BOE vs DEACON CORP.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

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a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Deacon Builders, LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion for judgment on the pleadings to selfrepresented Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“2AC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s requests for judicial notice filed with the moving papers and in reply are granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a); § 452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 26, 2025 (“Opposition”) and an amended opposition on December 30, 2025 (“Amended Opposition”). The Court considered both oppositions as Defendant had sufficient opportunity to address all arguments raised by Plaintiff in reply. The Court did not consider Plaintiff’s unauthorized sur-reply filed on January 15, 2025. Such filing is not permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b).

I. Overview

This appears to be an action for negligence and private nuisance. Plaintiff alleges that he resides at 3915 Broadway in Sacramento. (2AC, p. 5, ¶ A.) In July 2023, Defendant allegedly began construction work on a new development adjacent to Plaintiff’s property. (Id., ¶ B.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s use of heavy machinery caused violent shaking and vibrations and that the shaking caused “accelerated differential settling of the foundation.” (Id., ¶ C.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant laid trench plates on the road next to the property that caused “thunderous noise” throughout the day and night. (Id., ¶ D.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $75,000 to compensate for his sustained emotional distress, loss of living companions, and loss of quiet enjoyment and use of the property. (Id., ¶ F.)

Plaintiff filed this action on March 14, 2024. He filed his operative 2AC on November 12, 2024. It appears that Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: negligence and private nuisance. (See 2AC, p. 5, ¶ E.)

On April 30, 2025, the Court, by ruling on submitted matter, denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed under the pseudonym apparently indicated as “Jon (Alias) Boe.” Indeed, the Court’s April 30, 2025 ruling specifically addressed Plaintiff’s request to use a pseudonym in this action, discussed

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the applicable law, and explained the reasons why Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate why he should be permitted to utilize a fictitious name in this proceeding. (See Ruling on Submitted Matter, dated 4/30/2025 at 2.) Presumably recognizing that he was not granted permission to use any pseudonym in this case, Plaintiff immediately filed on May 1, 2025, a “Motion for Reconsideration” in which Plaintiff again attempted to move for “an order to Proceed vnder [sic] Pseudonym.” (Motion for Reconsideration, filed May 1, 2025, at 1.)

On August 29, 2025, the Court, by ruling on submitted matter, denied Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration” thereby leaving unchanged its April 30, 2025 order which had already denied Plaintiff’s request to use any pseudonym in this case. (See Ruling on Submitted Matter, dated 8/29/2025.) According to the Register of Actions, Plaintiff did not seek appellate review of either the Court’s order of April 30, 2025 or the Court’s order of August 29, 2025. Thus, at no time in this action has Plaintiff been granted permission to use any pseudonym, including that of “Jon (Alias) Boe,” or any other fictitious name.

On September 24, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to deem matters admitted with respect to Defendant’s Requests for Admissions, set one (“RFA”), which was set for hearing on October 21, 2025. The Court issued its tentative ruling the Court day prior to the hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06. The Court’s tentative ruling granted Defendant’s motion stating in part as follows:

As a result, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and the matters at issue are deemed admitted, unless Plaintiff serves, “before the hearing on the motion,” proposed responses to the subject request for admissions served on May 21, 2025, that are in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.220. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).)

(See Minute Order, dated 10/21/2025.) On the same date as the hearing, but prior to commencement of the hearing, Plaintiff filed a document self-titled, “Uerified [sic] Reply in Equity,” which includes what Plaintiff would argue constitutes verified proposed responses to the at-issue requests for admission. (See Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing.) After oral arguments on the same date, the Court took the matter under submission. On October 22, 2025, the Court issued a ruling on submitted matter which affirmed its order granting Defendant’s motion for deemed admissions.

However, due to the substantial issues regarding whether Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing sufficiently avoids deemed admissions (and the lack of any briefing in such regards) coupled with the fact that Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (c) provides no time deadline by which the Court may make its finding of whether a response “in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220” has been served “before the hearing,” the Court deferred ruling on whether Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing substantially complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 so as to avoid admissions.

As to its deferral of this issue, the Court stated:

Thus, the Court shall defer such ruling until such time that it is relevant for the Court to

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determine whether the Court’s conditional order granting this motion should be vacated, such as if and when any party attempts to establish and rely upon deemed admissions. At such time, the Court expects any moving and opposing party to specifically address and analyze the issues pertaining to the October 21, 2025 filing and its effect, if any, on the Court’s conditional order deeming admissions.

