Lam vs. Bui

In turn, the present version of section 2016.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties meet and confer, “either in person, by telephone, or by video conference....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a), italics added.) 9

Here, the only meet-and-confer effort Defendants made was sending the document entitled “Objection and Meet-and-Confer Regarding Deposition Notice from Defendant.” (Exhibit A to Declarations from Huong Bui and Yen Hai Bui.)

This does not comply with section 2016.040’s requirement that the meetand-confer take place in person, by telephone, or by videoconference.

Moreover, this letter does not exhibit a “reasonable and good faith attempt” at an informal resolution, particularly where the letter was sent on the same day the Motion was filed. (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 [“ ‘the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution,’ ” and it requires the parties to “ ‘attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate’ ”]; see Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432-433 [meet-and-confer efforts were insufficient where, upon receiving discovery responses, the plaintiff simply sent a single brief letter late in the relevant time period, before filing discovery motion].)

Since Defendants did not comply with the meet-and-confer requirement, the Court shall deny the Motion.

Defendants Have Not Established Good Cause

As noted, when a party seeks a protective order, it has the burden to show good cause for the issuance of a protective order. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318; GT, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 748, 754.)

In their Motion, Defendants contend the discovery Plaintiffs are pursuing is duplicative, oppressive, and harassing, as Plaintiffs have sought similar discovery in a prior quiet title case. (Huong Bui Declaration, ¶ 4; Yen Hai Bui Declaration, ¶ 3.) Defendants contend this discovery is “intended to pressure Defendants into relitigating matters already resolved.” (Huong Bui Declaration, ¶ 6; Yen Hai Bui Declaration, ¶ 5.)

However, the Court has already rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the present claims are barred by claim or issue preclusion. Further, Defendants have not cited any legal authority that supports their suggestion that discovery obtained in the prior quiet title action can be used in this action.

Under the Civil Discovery Act, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Los Angeles Unified 10

School Dist. v. Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Plan (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 621, 627-628.)

In their Motion, Defendants have not presented any evidence that the depositions, or Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, are not relevant to the present action.

Defendants also claim the noticed depositions conflict with pending hearings. (Yen Hai Bui Declaration, ¶ 4.) Defendants have not identified what hearings the noticed depositions might conflict with.

Perhaps tellingly, Defendants’ meet-and-confer letter merely states they “are unavailable for the entire month of February due to multiple legal obligations and deadlines.” (Exhibit A to Defendants’ Declarations.) They also maintain that attempting to proceed with the noticed deposition “would place excessive pressure, create significant scheduling conflicts, and constitute harassment. Absent court intervention, this would cause irreparable harm, as once a deposition occurs under these conditions, the harm cannot be undone.” (Exhibit A to Defendants’ Declarations.)

The Court acknowledges that a legitimate scheduling conflict might constitute good cause to reschedule the deposition. (See Cisneros v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 381, 420 [conflicting court appearance in a criminal matter represents good cause to continue civil administrative per se hearings].) A party may also object to a deposition notice if the deponent is unavailable on the date selected by the deposing party.

However, having to comply with multiple legal obligations and deadlines, which may place excessive pressure on Defendants, does not constitute good cause. The fact that Defendants are self-represented does not warrant a different result. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment, as the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel, as well as to those who forgo representation].)

Since Defendants have not established good cause for the issuance of a protective order, the Court shall deny Defendants’ Motion for a protective order.

Plaintiffs are ordered to provide notice of the Court’s ruling.

6 Nguyen vs. Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.’s Demurer to Plaintiff’s First Volkswagen Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the 6th Cause of Action. Group of America, Inc. Defendant Volkswagen of Garden Grove’s Demurer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the 5th Cause of Action.

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