ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al.

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Dmitriy Romanyuk’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This is a Lemon Law action arising out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2023 GMC Yukon XL. On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Defendant General Motors, Inc.'s (“Defendant”) failure to repair or repurchase the vehicle, breach of express warranty, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The parties engaged in mediation, and in or around January 2026, the parties agreed to settle the instant case for the amount of $101,509.92 to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s return of the vehicle. (David Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) As part of the settlement, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(d). (Ibid.)

Plaintiff now brings the instant motion, seeking attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $23,930.39, which encompasses $23,300.00 in attorney fees and $630.39 in recoverable costs and expenses. The Law Offices of Jon Jacobs (“Jacobs”), counsel for Plaintiff billed 46 hours in total between March 2025 and present. Plaintiff does not seek a multiplier.

Defendant opposes, disputing the reasonableness of the fees and the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff.

Legal Standard

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

The Song-Beverly Act provides that a court “shall” award a prevailing buyer a “sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794(d).)

Counsel has the burden of showing that the fees were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. (Civil Code § 1794(d); Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal. Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817-18; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v.

BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104); see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 (where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”).)

The general standards and authorities guiding the Court's consideration of this motion are well-established, and will receive summary recitation here. The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the 'lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney's fees under the lodestar method . . . .

Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked, and the tasks performed are sufficient.” (Conception v. Amscam (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) The appropriate hourly rate used to arrive at the lodestar is measured by “the prevailing billing rates of comparable private attorneys as the ‘touchstone’ for determination of that value.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

The Court then determines whether the lodestar should be enhanced or decreased by a “multiplier,” based on factor such as “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.' [Citation.]” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1216.) “There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation.' [Citation.] There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is entrusted to a trial

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

court's sound discretion; any one of those factors may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947.)

Discussion

Billing Rates

The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1094.) The lodestar rate should reflect rates charged in the “community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The trial court “possesses personal expertise in the value of the legal services rendered in the case before it.” (Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 661.) The “trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum, supra, at p. 1132; accord PLCM Group, (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

Plaintiff seeks the following rates for Jacobs’ attorneys: - Chad David (attorney), admitted 2019: $795/hr - Christine Morano (attorney), admitted 2024: $495/hr

The Court reminds Plaintiff that market rates in Sacramento are not the same as market rates in Southern California, regardless where counsel may be located. This case is a Lemon Law action, with no distinguishing characteristics that would support rates higher than market rates. Further, while Mr. David is the managing partner of his firm, he has only been practicing since 2019 and was not in the position of managing partner until January 1, 2026, shortly before the instant matter had settled. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the hourly rates are excessive. The Court will reduce Mr. David's hourly rates to $525/hr and Ms. Morano’s rate to $350/hr.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognizes its ability to award higher out-of-town market rates under certain circumstances, but concludes that Plaintiff has not carried their burden to show that it is appropriate to do so in this case. (See Cordero-Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1286 [evidence of billing rates throughout the state is “of little, if any relevance, and in any case cannot supplant the trial court's expertise” concerning appropriate hourly rate where the litigation actually occurred]; see also Nichols v. City of Taft (2007 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243 [using rates from the local community where the litigation occurred is “an integral

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

part of the initial lodestar equation” and is “one of the means of providing some objectivity to the process of determining reasonable attorney fees”].)

Plaintiff further seeks to recover fees from three paralegals at the rate of $250 an hour. The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable.

Hours Billed

The motion claims $23,300 in attorney fees representing 46 hours of work as follows:

- Chad David (attorney): 20.6 hours - Christine Morano (attorney): .4 hours - Lisa Tyler (paralegal): 4 hours - Sierra Jacobs (paralegal): 5.9 hours - Inigo Gatus (paralegal): 1.1 hours - “Various Admin” (billed at paralegal rate): 9 hours (included in number of hours, but not requested fees/costs) - “Additional Wrap Up Fees” (billed at Mr. David’s rate): 5 hours

Mr. David attached billing records detailing the amounts of time spent by each attorney and the tasks performed by each. These entries span from paralegal intake calls on March 21, 2025, through and including time spent preparing the instant motion.

Absent circumstances rendering an award unjust, a fee award should “ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 897 [emphasis added].) “Generally speaking, hours are reasonable if they were 'reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.'” (Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont. Ed. Bar 3d ed. 2016) § 9.4, pp. 9-10 [quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431].) “Hours that would not be billed to a fee-paying client because they are unreasonably duplicative or excessive for the task performed are not reasonable.” (Id. [citing Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 434].)

The Court has considered the evidence and arguments regarding the reasonableness of the hours expended and claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel in prosecuting the action. Specifically, the Court has carefully reviewed the billing records, all declarations of counsel, and the Court’s own Register of Actions that chronicle the history and progression of this case. Further, the Court has considered Defendant's arguments set forth in its opposition, and finds that many of Defendant's concerns have merit.[1]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

The Court will reduce the fees as follows, which the Court finds to be excessive and/or insufficiently supported as reasonable:

- 2.1 hours of time billed by Mr. David. - 1.2 hours of time billed by paralegals, which includes work unnecessary to the litigation or work that appears to include clerical tasks - 5 hours of anticipated “wrap-up” of the case. The Court declines to award prospective fees which are not supported by evidence and are hypothetical future fees.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the following adjusted hours to represent the reasonable time claimed and expended by Plaintiff’s counsel:

- Chad David: $9,712.50 o $525/hr x 18.5 hours - Christine Morano: $140 o $350/hr x.4 hours - Paralegals (Lisa Tyler, Sierra Jacobs, Inigo Gatus): $2,450 o $250/hr x 9.8 hours - “Additional Wrap Up Fees”: $0

Based on the foregoing, the total base lodestar fee award is $12,302.50. As noted above, Plaintiff is not seeking a multiplier.

Costs

Plaintiff requests $630.39 in costs and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d). Defendant has presented no argument in support of its opposition to Plaintiff’s request for costs. The Court construes Defendant’s failure to oppose Plaintiff’s motion for fees to be a concession on the merits. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4.)

Therefore, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion for costs in the full amount of $630.39.

Disposition

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded $12,302.50 in fees and $630.39 in costs.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV007421: ROMANYUK vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] The Court was not able to ascertain Defendant’s arguments found in Exhibit A to the

declaration of Marissa Rodriguez, which appears to merely highlight items which Defendant disputes without providing any “analysis,” as is represented by Ms. Rodriquez in her declaration. (See Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 16.)