar Calculation: Reasonable Rates

This is a straightforward lemon law case that did not involve any challenges to the pleadings, any dispositive motions, any complex discovery issues, any expert discovery, or trial. Indeed, the docket on the 35 case establishes no law and motion matters. Defendant confirms that only one deposition was conducted. Yet, Plaintiff seeks nearly $200,000 in fees, having staffed this simple case with four senior attorneys and seven paralegals with billing rates ranging from $250/hr (for paralegals) to $495- 945/hr (for attorneys).

The court finds that 11 timekeepers on this case is not reasonable. The court finds the following reasoning to be particularly applicable here: “[T]he record demonstrates the highly inefficient manner in which plaintiff litigated her case.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 255.) “[D]espite counsel's experience litigating “hundreds of automotive defect cases involving California's consumer protection statutes, including Song-Beverly,” an astonishing array of 10 different attorneys litigated this case, with multiple attorneys staffed at different times.

Further, counsel's billing entries demonstrate a lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks performed. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that plaintiff's counsel failed to act efficiently.” (Id. at 256.) The court finds that the rates requested are unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

“[A] court reasonably could [] reduce[] rates based on its finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)

Here, the court finds that, after reviewing the billing records, the tasks performed were not complex and there were no complicated law and motion matters (e.g., no demurrers, no motions for summary adjudication/judgment). The discovery that was performed was not complicated and did not include having to prepare for or take any depositions. There was no expert discovery performed. Further, this action did not go to trial or require Plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare trial related papers. Such work could have been done by lower-billing attorneys and/or by paralegals rather than senior attorneys billing $745 to $945/hr.

As for attorney rates, the court finds that the hourly rates sought here for this work is unreasonably excessive for the type of work performed on routine, non-complex, boilerplate lemon law discovery. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250 (reduction of rates is proper when trial attorney spent time on tasks that “should not have required anything more than [a] slight factual modification to [an] existing boilerplate.”)) Based on the straightforward issues raised in this case, that no particularly complicated law and motion matters arose, and that most tasks were routine and/or required a slight modification from existing form discovery, the court finds that a reasonable hourly blended rate is $300 per hour in this case.

Lodestar Calculation: Reasonable Hours

Plaintiffs seek to recover for 195.7 hours of work. Defendant primarily objects to two categories of billings—137.90 hours were billed to interoffice and/or client communications and 48.2 hours were billed to written discovery that Defendant contends were boilerplate.

Having reviewed the record in this case and Plaintiffs’ billing records, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ request is unreasonable on its face. In such a case, te court has discretion to reduce or deny altogether a fee request that appears to be unreasonably inflated. (Serrano, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at 635; see e.g., Morris v. Hyundai (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 28 (trial court may properly reduce fee request by 61%.).

Using this court’s own expertise and considering the straightforward nature of the litigation, its lack of difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case, the court finds that it is reasonable to reduce communication related entries by 95 hours and written discovery entries by 10 hours. (See, e.g., PLCM Group, Inc., 22 Cal.4th at 1096 for the court’s authority to determine the reasonable fees based on its own expertise).

The court, therefore, finds that 85.7 hours of work is reasonable and recoverable (195.7 hours requested – (95+10 hours reduced)).

Lodestar Calculation: Multiplier

In determining whether to apply a multiplier, the court considers a variety of factors that the court did not consider based when determining the lodestar figure, such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132- 1134; Northwest Energetic Servs., LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.)

Here, the declines to award a 1.5 lodestar multiplier. The case is not so novel or difficult and the results recovery is not so outstanding to warrant such a multiplier.

Costs Claim 37

Prejudgment costs must be claimed and contested in accordance with the rules adopted by the Judicial Council. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1034(a).)

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to file a memorandum of costs. However, by the parties’ settlement, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs need not file a cost memorandum to recover costs. Here, Defendant does not object to any of Plaintiffs’ cost items.

As such, the court will allow Plaintiffs to recover the $4,743.81 in costs.

Joinder

Defendant Lipper Components, Inc. filed a joinder in Defendant Renegade RV’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. (ROA #56). The notice of motion, however, seeks an “Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses to Plaintiffs to be Paid by Defendant REV Renegade, LLC.” (ROA # 48 at pg. ii:1-2). As such, Plaintiffs are not seeking any relief against Defendant Lippert Components, Inc.

The joinder is DENIED on this basis.

Summary of Total Award

Based on the court’s findings above, the court awards Plaintiffs total fees award of $25,710 ($300/hr x 87.5 hrs) and a total costs award of $4,743.81. The court, therefore, awards Plaintiffs a total fees, costs, and expenses award of $30,453.81 to be paid by Defendant REV Renegade, LLC, only.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

8 Doe vs. Crossline Plaintiff, an individual moves the court to proceed under pseudonym. Community Church Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

“The names of all parties to a civil action must be included in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.40.)” (Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing. v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 109.) However, “[b]ecause of the inherently sensitive nature of some proceedings, statutes specifically allow for keeping certain parties’ identities confidential. . . Even in the absence of a statute, anonymity for parties may be granted when necessary to preserve an important privacy interest.” (Id. at p. 110.)

“Before a party to a civil action can be permitted to use a pseudonym, the trial court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test: A party’s request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access. In deciding the issue the court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public’s right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur ‘only in the rarest of circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 111–12 (footnote omitted.).)

The Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing court recognized Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (Advanced Textile) as “setting out factors courts should consider in response to a party’s request for anonymity.” (Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at 112.) Specifically, Advanced Textile states courts “have permitted plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in three situations: (1) when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm [citations]; (2) when anonymity is necessary ‘to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature,’ [citations]; and (3) when the anonymous party is ‘compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution,’ [citations].” (Advanced Textile, supra, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068.)

In Poway Unified School Dist. V. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1496, the court held:

Balanced against the public's right to know is the victim's right to privacy. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 676, subd. (b) [barring the public from juvenile court hearings, even on serious crimes, upon request of the victim]; Pen.Code, § 293.5 [analogous protections in criminal proceedings]; § 6254, subd. (f)(2) [allowing a state or local agency compiling law enforcement records to withhold the name of a minor victim of enumerated crimes at the request of his parent]; and § 54961, subd. (b) [Brown Act exception to disclosure requirements in sex crime cases].) People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9, eloquently articulated the privacy concern for these types of crimes:

“There can be little dispute that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of sex offense victims is extremely strong and fully justified. ‘No *1502 crime is more horribly invasive or more brutally intimate than rape.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 53, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9.)

“ ‘Privacy’ is not an insignificant interest -— it is described in our state Constitution as one of our ‘inalienable rights.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) In the context of the victim of a sex offense, 39