(See Minute Order, dated 10/22/2025.)

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s 2AC. Defendant essentially argues that the Court’s October 22, 2025 order granting its motion for deemed admissions should stand as Plaintiff failed to serve, before the hearing on such motion, proposed responses that were in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. Defendant argues that based upon Plaintiff’s deemed admissions, judgment should be entered in Defendant’s favor. Plaintiff opposes.

II.

Discussion

A. Defendant’s Motion to Deem Matters Admitted

As discussed above, the Court previously deferred ruling on whether Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing and its asserted proposed responses to Defendant’s RFAs were substantially compliant with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 so as to avoid deemed admissions. The Court now rules on this issue as follows.

1.

Legal Standard

A responding party may avoid having matters in requests for admissions deemed admitted in the face of a motion seeking such deemed admissions if the Court finds that the responding party has served, “before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Section 2033.220 states, in full:

(a) Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) Each answer shall:

(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.

(2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.

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(3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.

(c) If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.

If a party to whom the requests are directs fails to serve a timely response, “the party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests.” (Id., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) The responding party maybe only be relieved from this waiver “on motion.” (Id., subd. (b).) Additionally, “[t]he party to whom the requests for admission are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240.)

When ruling on a motion seeking deemed admissions, the Court qualitatively evaluates “the proposed response to requests in toto to determine whether it substantially complies with the code. It does not permit the court to segregate each individual RFA response for the purpose of finding that portions of the document are code-compliant (and will therefore be accepted), while concluding that other portions are noncompliant (and will thus be rejected).” (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 779–780.)

If a party responds to requests for admissions but those responses are unverified, they are “tantamount to no responses at all,” and the proponent is entitled to obtain an order that the requests are deemed admitted. (Appleton v Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636; see also (Allen-Pacific, Ltd. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1551 [disapproved on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983, fn. 12].)

2. Substantial Compliance

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s proposed “verification” is unsworn and invalid as it is not signed by the real party in interest and is instead signed by Plaintiff under an unauthorized pseudonym. Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s “verification” fails to comply with the statutory requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 in that it is not sworn under penalty of perjury. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s “verification” “explicitly disavows being made under California Law” as Plaintiff states, among other qualifications that the responses “are entered without submission into any foreign neither or ciuil [sic] jurisdiction.” (Memorandum at 9:14- 27.)

Plaintiff argues in his Amended Opposition that the RFAs cannot be deemed admitted because they were defectively served. Plaintiff also contends the requests were ambiguous and Defendant

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failed to clarify the ambiguities at Plaintiff request. (Amended Opposition at 5:5-6:6, 6:25-7:2.) Plaintiff further argues that he did substantially comply with the statutory requirements for responses to requests for admissions in that he served written responses addressing each RFA. (Id. at 7:3-12.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that an unsworn or imperfect verification does not justify dismissal where the defect is curable and no prejudice is shown, citing Kulshresta v. First Union Commerical Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 606.

As to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s proposed responses are unverified and are thereby tantamount to no responses at all, the Court agrees. Indeed, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not verify his purported responses filed on October 21, 2025 by using his true name. Rather, what appears on the “verification” is only a signature by “Jon (Alias) Boe.” (See Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing at 11.) As Plaintiff concedes in his so-called “omnibus motion” filed on December 19, 2024, the name, “Jon (Alias) Boe” is not Plaintiff’s true name.

At no time has this Court granted Plaintiff permission to use “Jon (Alias) Boe” as a pseudonym. In fact, on April 25, 2025, the Court specifically denied Plaintiff’s request to use any pseudonym in this action, thereby requiring Plaintiff to utilize his true name consistent with Code of Civil Procedure section 367’s requirement that “[e]very action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Furthermore, there is no question that Plaintiff was well aware that the Court denied his December 19, 2024 motion that sought permission to use a pseudonym.

Indeed, Plaintiff even attempted a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial. The Court, on August 29, 2025, denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff did not seek or obtain appellate review regarding any such orders.

Despite these facts, fully knowing that he was required to obtain Court permission to use a pseudonym in this action, that his motion seeking such permission was denied such that no permission has been granted (as was his motion for reconsideration), and that he sought and obtained no appellate relief regarding such orders, what appears on Plaintiff’s purported “verification” on October 20, 2025, is a signature once again of “Jon (Alias) Boe.” As this is clearly not Plaintiff’s true name and as Plaintiff has long been on notice that he does not have permission to use such fictitious name, either Plaintiff has made this improper signature directly contrary to the law and this Court’s prior orders or Plaintiff (i.e., the real party in interest) did not make this signature and verification at all.

