Mark Sivertsen vs Ford Motor Company et al

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard. The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5)). This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559). “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.).

B. CALCULATION FOR FEES In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court considers the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36). The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.).

“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, citations omitted).

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.

It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [cleaned up]).

III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees, cost, and an enhancer in total amount of $20,444.78 based on a $70,000.00 998 resolution of a claim under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Plaintiff’s motion, p. 2). The breakdown of the total amount consists of the following: (1) $12,552.50 in attorney’s fees based on 26.3 hours spent by nine attorneys and two law clerks; (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $4,393.38); (3) $1,498.90 in costs and expenses; and (4) an anticipated additional $2,000.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion. (Id.).

The plaintiff seeks judicial notice of 27 separate documents Exhibits 1-27 to establish various Song-Beverly cases. The court denies this request as it will not take the substance of the document for the truth of the matter and relevancy to the extent that the Court will engage in an individual assessment of the case at hand. However, the Court has reviewed the documents.

Defendant opposes the motion and states that after the plaintiff accepted the 998 offer on July 16, 2026, Plaintiff made no effort to meet-and-confer prior to filing this attorney’s fees motion and did not act in good faith. (Defendant’s opposition, p. 5). Accordingly, defense seeks to strike the 4.2 hours and $1,533.00 in attorney’s fees incurred in preparing the motion. (Id., at p. 11).

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s law firm, Strategic Legal Practice seeks fees and a multiplier in a matter that is not unique, citing that discovery requests were filed similarly in hundreds of other case with only small factual difference such as the vehicle make, model, vehicle identification number, and purchase date. Thus, arguing that this matter did not present any novel or difficult issues; did not require skills that merit a multiplier as the case involved a template complaint, pro forma discovery, and boilerplate responses; did not preclude other employment by the attorneys; and that the contingent nature is part of its practice that is not unique to this case. (Id., p. 5-6).

Defense seeks a total reduction of $8,582.66 based on the following: a 30% reduction for inflated rates on plaintiff’s’ fees for filing the emotion and attending the hearing in the amount of $3,000.00; 30% reduction for unreasonable time from nine timekeepers in the amount of $3,765.75; costs in the amount of $1,498.90; and 0.1 negative multiplier to the remaining fees and costs in the amount of $1,318.01. (Defendant’s Opposition, p. 16).

A. ATTORNEY’S FEES Plaintiff asserts that the 998 offer was obtained after one and half years of litigation, which required the diligent work of plaintiff’s counsel, that included research; drafting a complaint; reviewing defendant’s answer; propounding discovery; responding to written discovery; exchanging expert discovery; attending a case management conference, mediation status conference, trial setting conference; receiving a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication motion and defense’s ex parte application to advance the hearing, receiving a demand for vehicle inspection and notice of deposition of the plaintiff, serving objections to the notice of deposition of the plaintiff and vehicle inspection; and evaluating a 998 offer that was ultimately accepted. (Plaintiff’s motion, p. 7-9; Declaration of Kwok at p. 3-4).

Plaintiff rebuts any allegation that efforts were unnecessary and resulting fees unreasonable on the grounds that plaintiff is entitled to prepare for trial. (Id., at p. 8). Further, the plaintiff contends that “FMC’s [defendant Ford Motor Company’s] conduct forced Plaintiff to incur attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.” (Id., at p. 13). In regard to Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s counsel overstaffed the case, Plaintiff contends that although nine attorneys and two law clerks were staffed on the case, only five attorneys and one law clerk (Richard Kwak, Edward Rodriguez, Breana Rucker, Nino Sanaia, Tyson Smith, and Sanam Vaziri) accounted for 17.3 hours and that tasks were not duplicative. (Id.).

Plaintiff sets forth the experience of SLP attorney’s (Declaration of Shahian, p. 6-16) and also sets forth a Laffey Matrix fees and argues that its fees are lower than attorney’s in this region. The attorney’s rates are submitted as follows:

Primary Case Team Richard Kwak 1-3 $510.84 ($473 x 1.08) $365 Breana Rucker 1-3 $510.84 ($473 x 1.08) $395 Nino Sanaia 1-3 $510.84 ($473 x 1.08) $475 Tyson Smith 11-19 $1,023.84 ($948 x 1.08) $525 Sanam Vaziri 20+ $1,232.28 ($1141 x 1.08) $610

(Id., at p. 16).

Timekeeper Summary Name Year Hours Rate Avelino, Olivia 2025 1.1 $635.00 Carvalho, Tionna 2024 2.4 $595.00 Carvalho, Tionna 2025 3.1 $650.00 Kwak, Richard 2025 4.2 $365.00 Lunn, David 2025 0.4 $695.00 Mejia, Tara 2024 1.0 $395.00 Rangel, Steve 2023 1.0 $285.00 Rodriguez, Edward 2025 2.5 $345.00 Rucker, Breana 2024 2.0 $350.00 Rucker, Breana 2025 1.0 $395.00 Sanaia, Nino 2025 3.1 $475.00 Smith, Tyson 2024 3.0 $525.00 Vaziri, Sanam 2024 1.5 $610.00

(Exhibit 28, Declaration of Shahian, p. 269-272).

