Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
to the prevailing party. (Cha Decl., Ex. A.) Pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1032(a)(4) and 1033.5, and Civ. Code § 1717, Plaintiff as the prevailing party may recover attorney fees and costs from Defendants.
The court has reviewed the billing entries provided by Plaintiff and found some items that are excessive. Due to the lack of opposition and reply briefs on this motion, the court will deduct the anticipated $5,000. The court will also deduct $4,357.50 in additional fees it found excessive on a relatively simple summary judgment motion. The court hereby awards reasonable attorney fees of $57,540.50 to Plaintiff. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
The court awards Plaintiff the full $1,695.08 in requested costs as the prevailing party. (Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5; Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.)
The combined total in attorney fees and costs that awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants is $59,235.58.
Plaintiff to give notice.
2. Gonzalez v. General Motors, LLC 24-1426822 Plaintiff Francisco Gonzalez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (“Motion”) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action after settling defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). Pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivisions (d) and (e), as the prevailing party on a lemon law matter, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 967, 998.) Plaintiff’s counsel requests $41,229.50 in attorney fees, plus a 0.15 multiple thereon for an additional $6,184.42 in fees, for a total of $47,413.92 in attorney fees.
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The court, having reviewed the billing entries provided by Plaintiff’s counsel finds the hourly billing rates between $350/hr. and $695/hr. are within the reasonable range. The court finds the hours billed are excessive. The majority of the excessive hours are those entries with dates identified as “TBD” in the billing and are related to un-filed motions to strike/tax costs and oppositions/appearances related thereto. There are several other entries that had somewhat excessive billing which the court also reduced.
Given how uncomplicated this matter was the reasonable attorney fees to be $33,067.50. (PCLM Group, Inc. vs. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-96.) The request for a multiplier is denied as this was not a complicated matter and counsel reasonably spent on average approximately 3.1 hours per month on this case. The court does not find any additional factors would support the need for a multiplier.
The request for costs totaling $2,317.71 is granted as Plaintiff filed a signed memorandum of costs. (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 131.) The burden to object to the costs would be on
Defendant who was required to file a timely objection to said costs. Defendant failed to do. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) As there are no timely objections, nor evidence of a written agreement to extend the objection time, the costs are awarded in full.
The total sum of attorney fees and costs awarded to Plaintiff against Defendant is: $33,067.50 + $2,317.71 = $35,385.21.
Plaintiff to give notice.
3. Diamond PEO, LLC v. Accurate Connections, LLC 19-1082775 (Withdrawn) 4. Cicale v. LoanDepot.com, LLC 26-1544409 Before the Court is the unopposed application of attorney Emily Craiger to appear in this matter pro hac vice as counsel for defendant LoanDepot.com, LLC.
Ms. Craiger has complied with the requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, Rule 9.40. Accordingly, the application is GRANTED.
Counsel for LoanDepot.com, LLC is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
5. Awesome Aminos, Inc. v. Vitapur, LLC 26-1543762 The Motion to Quash Service of Summons filed on 4/20/26 by Defendant Vitapur, LLC (“Defendant”) is DENIED.
Plaintiff Awesome Aminos, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) has met its initial burden to demonstrate facts justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction here. (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393.) Plaintiff has shown that it is and throughout the relevant period was effectively the successor of the contracting entity, Awesome Aminos, LLC (“AA NV LLC”). (ROA 13, Ex. B; ROA 26, Exs. A, B; Geis Decl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 5-7.) Plaintiff has also shown that both entities operated out of California throughout the parties’ relationship. (Geis Decl., ¶¶ 2-7, 10.)
Plaintiff has also shown that Defendant repeatedly shipped product samples to California for approval, that the officer it did business with was in California, and that it knew that Mr. Geis travelled from California for their in-person meetings. (Geis Decl., ¶¶ 1-7, 10.) Plaintiff has thus shown that Defendant’s contacts with California, as to the contract at issue, were of a continuing nature, and that Defendant knew that the customer operated out of California. This action arises directly from those sales.
The circumstances thus demonstrate that Defendant purposefully availed itself of this forum.
The burden therefore shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction here would be unreasonable. It has failed to do so. The Motion to Quash is therefore DENIED.
Both sides’ Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED under Ev. Code §452(c), as to the existence of the records.
Plaintiff is to give notice of this ruling.
6. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Mitchell 25-1498917 The motion of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee for the FLIC Residential