Jones vs. Hyundai Motor America

evidence that they did so.’ [Citation.] This is a ‘heightened standard,’ and it ‘pertains to the parties' manifestation of intent, not the agreement's validity.’ [Citation.]” (Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 879-880.)

Here, the Arbitration Provision broadly states that “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to these Terms or the applicability, breach, termination, validity, enforcement or interpretation thereof, or any use of the Airbnb Platform, Host Services, or any Content” shall be settled by binding arbitration. Further, “If there is a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be enforced or applies to our Dispute, you and Airbnb agree that the arbitrator will decide that issue.” (Anderson Decl., Exh. K; see also, Najarro, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 888 [provision that, as relevant here, “‘the arbitrator shall have the exclusive power to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this [a]greement’” constituted a “clear and unmistakable” delegation clause].)

The arbitration provision appears to cover the claims asserted by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

Also, the entire action is STAYED pending completion of arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. Once the arbitration is completed, the action may proceed as to Defendant TATIANA TALEB.

The court sets an ADR Review Hearing for 12/7/26 at 9:00 a.m. in Department W08. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a status report regarding arbitration no later than 10 court days prior to the hearing.

Moving Defendant to give notice.

15 Jones vs. Hyundai Motion to Compel Arbitration Motor America The court GRANTS Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s motion to compel arbitration the claims of Plaintiff Tina Jones and to stay the action.

Late-Filed Opposition and Reply Briefs: The court exercises its discretion to consider the late-filed opposition and reply briefs.

RJN: The court DENIES as unnecessary Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff Jones’s Complaint in this action and the Hyundai 2020 Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information. (Evid. Code, § 452(d), 452(h).)

Defendant attaches (as Exhibit C to the Declaration of Anthony Goel) the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (“Warranty”), which contains an arbitration provision identified in the Table Contents of the Warranty Booklet as: “BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLE ONLY.” (Goel Decl., Ex. C at p. 3.)

The arbitration provision provides in relevant part:

PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS. . . .

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through JAMS Mediation, Arbitration and ADR Services (JAMS) under its

Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures, or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

We will pay all fees for any arbitration except for the initial filing fee of $250 for JAMS or $200 for AAA. The arbitration will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about arbitration, including the applicable rules and how to commence arbitration, please contact: JAMS at www.jamsadr.org; 800-352-5267; or AAA at www.adr.org; 800-778-7879. ...

Notwithstanding the above, either you or we may file a lawsuit in small claims court for any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration, if the small claims court has jurisdiction. In addition, either you or we may invoke any JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures or AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules that allow you or we to have a small claims court decide any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration. This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION.

(Goel Decl., Exh. C at pp. 12-14.)

The Warranty Handbook was provided in the glovebox materials at the time of sale, for Plaintiff to keep. (Goel Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)

A party moving to compel arbitration bears an initial burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165–166.) The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541.) Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. (Condee v.

Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”].) For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 218.) If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.

A vehicle manufacturer meets this initial burden by submitting a copy of the agreement, stating the relevant terms verbatim in the moving papers, and presenting evidence the consumer received the owner’s manual and warranty information. (See, e.g., Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 872, 882 [reversing the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration].)

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165-166.) The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not

remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. (Ibid.) If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. (Ibid.)

Here, Defendant meets its initial prima facie burden of establishing the existence of a written arbitration provision, in the Warranty. Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the arbitration provision in the vehicle’s written Warranty, that he received a copy of the Warranty, or that he accepted the benefits of the Warranty.

Plaintiff argues that there is no contract between the parties where a party unknowingly received the arbitration terms. Plaintiff submits no evidence, however, showing she did not know of, review, and/or agree to the arbitration terms. Plaintiff fails to meet her shifted burden to produce evidence challenging the agreement. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165-166.)

Even if Plaintiff had submitted evidence to meet her burden, Defendant argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents Plaintiff from disclaiming the arbitration provision included in the Warranty.

“The doctrine [of equitable estoppel] acts defensively [and] operates to prevent one from taking an unfair advantage of another but not to give an unfair advantage to one seeking to invoke the doctrine.” (Peskin v. Phinney (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 632, 636; see also Evid. Code, § 623 [“Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it”].) For example, a principal will be estopped to challenge the validity of a contract based on lack of agent’s authority where the principal retained the benefits of the contract. (Lemat Corp. v. American Basketball Assn. (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 267, 276.)

Equitable estoppel may prevent a consumer from disclaiming an arbitration agreement. (Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1332 [citing other cases and holding, “Under certain circumstances, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may seek to enforce it against a signatory. Whether such enforcement is permissible is a question of state law”].) Specifically, “[w]hen a plaintiff brings a claim which relies on contract terms against a defendant, the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement. [Citations.]” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v.

Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1239-1240 [emphasis in original] [applying the doctrine against a nonsignatory plaintiff]; see also Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 269 n.5 [“‘a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract’s arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.’ [Citation.].”)

Here, Plaintiff relies on the express warranties contained in the Warranty to bring claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and pleads a claim for Breach of Express Warranty. Plaintiff also previously invoked and benefitted from the Warranty, bringing her Vehicle in for at least one warranty repair. (Goel Decl., ¶ 20, Exh. D.)

The court finds Plaintiff is equitably estopped from arguing the arbitration provision contained within the vehicle’s express warranty is unenforceable.