The Court notes that according to Defendant's RFA No. 18, which has been deemed admitted, Plaintiff's "true legal name is Jamie Seed Camel." (See Aguilar Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff's October 21, 2025 filing includes no verification in such name. Notably, while Plaintiff has apparently made a variety of filings in connection to this motion which, in parts, appear to argue that Plaintiff’s “verification” is valid, all such filings are also made and signed only under the same unauthorized fictitious name, “Jon (Alias) Boe,” and also contain no indication of the real party in interest.

In any event, what is important here is that purported “verification” included in Plaintiff's October 21, 2025 filing clearly was not made by Plaintiff “in the name of the real party in interest” under Code of Civil Procedure section 367 and thus, was neither properly nor clearly “subscribed by him” as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. The purposes of section 367 and 2015.5, among other reasons, are to

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make clear what specific person (or if applicable, an entity party) is subject to legal consequences such as the penalty of perjury upon signing a verification. Plaintiff's submission of a "verification" which does not bear any signature in his name, but instead, bears an unauthorized fictitious name, only serves to obfuscate who signed and is subject to such potential legal consequences. The Court finds that the “verification” is defective on its face for this reason. The Court does not conclude that the purported "verification" was "subscribed by" the real party in interest in this action.

As indicated earlier, if a party responds to requests for admission but those responses are unverified, they are “tantamount to no responses at all,” and the proponent is entitled to obtain an order that the requests are deemed admitted. (Appleton v Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636; see also (Allen-Pacific, Ltd. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1551 [disapproved on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983, fn. 12].) Therefore, the Court finds no grounds for it to make a factual finding now that Plaintiff served, “before the hearing on the motion” seeking deemed admissions, proposed responses to the subject request for admissions that were in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. On this basis alone, the Court’s October 22, 2025 order granting Defendant’s requested deemed admissions stands.

While the Court need not proceed further in addressing whether Plaintiff served substantially compliant responses so as to avoid deemed admission, it does so to explain yet another and independent reason why Plaintiff failed to do so. That is, even if Plaintiff had used his true name in signing the “verification” contained in his October 21, 2025 filing or that it could be determined in some other way that the "verification" was somehow "subscribed by him" within the meaning of section 2015.5, the statements made therein do not constitute an adequate verification effectively made under California law. In this regard, Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 states in full:

Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or requirement made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public), such matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of such person which recites that it is certified or declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury, is subscribed by him or her, and (1), if executed within this state, states the date and place of execution, or (2), if executed at any place, within or without this state, states the date of execution and that it is so certified or declared under the laws of the State of California. The certification or declaration may be in substantially the following form:

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(a) If executed within this state:

“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct”: _____________ _________ (Date and Place)(Signature)

(b) If executed at any place, within or without this state:

“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct”: _____________ _________ (Date)(Signature)

In contrast to Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, Plaintiff’s offered “verification” instead states:

By the authority of conscience, vunder Heauen, and before the thorne of eternal law, I affirm this UERIFIED REPLY IN-EQUTIY as true, correct, and faithful to the best of My knowledge, without prejudice to any right in equity or at law, now and foreuer. One the People [Settlors] Proclamation

Uested with the power and the spirite, i proclaim the aforementioned to bee a uerifiable fact, such is true and accurate, and i auer such vnder penalty of perjuring Myselfee against God and the laws of Nature. [Matthew v: vv. 34-37] But I say vnto you, Sweare not at all, neither by heauen, for it is Gods throne: Nor by the earth, for it is his footstoole: neither by Hierusalem, for it is the citie of the great king.[sic] Neither shalt -’ thou sweare by thy head, because thou canst not make one haire white or blacke. But let your communication bee Yea, vea: Nay, nav.: For whatsoeuer is more then these, commeth of euill. Exercised on this 20th daye of October 2025, a.D., at Sacramento, California.

