Motion to Compel Arbitration
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” (AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333.) The FAA permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Id.) When deciding whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, courts generally apply “ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.)
On a motion to compel arbitration, the court’s role is limited to deciding: “(1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.” (Brennan v. Opus Bank (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3d 1125, 1130.) If these conditions are satisfied, the court is without discretion to deny the motion and must compel arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 4; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218 [“By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.”].) “[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” (Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 91.)
The Agreement Covers the Claim Asserted by Plaintiffs
Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement with Plaintiff decedent. (Torres Dec., Ex. A.) In covering “any claim, dispute, or controversy arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment with Company, application for employment or the separation of that employment,” the Agreement covers Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.
Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED, and the action is STAYED pending the completion of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
An ADR Review Hearing is set for 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 2026, in Department N16.
Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.
6 Mathews vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Hyundai Motor America For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s unopposed motion to compel Plaintiff Kevin Matthews to arbitration and stay action is GRANTED.
Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452 subds. (d), (h).)
Statement of Law
A court shall order arbitration if it determines an agreement to arbitrate exists, unless the moving party waived arbitration, grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or a party to the agreement is also a party to a pending action involving the same transaction with a third party and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) If the court orders arbitration, it shall, upon motion of either party, stay the action or proceeding until the completion of the arbitration, or until such earlier time as the court specifies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4; Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 620.)
There is a strong public policy favoring arbitration, and any doubts regarding arbitrability are resolved in favor of arbitration, “unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 185.) However, ordinary principles of contract interpretation apply, meaning the court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the claims at issue, the scope of the arbitration clause, and the terms of the arbitration clause. (Id.) In determining the applicability of an arbitration agreement, the court should attempt to give effect to the parties’ intentions, considering the agreement as a whole, and in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the language of the agreement. (Id. at pp. 185-186.)
Application of the FAA
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which includes both procedural and substantive provisions, governs agreements involving interstate commerce.
The FAA states that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The Supreme Court has described this provision as reflecting both a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” (AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333.) The FAA permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Id.)
Defendant contends that the FAA applies because automative sales necessarily involve interstate commerce (citing to United States v. Oliver (9th Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 547, 550). Furthermore, the Warranty provides: “This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.” (Decl. of Ameripour., Ex. 2.)
The court finds that the FAA applies.
The Arbitration Agreement
In support of Defendant’s motion, Defendant attaches as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of counsel the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty”), which contains the following arbitration provision:
BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY
PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS THIS SECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE YOU FROM FIRST PURSUING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH BBB AUTO LINE AS DESCRIBED IN THE “ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION” PROVISION IN SECTION 3 OF THIS HANDBOOK.
If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.
[...]
This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.
In any arbitration, the arbitrator shall be bound by the terms of this agreement and shall follow the applicable law. The arbitrator shall not have the power to commit manifest errors of law, and any award rendered by the arbitrator that employs a manifest error of law may be vacated or corrected by a court of competent jurisdiction for such error. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and us and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others, or issue any award or remedy in arbitration against or on behalf of anyone who is not a named party to the arbitration, as permitted by law.
In other words, you and we may bring claims against the other only in your or our individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action to the maximum extent permitted by law. You and we acknowledge and agree that, to the fullest extent permitted by law, we are each waiving the right to participate as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action lawsuit, class-wide arbitration, private attorney general action, or any other representative proceeding.
If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and must be stayed pending arbitration of the arbitrable claims and remedies. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement cannot be enforced as to a particular request for public injunctive relief, then that request for public injunctive relief (and only that request for public injunctive relief) must be brought in court and must be stayed pending arbitration of the arbitrable remedies.
If arbitration is elected by either party, the parties collectively agree that they waive their right to a jury trial.
Notwithstanding the above, either you or we may file a lawsuit in small claims court for any claims that SECTION 4 otherwise require binding arbitration, if the small claims court has jurisdiction. In addition, either you or we may invoke any AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules that allow you or we to have a small claims court
decide any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration. This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.
IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION.
(Decl. of Ameripour, ¶ 4, Ex. 2 at pp. 12-14.).
A party moving to compel arbitration bears an initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165–166.) The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541.) For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, at 218.) If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.
Here, Defendant meets its initial prima facie burden of establishing the existence of a written arbitration provision in the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information (the “Warranty”).
Plaintiff did not oppose this motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff did not meet his shifted burden.
The Arbitration Agreement Covers the Dispute at Issue
The agreement to arbitrate in the Warranty applies to: “any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase,
advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law.” (Decl. of Ameripour, Ex. 2.)
Therefore, the agreement to arbitrate contained in the Warranty is broad enough to encompass Plaintiff’s claims for breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and violation of the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
Plaintiff did not oppose, and, therefore, failed to demonstrate that any of his claims fall outside of the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff also failed to present any challenges to the Arbitration Agreement and failed to argue why it should not be enforceable.
Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted, and the action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.)
An ADR Review Hearing is set for 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 2026, in Department N16.
Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.
7 Fuentes vs. Tran TENTATIVE RULING:
For the reasons set forth below, the motion by Justin Farahi of Farahi Law Firm, APC, to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Jimmy Anthony Fuentes is GRANTED.
An attorney may withdraw even without cause as long as “withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to the client’s interests.” (Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915.) It is within the court’s discretion as to whether to deny an attorney’s request to withdraw because such withdrawal would cause injustice or undue delay in the proceeding; however, such discretion is to be exercised reasonably. (See Mandell v. Sup. Ct (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 1, 4.)