Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on April 12, 2023. It alleges causes of action for (1) negligence, (2)

34-2023-00337868-CU-PO-GDS: Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc, a California corporation 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 54

nuisance, and (3) trespass. All three causes of action are premised upon allegations that Defendants negligently and carelessly performed automotive services by failing to replace the Vehicle’s oil cap at the conclusion of service and failing to properly inspect the vehicle before returning it to Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 28, 32.)

Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. They now move for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ nuisance and trespass causes of action.

Legal Standard

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings if the operative complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds.(b)(1), (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Except as provided by statute, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed like a general demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Accordingly, the grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be based on facts which the court may judicially notice.

Discussion

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for nuisance and third cause of action for trespass, arguing “the facts support [P]laintiffs’ first cause of action for negligence but cannot state a claim for nuisance or trespass.” (Mot. 3:3-8.)

Nuisance

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ “nuisance cause of action is a clone of the negligence cause of action[,]” and “where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (Mot. 5:15-23 [footnote omitted].) Defendants continue: “[the] complaint thus alleges only one cause of action, and one breach of duty by defendants.” (Id. at 6:7-8.)

Plaintiffs oppose the motion, rejoining that “[t]he torts of nuisance and negligence frequently coexist[,]” but “it does not necessarily follow that a cause of action for nuisance is not actionable.” (Opp’n 5:22-6:1.)

“Where negligence and nuisance claims rely on the same facts regarding lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim." (El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) In such a case, where the nuisance and negligence claims rely on the same facts, a challenge to the pleadings is proper because the nuisance claim has “no independent vitality” and simply restates the “negligence claim ‘using a different label.’

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00337868-CU-PO-GDS: Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc, a California corporation 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 54

[Citation.]” (See Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 543; see id. at p. 542 [“Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ (Citation.)”].)

Here, Defendants are correct that as currently pled, the second cause of action for nuisance relies on the same underlying facts as the first cause of action for negligence. Therefore, the motion is well-taken.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that their negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts. Rather, they simply argue that they have alleged the requisite elements of a nuisance claim.

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for nuisance.

Trespass

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s third cause of action for trespass fails because trespass requires an unauthorized entry onto their property, and the Vehicle “caught fire in plaintiff’s garage, after plaintiff drove the vehicle there.” (Mot. 7:20-27.) Defendants contend “the disputed issue is whether plaintiff has pled a ‘lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission.’ [Citation.]” (Reply 4:10-12.)

Plaintiffs respond that they “properly plead their trespass cause of action[,]” as case law supports that “a fire caused by negligence can result in a trespass.” (Opp’n 9:1-3.) Plaintiffs further argue that it is absurd to argue that they authorized the fire and subsequent damage by driving the Vehicle in the garage. (Opp’n 8:5-10.)

“Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property.” The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261–262.)

/// “ ‘[T]respass may be committed by consequential and indirect injury as well as by direct and forcible injury.’ [Citation.]” (Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Group (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1306.) “The interference need not take the form of a personal entry onto the property by the wrongdoer. Instead, it ‘may be accomplished by the casting of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00337868-CU-PO-GDS: Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc, a California corporation 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 54

substances or objects upon the plaintiff's property from without its boundaries.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“ ‘[A]n entry may [also] be accomplished by setting in motion an agency which, when put in operation, extends its energy to the plaintiff’s premises to its material injury.’ [Citation.]” (Elton, supra, at p. 1036.) “Thus, intangible intrusions such as noise or vibrations may constitute a trespass if they cause actual physical damage [citations] as opposed to merely a diminution in market value [citation].” (Id. at p. 1307.) Accordingly the Court of Appeal in Elton followed out of state authority in holding that “a fire can constitute a trespassory invasion.” (Ibid.) “When negligently inflicted with resulting actual damage, [fire] may constitute a trespass.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint, in pertinent part, as follows:

31. At all times herein mentioned, plaintiffs were the owners, tenants, and/or lawful occupants of property damaged by the fire herein mentioned.

32. Defendants, and each of them, by their acts and/or omissions set forth above, directly and legally caused the fire to ignite, spread, cause harm, damage and injury to plaintiffs, resulting in a trespass upon these plaintiffs’ property interests, 33. Plaintiffs did not grant permission for defendants to wrongfully act in a manner so as to cause the fire, and thereby produce a fire which spread and wrongfully entered upon the property, resulting in the harm, injury, and/or damage alleged above.

34. That as a direct and proximate result thereof, plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer damages as set forth above, in an amount according to proof at trial. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-34.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently state a cause of action for trespass based upon the referenced authorities. The authorities cited by Defendants to support their argument that Plaintiffs cannot pursue a cause of action for trespass because they drove the Vehicle into their garage are inapposite. (See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 315 [finding trespass cause of action could not be maintained against a lead manufacturer when the plaintiffs consented to the placement of lead on their properties]; ibid. [“Their alleged lack of knowledge at that time of lead’s dangerous propensities does not vitiate their consent to the placement of the lead on their properties, though it may make that consent

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00337868-CU-PO-GDS: Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc, a California corporation 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 54

uninformed.”].)

Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiffs third cause of action for trespass.

Conclusion

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the nuisance cause of action and denied as to the trespass cause of action.

Where granted, the motion is granted with leave to amend as this is the first challenge to the pleadings. Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint no later than September 9, 2024, to address the deficiencies raised in the demurrer.

Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present the clerk with a copy of this ruling at the time they file the First Amended Complaint to facilitate its filing.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; CRC 3.1312.)

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00337868-CU-PO-GDS: Louis Accaria vs. Von Housen Management Inc, a California corporation 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 54

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