Scope of Arbitration Agreement

Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement contained in the Warranty, which covers in relevant part: “any claim or disputes between us . . . related to or arising out of . . . the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, [or] the vehicle warranty.” (See Goel Decl., Exh. C.)

Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that regardless of whether the arbitration provision in the Warranty constitutes a valid arbitration agreement, the arbitration provision is unconscionable.

A court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that is unconscionable. (Civ. Code § 1670.5.) “Because unconscionability is a contract defense, the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proof.” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 911.)

To be unenforceable, a contract must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, but the elements need not be present in the same degree. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) The analysis employs a sliding scale: “. . . the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114; Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 167, 174-175.)

Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because the arbitration provision is a contract of adhesion to which Plaintiff never agreed.

Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the parties’ circumstances at that time. It focuses on the factors of oppression or surprise. (Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1329.) Adhesive contracts create a “modest degree of procedural unconscionability.” (Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 248.)

Plaintiff asserts Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications Am., LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279 is instructive. In Norcia, the plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging the cellphone manufacturer misrepresented facts about the phone’s performance. (Id. at 1282-1283.) The cellphone manufacturer moved to compel, arguing the arbitration agreement contained inside a warranty

brochure in the mobile phone’s packaging. (Id. at 1281.) In determining whether the plaintiff had engaged in any conduct sufficient to show that he agreed to be bound by the arbitration agreement in the warranty brochure, the Ninth Circuit noted there was no dispute that plaintiff did not expressly assent to the agreement in the brochure, did not sign the brochure or otherwise act in a manner that would show “his intent to use his silence, or failure to opt out, as a means of accepting the arbitration agreement.” (Id. at 1285-1286.)

Therefore, “Samsung’s offer to arbitrate all disputes with Norcia [in the warranty] ‘cannot be turned into an agreement because the person to whom it is made or sent makes no reply, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent,’ [citation] unless an exception to this general rule applies.” (Norcia, 845 F.3d at pp. 1285-1286.) The Ninth Circuit noted in dicta, however, that the manufacturer “may be able to require [the consumer] to arbitrate claims arising out of the [warranty] contained in the Product Safety & Warranty Information brochure.” (Id. at 1288, n. 3 [“Under [Weinstat v.

Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213], Samsung may be able to require Norcia to arbitrate claims arising out of the Standard Limited Warranty contained in the Product Safety & Warranty Information brochure, but we need not consider the enforceability of any such limitation because Norcia has not brought any warranty claims against Samsung”].)

Unlike the plaintiff in Norcia that had brought no claims under the warranty, Plaintiff here relies on the Warranty to bring claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. In addition, the arbitration provision here includes a 30-day opt-out provision, which eliminated or greatly reduced the adhesive nature of the agreement.

For the reasons above, the court finds only a modest amount of procedural unconscionability.

Substantive Unconscionability

Lastly, Plaintiff argues the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because the agreement deprives Plaintiff the choice of arbitrator, shifts fees and

costs of arbitration onto Plaintiff, and deprives Plaintiff a jury trial.

“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.’” (Serafin v. Balco Properties ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 154, 177.) “A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Association v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 246.) In assessing substantive unconscionability, the “paramount consideration” is mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate. (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1287.)

Here, while the arbitration agreement limits the number of arbitration services available to administer the arbitration, Plaintiff does not show that proceeding before JAMS and/or AAA would negatively affect Plaintiff’s rights.

The agreement does not improperly shift fees and costs of arbitration to Plaintiff, instead requiring that Plaintiff be responsible for only the initial filing fee of $200-$250. The court notes that is less than the filing fee Plaintiff paid to initiate this court action. Lastly, in failing to meet her shifted burden to challenge the authenticity of the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff waives any argument that the valid arbitration agreement “deprived” of her right to jury trial.

In sum, Plaintiff shows only a modest amount of procedural unconscionability and no substantive unconscionability.

As such, the court GRANTS the motion and STAYS this action pending resolution of the parties’ arbitration. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

The court sets a Status Conference re ADR for 2/1/27 at 9:00 am in Dept. W8. Plaintiff SHALL submit a status report regarding the arbitration no later than 10 court days prior to the hearing.

The court VACATES the scheduled 8/31/26 Case Management Conference.

Defendant to give notice.

16 Schlickman vs. Demurrer (re Third Amended Complaint) Anser Advisory

1. Demurrer

As explained below, the court SUSTAINS Defendants GARY COOLEY and MARLENE HUMBERT’s (the “Moving Defendants”) demurrer to the ninth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth causes of action asserted in the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) filed by Plaintiff CARA SCHLICKMAN.

The TAC asserts 18 causes of action against numerous defendants. As to the Moving Defendants, the TAC asserts the following causes of action:

6th C/A (harassment in violation of FEHA) 9th C/A (failure to pay minimum wages etc) 10th C/A (reporting time pay & liquidated damages) 11th C/Ca (failure to pay sick leave) 12th C/A (failure to pay overtime wages etc) 13th C/A (missed, interrupted, untimely meal periods) 14th C/A (missed, interrupted, untimely rest breaks) 15th C/A (waiting time penalties) 16th C/A (failure to reimburse) 17th C/A (unfair trade practices) 18th C/A (unfair competition)

[The TAC misnumbered the 15th and 16th causes of action.]

Moving Defendants generally demurs to the 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)

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