Defendant argues that the case settled at mediation after pro forma written discovery and that SLP cannot justify its high hourly rate, “exorbitant time” and staffing spent. (Id., at p. 6). Defendant argues that the number of hours billed is unreasonable due to significant overlap and the basic nature of the case and cites that 11 billers ran up fees. (Id., at p. 8-13). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is unreasonably inflated, padded and layered with multiple timekeepers, boilerplate template work that did not require special skill, inefficient task allocation, and that the amount should not exceed more than $11,862.12. (Id. at p. 6).

The Court has reviewed the briefing and specifically the time entries submitted, and the arguments presented in support of the hourly rates requested. The Court finds that discovery and information gathering regarding basic and template form interrogoatires, special interrogoatires, and request for production, set one is overcharged given the basic nature of the case and reduces the following: 1 hour of work submitted by Breana Rucker in 2024 at the rate of $350.002; 1 hour of work from Tara Mejia in 2024 at the rate of $395.00; and 1 hour of work from Tyson Smith at the rate of $525.00 per hour in 2024. Further given the straightforward nature of the present motion and failure to meet-and-confer which would have accounted for time, the court reduces the fee motion drafting by 2.5 hours by Richard Kwon at the rate of $365.00 in 2025.

The Court GRANTS attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,370.00.

B. COST Plaintiff seeks $1,498.90 in costs and expenses related to litigating and resolving this matter. (Exhibit 28 of Declaration of Shahian).

Defendant opposes the request for costs on the grounds that the plaintiff fails to meet its burden. Defense argues that plaintiff overstaffed the case and seeks unrecoverable fees and specific billing entries in Exhibit 28 demonstrates unreasonable and unreliable calculations. (Defendant’s opposition, p. 13-14). Defense argues that the matter did not involve bespoke pleadings but rather were template non-novel theories similar to the hundreds of other cases that SLP handles. (Id.).

Upon review of the documents, the Court awards $1,498.90 in costs and expenses.

C. MULTIPLIER Plaintiff asserts that a 1.35 multiplier is warranted based on the following: (1) “This excellent result alone merits a multiplier enhancement,” in reference to the $70,000.00 recovery. (Plaintiff’s motion, at p. 16); (2) the risks that non-recovery or delay was substantial. Plaintiff states that having taken the matter on a contingency basis, it assumed the risk of not getting paid at all or for several years. Thus, it seeks a 1.35 multiplier of $4,393.38 to reflect the risk of non or delayed payment. (Id.) and; (3) Plaintiff argues that the delay of payment justifies a multiplier citing that the complaint was filed on January 18, 2024 and it has not been paid for nearly two years. (Id.).

Defendant asserts that a multiplier is not warranted based on the boilerplate nature of the case, straight forward and basic nature of the case that required no special skills, early resolution of the case after template written discovery was propounded, and bulk filing of similar cases. Defense seeks a 0.1 negative multiplier downward of any recoverable fees based on plaintiff’s counsel failure to meet-and-confer and expend resources prior to filing this motion and act in good faith, as well as the fair market value of legal services that should be reduced.

Based on the straight forward basic nature of the case, lack of demonstration of unique work pointing to a novel or difficult issue, type of case handled by SLP in the Song-Beverly matter, and early resolution at mediation absent further discovery (after initial written discovery) and no depositions, or no opposition motion work, the Court does not find that the plaintiff has demonstrated that a multiplier is warranted in this matter. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier.

The Court also DENIES defendant’s request to impose a negative multiplier for Plaintiff’s failure to meet-and-confer about attorney’s fees prior to filing the motion. // //

2 The Court notes a discrepancy in the attorney’s fees amount regarding Breana Rucker in 2024, on p. 272 the amounts in 2024 are listed as $350.00 and increased to $395.00 in 2025, however on p. 271 the rate for discovery and information gathering is listed as $325.00. The sum of $12,552.50 however amounts to $350.00 rate so the Court applies that rate rather than the $325.00 listed. 16

D. ESTIMATED COSTS Plaintiff requested $2,000.00 for anticipated time spent on preparing and submitting a reply brief and appearing for Court. However, the Court notes that no reply brief was filed by the plaintiff. Further, no appearance has yet been made and any appearance if made would not amount to that time on this straightforward motion. Plaintiff has not made a showing to prove this cost.

The defendant’s oppose the $2,000.00 for similar reasons to other fees and costs noted above.

The Court DENIES the anticipated $2,000.00 that was estimated by the plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court awards the plaintiff a total of 11,868.90 that consists of $10,370.00. in attorney’s fees and $1,498.90.

The request for a 1.35 enhancer by the plaintiff is DENIED. The defendant’s request for a negative 0.1 downward multiplier is DENIED. The request for anticipated cost of $2,000.00 addressed above for a reply brief that was not filed is DENIED.

Moving party to prepare the formal Order.

Calendar Lines # 6 Case Name Agnieszka Ayotte et al vs Ford Motor Company et al