SIR LEXIES LEE and ESTELA LEE FLORES v. THE MELVIN B. JEFFERSON TRUST, et al.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

SIR LEXIES LEE and ESTELA LEE FLORES, Case No.: CIVVS2505215 Plaintiffs, [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ v. (1) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND (2) THE MELVIN B. JEFFERSON TRUST, et al., MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Defendants.

IV. INTRODUCTION

A. The Complaint’s Allegations

On July 29, 2025, Plaintiffs Sir Lexies Lee and Estela Lee Flores filed their Complaint

against Defendants The Melvin B. Jefferson Trust, Cornell Jefferson (Trust); Cornell Jefferson;

and Ress Financial Corporation (Ress). Plaintiffs allege five causes of action for 1) Quiet Title,

2) Fraud, 3) Intentional Interference with Contract Relations, 4) Breach of Contract, and

5) Common Counts.

Plaintiffs allege they own two parcels of real property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino

County. Parcel One is located at 20565 Yucca Loma Road and Parcel Two is 20585 Yucca Loma

Road. Defendant Trust was the previous owner of the parcels. Grantor Melvin B. Jefferson

transferred the properties during his lifetime to Plaintiff Flores. Eventually, Defendant Cornell

Jefferson became the successor trustee of the Trust. Defendant Ress allegedly services the loans

for both properties.

Plaintiffs further allege that after the parcels were deeded to Plaintiff Flores, Plaintiffs

made monthly payments to Melvin B. Jefferson during his lifetime, then to Shirley Jefferson, the

next successor trustee. It is alleged Shirley Jefferson told Plaintiffs not to make payments to

Defendant Cornell Jefferson because he would not be the named successor trustee. Plaintiffs

were not advised as to where to send payments thereafter. Seventeen months after Shirley

Jefferson’s passing, in January 2024, Cornell Jefferson was then named by the court as the

successor trustee. Once appointed, he demanded all payments be made but admitted being

unaware of the exact amount owed. Plaintiffs resumed monthly payments in March 2024. On

April 9, 2024, a Notice of Default was recorded. In a May 20, 2024 letter, Ress stated it was

directed to return payments to Plaintiffs.

In sum, it is alleged that Defendant Cornell Jefferson refused to accept payments on the

loan prior to the Notice of Default but also refused to provide a payment history or current

balance. Ress admitted an accounting error and promised to record a Notice of Rescission, but

failed to do so. Plaintiffs allege the Notice of Default was thus recorded on false and incomplete

payment accounting. Plaintiffs also allege they could not locate or contact Defendant Cornell

Jefferson. Finally, as a result of the Notice of Foreclosure, the tenant at both properties is

refusing to pay rent.

On May 14, 2026, Plaintiffs named Kathy Denise Kellner, Daniel Patrick Massey,

National Realty Group, and Polaris Endeavors, Inc. as Does 1 through 4, respectively.

B. Pending Motions

There are two motions currently before the Court. First, on May 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed

their Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. Then, on June 1, 2026, Plaintiffs filed

their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which is supported by the declarations of Zshonette

Reed, Estela Lee Flores, and Sir Lexies Lee, as well as a Compendium of Exhibits.

On June 18, 2026, Defendants Kathy Denise Kellner and Daniel Patrick Massey; Polaris

Endeavors, Inc.; and Ress Financial filed oppositions to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Ress has also filed a Request for Judicial Notice.

On June 22, 2026, Defendants Cornell Jefferson and the Trust filed an Opposition to the

Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. On June 24, 2026, Plaintiffs filed replies. After

issuing a tentative ruling and holding a hearing on the motions, the Court now issues its final

ruling as to both motions.

V. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

With respect to its Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendant Ress

requests judicial notice of the Notice of Default recorded on February 5, 2025, in the Official

Records of San Bernardino County, Instrument Number 2025-0024108 and its Verified Answer

filed in this case on December 1, 2025. Judicial notice of the existence of recorded instruments

and their legally operative effect is proper; therefore, as to Request No. 1, the Court GRANTS

the request. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) The Court further GRANTS Request No. 2 pursuant

to Evidence Code section 452, subd. (d).

VI. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), the Court has wide

discretion to permit a party to amend a pleading. Judicial policy favors resolution on the merits;

thus, the court will usually liberally grant leave to amend a pleading. (Nestle v. City of Santa

Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) Ordinarily, the court does not consider the validity of the

proposed amendment. Grounds for demurrer or motion to strike are premature. (Kittredge Sports

Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 (Kittredge Sports Co.).) However, the

court undoubtedly has discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to

state a valid cause of action or defense. Such denial is “most appropriate” where the pleading is

deficient, as a matter of law, and the defect could not be cured by further appropriate

amendment. (California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274,

280–81, disapproved on other grounds in Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co.

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 407.)

If a party has been dilatory in seeking an amendment, and the delay has prejudiced the

opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Hirsa v. Superior Ct. (1981)

118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the

trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence or added costs of preparation, an increased burden of

discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-88.)

