BLACHA vs TAYLOR, et al.

22CV015544: BLACHA vs TAYLOR, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by George Blacha (Plaintiff) CRS# 136745559640 in Department 25

Tentative Ruling - 06/10/2026 Jenna Whitman

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by George Blacha on 05/20/2026 is Granted.

Plaintiff and cross-defendant George Blacha (Blacha) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for “Property Damage” alleged in the First Amended Cross Complaint filed by Defendant/cross-complainant Cecily Taylor (Taylor).

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings if "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c)(1)(B)(ii).) Blacha previously demurred to the original cross-complaint on essentially the same grounds, which demurrer was sustained with leave to amend for lack of standing. Crosscomplainant’s subsequently filed amended cross-complaint still asserts (repeatedly) that the LLC, not Taylor, is the sole owner of the subject vessel and its onboard fixtures. It also alleges Taylor’s continuous involvement in the LLC and that the vessel was purchased to operate the LLC’s AirBnB business. It also alleges that Taylor “had to” pay out her own moneys to repair the damages to the vessel caused by Blacha. Finally, it asserts:

“Cecily Taylor has standing to complain of the Blacha's causing property damages to Lady Serendipity and the property owned by the LLC, as well the damages caused to her, because Blacha's actions to damage the vessel were intended to harm Taylor and the damages to her were not incidental.” (Am. Cross Compl., para. 49.)

Taylor’s belated opposition (executed and emailed to Dept. 25 one day before the hearing) fails to address the challenge to the sufficiency of the property damage claim. It does not explain how Taylor’s involvement in facilitating the purchase of the vessel and business or operating the business, as sole member of the LLC or otherwise, or her purported “obligation” to repair the vessel, confer standing upon her to seek damages for harms to the LLC’s property. Nor does it cite to any authority for the proposition that because Blacha’s intended to harm her by damaging the vessel allows her to recover damages for repair or loss of value of the damaged property, rather than the owner. (This argument would seem to pertain more readily to the infliction of emotional distress causes of action.)

The opposition merely argues that Taylor has alleged valid causes of action concerning harassment “and other claims,” and that there are numerous disputes of fact making judgment on the pleadings inappropriate. The only issue identified that might be potentially relevant to a claim for “Property Damage” is the loss of AirBnB revenue, but the amended cross-complaint admits (at p. 3) that the LLC purchased the AirBnB business in addition to the boat.

Neither does Taylor’s opposition address paragraph 49, quoted above, or its selective quotation of A.H. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 93, 107-108 for her proposition that she may assert a cause of action because her damages were not “incidental.” A.H. Ahmanson & Co. governs 22CV015544: BLACHA vs TAYLOR, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by George Blacha (Plaintiff) CRS# 136745559640 in Department 25 when a shareholder may assert a direct, as opposed to a derivative claim, on behalf of a business entity; it provides guidance as to whom a claim belongs to, which turns on whether the damage is directly inflicted upon the corporation, with a resulting impact on the value or assets of the company, which impacts shareholders indirectly, or whether an individual right of a shareholder not belonging to the company has been breached, resulting in a direct harm unique to that shareholder (not suffered commensurately by all shareholders).

Here, if the property interests at issue were (as pleaded) owned by the LLC, the harm was inflicted upon the LLC, and to the extent Taylor (as an owner) was harmed by property damage and loss of revenue, it was indirectly. Under A.H. Ahmanson & Co., the claim for harm to the vessel, its fixtures, and the AirBnB revenues is derivative and belongs to the LLC. Thus, Taylor has not demonstrated standing to pursue losses for damages to the vessel, its fixtures, or the LLC’s revenues.

The Court observes that the cause of action for “Property Damage” (which may in fact be a claim for negligence or trespass, it is unclear) incorporates numerous factual allegations that appear unrelated to property damage (e.g., claims that Blacha fraudulently obtained a certificate of ownership of the vessel in his own name to cause Taylor emotional distress). The undersigned cannot discern any theory of liability alleged here that would entitle Taylor (as opposed to the LLC) to recover for “property damage” (as defined, e.g., in damages instructions CACI 3903F and 3903J) and Taylor’s late-filed opposition does not articulate one.

Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to Taylor’s third cause of action.