(RFJN, Ex. 6, p.11 [errors in original].)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s argued “verification” does not comply with the statutory requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, as it is not effectively signed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California. While Plaintiff’s proposed “verification” does recite that it is made in Sacramento, California, Plaintiff’s “verification” is not in substantially the same form as set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 2015.5 insofar as it appears to qualify the attestation of “penalty of perjury” as that being “against God and the laws of Nature.” Further, as Defendant points out, in other parts of Plaintiff’s October 21, 2025 filing, he appears to disavow and/or reject the application of California law, arguing that instead only “equitable” principles and other maxim govern him and this action. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s

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October 21, 2025 filing does Plaintiff clearly state, clarify, or imply that his proposed responses are, in fact, made and verified under penalty of perjury subject to the laws of the State of California. Indeed, the purpose of the simple and unqualified “penalty of perjury” attestation when the signature is made within the State of California is to make clear that California law governs such penalty. Section 2015.5 does not permit a declarant to limit its potential liability by stating that its attestation under penalty of perjury is made (and thereby potentially only made) subject to laws from a source other than California law.

While Section 2015.5 might not prohibit a declarant from also verifying under penalty of perjury under other jurisdictions or sources of law, it does not permit the injection of qualifications or conditions which can be used later to disclaim that the verification was ever made subject to California law. Indeed, while it would have been potentially sufficient if Plaintiff (if using his true name) attested that his responses were made under “penalty of perjury” without qualification, and signed in Sacramento, he purposefully did not do so here assuming he signed the "verification" at all.

As a result, Plaintiff’s attempted “verification” is defective on this ground as well. This provides yet a separate and independent ground why the Court’s deemed admissions order stands.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s citation to Kulshresta is unavailing. In Kulshresta, the trial court granted summary judgment after it excluded a declaration that was signed in another state and did not reference California’s laws. (Kulshresta, supra, at p. 606.) The Supreme Court evaluated whether the declaration should have been considered as admissible evidence notwithstanding the declaration’s failure to conform with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court held that “a declaration is defective under section 2015.5 absent an express facial link to California or its perjury laws.” (Id. at p. 612.) The Court further confirmed, “courts do not find compliance with section 2015.5 to be both substantial and sufficient unless all statutory conditions appear on the face of the declaration in some form.” (Ibid.)

As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s “verification” does not substantially comply with Section 2015.5. Therefore, it is insufficient to constitute a valid verification of Plaintiff’s RFA responses. Again, because Plaintiff has submitted essentially unverified responses, he has not substantially complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 as unverified responses are “tantamount to no responses at all.” (Appleton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 636.)

Therefore, the Court makes no finding now that its October 22, 2025 order granting Defendant’s motion for deemed admissions should be vacated based upon Plaintiff’s filing of purported responses prior to commencement of the hearing on October 21, 2025.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant argues the SAC fails to state a cause of action for negligence, private nuisance, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, because Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted that he has not incurred any damages (Declaration of Kymberli Aguilar (“Aguilar Decl.”), Ex. A, RFA

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Nos. 1, 4, 10), that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care (Id., Nos. 2, 3), and that any alleged emotional distress predates the construction work alleged in the 2AC (Id., No. 17). Defendant also contends that judgment should be granted because Plaintiff continues to prosecute the action under a pseudonym. Finally, Defendant argues that judgment should be granted because Defendant was improperly sued as Deacon Construction, LLC is the entity that actually performed the construction work alleged in the 2AC.

Plaintiff argues in opposition that Defendant’s motion relies on “hyper-technical objections” to the 2AC, and that all of the identified defects are curable as a matter of law. (Opposition at 2:18- 3:2.) Plaintiff also argues that equity requires the Court to join Deacon Construction, LLC as a mandatory party since Defendant has admitted which entity performed the alleged construction work. (Id. at 3:8-4:7.) Plaintiff further contends Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting that Defendant and Deacon Construction, LLC are separate entities and that Defendant has failed to rebut the “merger and identity allegations placed on the record.” (Opposition at p. 8:19-20 [emphasis in original].)

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s requests for admissions cannot be deemed admitted for the reasons discussed above. Finally, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym does not warrant dismissal. Plaintiff requests leave to amend.

1.

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time for demurrer has expired. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) The motion may be directed either at the entire complaint or answer, or at any cause of action or affirmative defense set forth in the pleadings (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2).) When the moving party is the defendant, as in the instant motion, there are two permissible grounds: (a) The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or (b) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

The grounds for the motion shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) Indeed, the court will take judicial notice of records, such as admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and the like, when considering a demurrer [or motion for judgment on the pleadings]. (Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482; Morris v. Harbor Boat Bldg. Co. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 882, 886; Columbia Cas.

Co. v. Northwestern. Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604-605.) The Court properly takes judicial notice of such admissions “only where they contain statements of the plaintiff or his agent which are inconsistent with the allegations of the pleading before the court.” (Del E. Webb Corp., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 605.) Thus, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may extend consideration to matters that are subject to judicial notice; in doing so, the Court performs essentially the same task as ruling on a general demurrer. (Smiley v.

Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.) The Court sets out the general rules governing demurrers below.

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A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 C.481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted if, taking all of the allegations of the complaint to be true (or as contradicted by judicially noticed admissions), the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Consolidated Fire Protection Dis. v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers' Ass'n (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (See Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465 [“If there is no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted”].)

2. Negligence

To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation linking the breach to the plaintiff’s injury,

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and (4) damages resulting from the breach.” (Pereda v. Atos Jiu Jitsu LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 759, 767-768.)

As discussed above, the Court has granted Defendant’s motion to deemed matters admitted. “[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983.) Thus, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted that he did not incur any damages due to work performed by Defendant, that Defendant does not owe him a duty of care, that any damages to Plaintiff’s residence predated any work performed by Defendant, and that Plaintiff’s emotional distress predated the work performed by Defendant. (Aguilar Decl., Ex. A, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 17.)

These admissions show that Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence, as Plaintiff admissions directly contradiction the allegations stated in the 2AC. (Del E. Webb Corp., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 605 [A court properly takes judicial notice of requests for admissions “where they contain statements of the plaintiff . . . which are inconsistent with the allegations of the pleading before the court.”.)

Therefore, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence.

2. Private Nuisance

Civil Code section 3479 states:

Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.

“[T]o recover damages for nuisance the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s ‘invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial, i.e., that it caused the plaintiff to suffer “substantial actual damage.”’ The interference ‘must also be unreasonable.’” (Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1154 [footnotes omitted].)

Again, Plaintiff’s deemed admissions demonstrate that Plaintiff was not damaged by Defendant’s alleged work, that Defendant’s work was not a substantial factor in causing the damages alleged by Plaintiff, and that Defendant’s work was performed in a reasonable manner. (Aguilar Decl., Ex. A, Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 17.) As a result, Plaintiff’s allegations are inconsistent with the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV005025: BOE vs DEACON CORP. 02/24/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

judicially noticeable facts before the Court.

Thus, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for private nuisance.

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Plaintiff appears to acknowledge in opposition that he omitted this cause of action from his 2AC. (Opposition at p. 11:12-13.) However, to the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress, his allegations are insufficient.

“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 [internal quotation marks omitted].) “A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.) Additionally, the defendant’s conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Ibid.)

First, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant engaged in “outrageous” conduct that exceeds what is generally tolerated in civilized society. Plaintiff has merely alleged that Defendant’s manner of conducting its construction work was negligent and disruptive. Second, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant intended to inflict injury on Plaintiff. Finally, as discussed above, Plaintiff has been deemed to admit that he was not injured emotionally or physically by Defendant’s conduct.

As a result, to the extent Plaintiff intended to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to this cause of action.

4. Other Grounds for Defendant’s Motion

Defendant also argues that the Court should grant its motion because Plaintiff has proceeded to prosecute this action under a pseudonym and because he has failed to name the proper entity as a defendant in the action.

Defendant provides no legal authority that these are proper grounds on which to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings. As noted above, when a Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings, there are only two permissible grounds for the motion: (a) the court lacks subject

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV005025: BOE vs DEACON CORP. 02/24/2026 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

matter jurisdiction, or (b) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) In the absence of legal authority that supports Defendant’s contention that the Court may grant judgment on the grounds stated above, Defendant’s motion on these grounds is denied.

The Court does note that although Plaintiff contends that “equity” demands that the correct entity, which has been identified by Defendant, be joined as a party to the instant action, he provides no legal authority that supports his contention, nor can such an assertion simply result in such joinder without filing a proper noticed motion pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. As the Court has indicated in prior rulings, Plaintiff’s arguments that “equity” govern his case constitute no grounds to ignore or violate the Code of Civil Procedure and California Rules of Court.

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend. However, because Defendant’s RFAs have been deemed admitted and are properly considered under judicial notice, the Court finds that amendment would be futile under the circumstances. Nor has Plaintiff otherwise demonstrated how leave to amend would cure any deficiencies in his pleadings under these circumstances.

III.

Disposition

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend.

To the extent Plaintiff may have any cognizable form of relief remaining under the Code of Civil Procedure and California Rules of Court, the Court does not address such matters in the context of this ruling as no such request is properly or timely before this Court.

Defendant’s counsel shall prepare consistent with this ruling an order and judgment of dismissal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 and circulate the same prior to submission to the Court.