Here, Plaintiffs move for leave to file a First Amended Complaint on the following

grounds: 1) significant events material to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred after the original complaint

was filed on July 29, 2025, including the September 3, 2025 trustee’s sale conducted

notwithstanding the recorded Notices of Pendency of Action, the recording of void Trustee’s

Deeds Upon Sale in October and November 2025, the unauthorized listing of Parcel Two for sale

during the pendency of this action beginning February 26, 2026, and the wrongful arrest of

Plaintiff Sir Lexies Lee on March 17, 2026; 2) to add 11 new defendants whose identities and

roles were previously unknown, 3) to expand the complaint from five to 23 causes of action

(adding 18 new causes of action arising from post-filing conduct and from legal theories that

became ripe or fully developed through post-filing investigation); and 4) that no prejudice will

result as trial is not scheduled until April 26, 2027, discovery has not yet commenced, and the

new defendants were already on notice of this litigation through the recorded lis pendens and

written correspondence from Plaintiffs’ counsel.

In support of the motion, counsel for Plaintiffs’ Zshonette L. Reed submits a declaration.

In compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), the proposed amended pleading is

attached as Exhibit A. In compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b), Attorney

Reed also describes, in depth, the effect of the amendments, why they are necessary and proper,

when the facts were discovered and why they were not made earlier. (See Reed Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8.) In

sum, Reed details that on August 6, 2025, Notices of Pendency of Action were recorded as to

both properties at issue. On September 3, 2025, Ress conducted a trustee’s sale of both properties

notwithstanding the lis pendens. Counsel also discovered the notary involved is a Ress employee

and acted as a notary in which her employer is a party. Counsel also discovered other successor

trustees after the death of Shirley Jefferson, and counsel discovered additional tenants. On March

17, 2026, Plaintiff Sir Lexies Lee was arrested and charged with first-degree burglary, and

Plaintiff’s family was displaced as a result. (See Reed Decl. ¶ 6.) Attorney Reed also explains

that some of these events only recently occurred and were discovered after she investigated upon

taking over the case in March 2026. (¶ 8.) Trial is not set until April 26, 2027, and discovery has

not commenced. (¶ 9.)

Defendants Cornell Jefferson and the Trust oppose this motion on the grounds it is

untimely, prejudices the defendants, and there is an unlikelihood of success of the proposed

charges. Defendants neither rebut the justifications for the timing of the amendment nor address

the fact that trial is scheduled nine months into the future. Defendants’ arguments on prejudice

are similarly unpersuasive.

Because judicial policy heavily favors resolution on the merits, and trial is not set until

April 2027, Defendants suffer no cognizable procedural prejudice. The motion for leave to

amend is granted.1

VII. MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Applicable Law

Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subd. (a), allows for the issuance of preliminary

injunctions at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint or upon affidavits that show

satisfactorily that sufficient ground exists. Nevertheless, a preliminary injunction is a drastic and

extraordinary remedy that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries

the burden of persuasion. (Mazurek v. Armstrong (1997) 520 U.S. 968, 972.)

A preliminary injunction is appropriate if the party is entitled to the relief demanded and

irreparable harm will result to the applicant if the injunction is not granted. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 526, subd. (a)(2).) The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of

the trial court. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527; IT Corp. v. County of

Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69.) That discretion, however, should be exercised in favor of the

party most likely to be injured. (McCoy v. Matich (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 50, 52.)

In ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction, the court must evaluate two

interrelated factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the movant will prevail on the merits at

trial, and (2) whether the harm to the movant from refusal to grant preliminary injunction

1 The Court deems the First Amended Complaint filed for purposes of this motion only, because Plaintiffs rely on allegations and causes of action in the FAC in support of their motion for the injunction. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve and file the FAC no later than August 3, 2026.

outweighs the harm to the respondent from the imposition of the preliminary injunction. (IT

Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 69-70.) The latter factor involves consideration of the inadequacy

of the other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status

quo. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.)

The mix of these two factors should guide the court in its exercise of discretion — the greater the

showing on one of the factors, the less that must be shown on the other. (Butt v. State of Calif.

(1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) Nonetheless, both elements must be established before a preliminary

injunction is granted. (Ibid.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 526, subd. (a)(2), lists the traditional consideration of

“irreparable harm.” Irreparable harm is often related to the “inadequate legal remedy.” Relief is

unlikely unless someone will be significantly hurt in a way that cannot later be repaired. (People

ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 863, 870-71.)

Injunctive relief is afforded when related to a cause of action in the complaint that affords such

relief. (Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168.) A cause of action must exist

before injunctive relief may be granted, and where the complaint fails to state a cause of action

that would afford injunctive relief, no preliminary injunction can be granted. (Major v.

Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.)

B. Summary of Parties' Submissions

1. Plaintiffs' Position

Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo, arguing they are

likely to prevail on claims for quiet title, cancellation of void instruments, and wrongful

foreclosure based on three independent structural defects:

➢ Prohibited Notarization: The Trustee’s Deeds Upon Sale are void under

Government Code section 8224 because the officiating notary, Angela Groves, was an employee

of the foreclosure trustee, Ress Financial Corporation (“Ress”).

