WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al.

At the time of purchase, Defendant contends Plaintiff was provided an express written warranty located in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty Booklet”). (Declaration of Ali Ameripour (“Ameripour Decl.”), Ex. 3.) The Warranty Booklet contained a binding arbitration provision. (Ibid.)

On May 9, 2020, Defendant claims Plaintiff enrolled the Subject Vehicle in Hyundai’s Bluelink services. (Declaration of Vijay Rao (“Rao Decl.”), ¶ 5.) Enrollment would have required Plaintiff to agree to Defendant’s Bluelink Connected Services Agreement (“CSA”), the terms of which contained a second binding arbitration provision. (Rao Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6, Ex. 1.)

26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Defendant now moves to compel arbitration and stay the present action pending the outcome of arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1281, on the basis that Plaintiff is bound by the arbitration clauses contained in the Warranty Booklet and the CSA. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration clauses and, as a result, Plaintiff’s claims should be stayed pending arbitration. Defendant further argues that it may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show she consented to arbitrate her claims.

II.

Legal Standard

California has a public policy that encourages arbitration, and courts have repeatedly approved and upheld arbitration clauses. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [California has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the Court shall order the parties to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the FAA is essentially the same:

A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

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thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

(9 U.S.C. § 2.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p. 1518.)

In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.

(Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

Normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of contractual arbitration provisions. Included among these is the long-accepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)

III.

Discussion

A. The Warranty Booklet

The arbitration provision in the Warranty Booklet states:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY

PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use of your vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through JAMS Mediation, Arbitration and ADR Services (JAMS) under its Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures.

....

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION.

(Ameripour Decl., Ex. 3, pp. 13-14.)

There is no evidence Plaintiff signed the arbitration provision or the Warranty Booklet or signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the Warranty Booklet. In fact, there is no evidence the Warranty Booklet was even presented to Plaintiff prior to, or after, their purchase of the Subject Vehicle. Rather, Defendant simply attaches the Warranty Booklet as an exhibit to defense counsel’s declaration. (Ameripour Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 3.) There is no declaration by a representative

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of Defendant or a Hyundai dealership stating that the Warranty Booklet was, in fact, provided to Plaintiff, that the Warranty Booklet is provided to all Hyundai purchasers, or that the Warranty Booklet is even applicable to Plaintiff’s vehicle.

In Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279, the Ninth Circuit found that an arbitration provision in Samsung’s warranty handbook with an opt-out provision was not enforceable as to the plaintiff. After analyzing California law, the Court found that the plaintiff did not

expressly assent to any agreement in the brochure. Nor did [plaintiff] sign the brochure or otherwise act in a manner that would show “his intent to use his silence, or failure to opt out, as a means of accepting the arbitration agreement.” [Citation.] Under California law, an offeree’s inaction after receipt of an offer is generally insufficient to form a contract. [Citation]. Therefore, Samsung’s offer to arbitrate all disputes with [plaintiff] “cannot be turned into an agreement because the person to whom it is made or sent makes no reply, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent,” [citation], unless an exception to this general rule applies.

(Norica, supra, at p. 1286.) The Ninth Circuit further reasoned, “[n]or would a reasonable person understand that receiving the seller’s warranty and failing to opt out of an arbitration provision contained within the warranty constituted assent to a provision requiring arbitration of all claims against the seller, including claims not involving the warranty.” (Id. at p. 1290.)

Here, the same analysis applies. The Warranty Booklet does not operate as a contract with an enforceable arbitration agreement.

Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show that Plaintiff agreed to an enforceable arbitration provision in the Warranty Booklet.

B. Equitable Estoppel

Defendant next argues it may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (See Def.’s Mot. 11:18-20.)

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26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

The Court disagrees.

“ ‘Generally speaking, one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be bound by it or invoke it.’ [Citation.]” (JSM Tuscany, LLC. v. Super. Ct. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236.) Equitable estoppel is one exception to this “general rule.” (Id. at pp. 1236-1237.) The doctrine has been used both to equitably estop a nonsignatory from refusing to be bound by an arbitration agreement between other parties and to estop a signatory to an arbitration agreement from refusing to arbitrate with a nonsignatory. (Knight, et al., Cal.

Practice Guide: Alt. Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group 2024 Update) ¶ 5:266.10.) Both uses of equitable estoppel, however, are premised upon the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between two or more persons/entities. (See, e.g., Metaclad Corp. v. Ventana Envir. Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 [“Courts applying equitable estoppel against a signatory have looked to the relationships of the persons, wrongs and issues, in particular whether the claims that the nonsignatory sought to arbitrate were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; International Paper Co. v.

Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH (2000) 206 F.3d 411, 418 [applying equitable estoppel to require International Paper to arbitrate its dispute with Schwabedissen when a contract between Schwabedissen and Wood “provides part of the factual foundation for every claim asserted by International Paper against Schwabedissen” and that contract contained an arbitration agreement].)

None of the authorities cited by Defendant apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration absent the existence of an underlying agreement to arbitrate. And Defendant has not shown its existence in this case.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion is also denied to the extent it is premised upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

C. The CSA

The arbitration provision in the CSA states:

Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service

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26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Plans, your Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

However, any dispute you or we may have relating to copyrights or other intellectual property shall not be governed by this agreement to arbitrate. For the avoidance of doubt, this means that any claims you or we may have relating to intellectual property rights against the other, including injunctive and other relief sought, may be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to:

claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising); claims that are currently the subject of purported class action litigation in which you are not a member of a certified class; claims relating to your vehicle for which you seek product or service support via the sites; claims arising out of or relating to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act; claims relating to your data privacy or information security; and claims that may arise after the termination of this Agreement.

...

(Rao Decl., Exhibit 2, § 15.C.)

Defendant has also failed to show mutual assent on the CSA. The Declaration of Vijay Rao, the Director of Connected Ops & Owner Apps/Web for Defendant, merely describes the process by which customers agree to the CSA upon enrolling their vehicle in Bluelink service. (Rao Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6.) Exhibit 1 is the acknowledgment checkbox screen that Plaintiff “would have seen when they activated Bluelink services[,]” and Exhibit 2 is a copy of the CSA “that was in effect at that time.” (Rao Decl., ¶ 6, Exs. 1, 2.) These documents are generic and not specific to Plaintiff. Defendant did not show Plaintiff checked the box, or otherwise “signed” or agreed to the CSA.

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26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Further, Exhibit 1 entitled “Complimentary Subscription” states: “Your Hyundai includes 3 years of complimentary Blue Link services which offers a suite of safety and convenience features. This subscription includes the Connected Care, Remote and Guidance packages.” (Rao Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 1.) The evidence suggests that the subscription is voluntary or optional, and, therefore, the Court cannot assume that Plaintiff chose to enroll in the service when she purchased the Subject Vehicle.

Thus, Defendant has failed to show Plaintiff agreed to the terms and conditions of the CSA, including the arbitration provision.

IV.

Disposition

For the stated reasons, Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate her claims. Therefore, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s additional arguments made in opposition to the motion, including those concerning unconscionability.

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008563: WYATT vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***