Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration
The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.
Special Damages for Libel Per Quod: Moving Party contends to the extent any alleged defamatory meaning is not apparent on its face, the defamation claim sounds in libel per quod and requires special damages, which are not pleaded.
“Libel per se is distinguished from libel per quod in Civil Code section 45a (Citation): ‘A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof...’” (Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 382.) Libel per se includes statements which impute to a party, in connection with the sale of goods, fraud, dishonesty or questionable business methods. (Id., at 385-386.)
The statements pertaining to excessive charging such as ARKA charging “four times more compared to the actual supplier,” would reasonably appear to be libelous on their face as they could be deemed to impute dishonesty in ARKA’s profession and thus pleading special damages would not be required. “The courts have manifested liberality, at the pleading stage, in finding libel per se. Thus it has been said to be ‘error for a court to rule that a publication cannot be defamatory on its face when by any reasonable interpretation the language is susceptible of a defamatory meaning.’” (Barnes-Hind, Inc., supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at 385.)
The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.
Injunctive Relief: Moving Party argues that the prayer for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief compelling removal of the challenged online statements is legally improper as a prior restraint on speech. An improper remedy demanded in the complaint is not a ground for demurrer. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) This argument thus does not support dismissal of the defamation cause of action.
Request for Judicial Notice: ARKA’s request for judicial notice is DENIED. It appears ARKA seeks to have the Court consider the substance of these declarations, which is not proper in ruling on a demurrer. (
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Counsel for ARKA shall give notice. 7 Desmond v. The Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration, filed on 11/21/25 by Hyundai Motor Defendant Hyundai Motor America (HMA) is DENIED. America HMA has failed to show that the parties entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate here. HMA asserts that Plaintiff Alicia
Desmond (Plaintiff) agreed to arbitrate because HMA included an arbitration provision in the “Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information” (Warranty) for the vehicle. (Ameripour Decl., ¶ 4 and Ex. 2.) But HMA has not shown that the Warranty reflects an actual agreement with Plaintiff: HMA does not present any evidence to show that Plaintiff signed or accepted the arbitration provision in the Warranty, or was even informed of its existence.
HMA argues that equitable estoppel applies, as Plaintiff’s claims rely on the Warranty. But an essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent. (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270.) A warranty is not a traditional contract: it is effectively a unilateral promise to the consumer. (Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1258; Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) Equitable estoppel thus cannot apply in this context.
Nor are Plaintiff’s claims clearly dependent upon the Warranty in any event. (See Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122, 1133 [warranty claims arise from a statutory scheme; unless properly disclaimed, every retail sale of consumer goods includes the implied warranty that the goods are merchantable].) HMA has thus failed to show that equitable estoppel applies here.
As HMA has failed to establish that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between HMA and Plaintiff, the Motion is DENIED.
HMA’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED under Ev. Code §452(d), as to the existence of the record.
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection, filed as ROA 38, is OVERRULED.
HMA to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within 20 days.
Plaintiff is to give notice of this ruling. 8 Sycamore Plaintiff Sycamore Canyon Plaza, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) unopposed Canyon Plaza, Motion for Terminating and Monetary Sanctions (“Motion”) against LLC vs. Yu defendant Sujin Yu (“Defendant” for this ruling) is GRANTED.
The court previously ordered Defendant to serve initial responses to sets one of form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production on 06/30/25; monetary sanctions were also issued. (Burton Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) Despite multiple attempts by Plaintiff’s counsel to obtain verified responses from Defendant, nothing has been served in the 10.5 months since the order was issued and in over 1.5 years since the discovery requests were served. Meet and confer efforts were met with empty promises by defense counsel, or emails improperly sent to Plaintiff’s former counsel without any discovery responses attached. (Burton Decl. ¶¶ 5-10, Exs. 2-6.)
The court finds Defendant has abused the discovery process by failing to respond to authorized methods of discovery and by