➢ Late Recording: The deeds were recorded 56 and 61 days after the September 3,

2025 trustee sale, missing the 21-day statutory perfection window under Civil Code section

2924h(c).

➢ Defective Notices of Default: The operative Notices of Default stated only the

total outstanding loan balances rather than the specific reinstatement amounts required to cure

under Civil Code section 2924c.

Plaintiffs further argue that the recorded Notices of Pendency of Action (lis pendens) on

August 6, 2025, provided constructive notice to subsequent purchasers Kellner and Polaris,

defeating their claims to bona fide purchaser (BFP) status as a matter of law.

Regarding irreparable harm, Plaintiffs point to the physical destruction of Parcel One

(structural failure, exposure to the elements, and documented squatter break-ins) and the

imminent risk of a third-party sale of Parcel Two, which has been listed on the Multiple Listing

Service (MLS) and leased in violation of this Court’s Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

Plaintiffs also request interim authority to enter and stabilize Parcel One.

2. Defendants' Position

Defendants Kellner, Massey, Ress, and Polaris file separate oppositions, raising three

primary defenses:

➢ Voidable vs. Void Title: Defendants argue that any procedural or notary

infractions render the trustee's deeds merely voidable, not void, which cannot disrupt title

transferred to a BFP.

➢ Extinguishment of Lis Pendens: Relying on the principle of relation back,

Defendants contend that because the underlying deeds of trust were recorded years before the

litigation, the subsequent foreclosure sales extinguished Plaintiffs’ subordinate lis pendens.

➢ Absence of Tender: Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ failure to allege a

credible tender of the secured debt is a fatal condition precedent to any equitable action to set

aside the sales.

Additionally, Polaris argues it did not abandon Parcel One but was halted by this Court’s

TRO while seeking permits to repair vehicle damage. Kellner argues that Parcel Two was used

as a rental property rather than a primary homestead, defeating any presumption of unique or

irreparable harm.

C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs here take issue with the Notice of Default for not allowing them to cure the

default because material terms were excluded. None of the Defendants contest this evidence.

Importantly: “[a] material defect in the notice, such as a gross misstatement of the amount in

default, voids the sale.” (Bernhardt, Cal. Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d

ed. 2004) § 2.22, pp. 72–73.) (Id. at p. 99.) Plaintiffs have therefore provided evidence that

supports voiding the sales. As this evidence is uncontested, and would affect all parties, Plaintiffs

have presented a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

In addition, the BFP status of the purchasers Kellner and Polaris is not established.

Because Plaintiffs present uncontested evidence that the underlying Notices of Default omitted

material reinstatement terms, the foreclosure sales are likely void ab initio. Consequently, the

subsequent purchasers cannot rely on the clean title presumptions of a trustee's sale, and their

interests remain subject to the prior recorded lis pendens. “The main purpose of the recording

laws is “to protect those who honestly believe they are acquiring a good title, and who invest

some substantial sum in reliance on that belief.” Generally, to be a bona fide purchaser for value,

the buyer must (1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and (2) have no knowledge or

notice — actual or constructive — of the asserted rights of another. Ordinarily, a buyer satisfying

those elements “takes the property free of such unknown rights. [Citations.]”” (RNT Holdings,

LLC v. United General Title Ins. Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296.) Here the purchasers

had constructive notice considering the recording of the lis pendens. Therefore, Plaintiffs have

established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, which Defendants have not overcome.

D. Irreparable Harm

As to irreparable harm, Defendants appear to argue that monetary damages are sufficient;

however, Civil Code section 3387 provides that: “It is to be presumed that the breach of an

agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation. In

the case of a single-family dwelling which the party seeking performance intends to occupy, this

presumption is conclusive. In all other cases, this presumption is a presumption affecting the

burden of proof.” While Defendant Kellner contends Parcel Two is a commercial rental,

Plaintiffs’ supplemental declarations establishing their intent to reoccupy the property as their

principal residence trigger the conclusive presumption of irreparable harm under Civil Code

section 3387. (See Lee Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6; see also Flores Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6.) Here, Plaintiffs have

shown irreparable harm and that the balance of hardships weighs in their favor.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion for preliminary injunction, to the extent it

maintains the status quo. Plaintiffs’ request to allow them to enter and maintain Parcel One

pending trial is denied. This would be tantamount to granting them possession of Parcel One at

this time, which would go beyond maintaining the status quo.

E. Bond

A bond was previously ordered for $50,000 but the Court has since waived the bond

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.240. Defendant Kellner requests the Court

require a bond be posted. She maintains the injunction will prevent her from selling the property

that she renovated, which she estimates is worth $400,000. Plaintiffs, however, argue that

Kellner did not move for reconsideration when this Court waived the bond requirement

previously. To the contrary, at the hearing when this issue was considered, none of the parties

objected. The Court exercises discretion to continue to waive the bond requirement.

VIII. CONCLUSION 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs

shall file their First Amended Complaint no later than August 3, 2026.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court