Lam v. Bui

A trial court’s determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings accepts as true the pleading’s factual allegations, and it gives them a liberal construction. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516; see Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 190-191 [while allegations of a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a demurrer, the facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true, and, if contrary to the allegations in the pleading, will be given precedence].)

Although the trial court must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, it “does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219.)

The Present Claims Are Not Barred by Claim or Issue Preclusion

Defendants contend the Complaint is barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion / res judicata, as well as issue preclusion / collateral estoppel.

Defendants are mistaken.

“Claim preclusion applies to ‘ “ ‘matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigatable’ ” in the prior action. [Citation.] “ ‘ “The doctrine ... rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom [the party] is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent.” ’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘ “If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 486.)

“ ‘ Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Egelston v. State Personnel Bd. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1055, citing to DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824; see Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 488 [claim preclusion does not apply where the parties in the two lawsuits are not the same].)

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘prevents relitigation of previously decided issues’ and applies ‘(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Egelston v. State Personnel Board (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1055.)

Res judicata does not bar Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as the causes of action between the quiet title action and the present Complaint are not the same. The quiet title action involved allegations that Defendant Cindy Bui encroached and took a portion of Plaintiff Ben Lam’s property. While the allegations in the present Complaint allude to the property dispute underlying the quiet title action, the gravamen of the present Complaint is Defendants’ alleged harassment of Plaintiffs. Thus, the allegations in the present Complaint were not matters that were raised, or could have been raised, in the quiet title action. The present causes of action were not matters “within the scope of the [quiet title] action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues” in the quiet title action. (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 486.)

Second, the quiet title action only involved Ben Lam as the plaintiff and Cindy Bui as the defendant. (Exhibit B to Request for Judicial Notice.) Here, Lam Nguyen is a new plaintiff, and Huong Bui is a defendant. While the Court acknowledges the possibility, if not the likelihood, that Lam Nguyen and Huong Bui are in privity with Ben Lam and Cindy Bui, respectively, this cannot be resolved by way of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Third, while there was a final judgment in the quiet title action, that judgment was only as to the sole cause of action for quiet title. There was no judgment as to Plaintiffs’ present claims of harassment.

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by collateral estoppel, as there has been no final adjudication of an identical issue that was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the quiet title action.

In their Motion, Defendants make the argument that “California law does not recognize a standalone civil cause of action for ‘harassment.’ ” However, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not include a cause of action for “harassment.”

Finally, Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to support a trespass claim, as “[t]he Complaint contains conclusory allegations and fails to plead specific facts establishing unauthorized entry or interference with Plaintiff’s exclusive possessory rights.”

“ ‘Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property.’ [Citation.] The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. [Citation.]” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261–262.)

The Court rejects Defendants’ contentions, as Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support their trespass cause of action.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege they own or control the property located at 12531 Hazel. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 7.) They allege Defendants intentionally, recklessly, or negligently entered onto Plaintiffs’ property, even though they were not given permission to do so. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Defendants then caused Plaintiffs’ harm by, among other things, cutting down Plaintiffs’ fruit trees. (Complaint, ¶ 11, 41.)

For purposes of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the foregoing allegations must be treated as being true. (Hopp v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 713, 717.) More importantly, these allegations state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for trespass.

Plaintiffs are ordered to provide notice of the Court’s ruling.

6 Cheu v. RED SUN, Defendants Teh-Ming Cheu, Cheng-Oh Cheu, and Diann-Ching Wang’s LLC, Motion for Appointment of Appraisers to Value Plaintiff’s Interest in Red Sun, LLC for Subsequent Buyout Order, to Stay this Case and for Order Setting Bond Amount is DENIED.

Plaintiff Teh-Show Cheu’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Andrew S. Sussman are OVERRULED as to paragraph 4 and Exhibit 2, but they are SUSTAINED as to paragraphs 7 and 8.

Defendants’ evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Thomas P. Aplin are SUSTAINED as to paragraph 2, lines 9:9-9:12, 9:14-9:15, and 9:16- 9:17, as well as paragraph 5, line 9. The remainder of Defendants’ evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

The Motion is an Untimely, and Improper, Motion for Reconsideration

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); Dickson v. Mann (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 935, 950-951.)

“ ‘[S]ection 1008 is designed to conserve the court’s resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same motion over and over.’ [Citation.]” (Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 735; see UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hospital (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357, 367 [“The overriding purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 is to prevent duplicative motions”].)

“[A] party is prohibited from making, and the trial court from granting, a motion for reconsideration unless the requirements of... [section] 1008 are satisfied.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 211; see Boschetti v. Pacific Bay Investments Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1059, 1070 [section 1008 “prohibits a party from making a renewed motion not based on new facts or law”].)

“Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]” (Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 312; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.)

“ ‘The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it’ at the original hearing.” (Dickson v. Mann (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 935, 951, citing to New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212- 213.)

In seeking reconsideration, the motion fails when it is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the merits of the original motion that the party is now seeking reconsideration of. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500; see J.W. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1171 [“‘the name of a

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