HONGXIA XIAO VS. FERNANDO ACOSTA, ET AL.

Background

This is an action regarding a real estate purchase (the subject property) plaintiff made in February 2022. Seller Cabrigas defendants were represented at the time of sale by Luxe Places as seller’s real estate agents and brokerage. “During a visit to the Property in the beginning to middle of February, 2022, before entering into the purchase and sale agreement for the Property, Cabrigas orally represented to Plaintiff that the bottom floor of the Property was rented as a separate unit

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 15 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ which is why a second kitchen was added on the bottom floor. The ability to rent the bottom floor as a separate unit was important to plaintiff because she was purchasing the Property as a rental property.” (FAC ¶ 13.)

“The Real Estate Disclosure Statement [appended to FAC as Ex. 2] stated that no room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs were made without necessary permits and that all room additions, structural modifications, and other alterations or repairs were in compliance with building codes.” (FAC ¶ 14.) “In reliance upon Cabrigas’ representations and the Real Estate Disclosure Statement, Plaintiff purchased the Property.” (FAC ¶ 15.)

On or about December 19, 2024, approximately two and one-half years after plaintiff purchased the subject property, the City of San Bruno inspected the property. “The inspection revealed numerous unpermitted renovations and hazards that were not disclosed in the Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement including, but not limited to: the back bedroom extension (downstairs) on the first floor was not permitted; the back Master Room (upstairs) was not permitted; the downstairs kitchen was not allowed; the backyard deck was built without a permit and is a hazard; the walls obstructing electrical outlets are not code-compliant and the washer and dryer downstairs were not code-compliant (collectively, the “Defects”).” (FAC ¶ 17, FAC Ex. 4 [correction notice from city].)

On October 8, 2025, plaintiff filed her FAC which raised six causes of action. The Cabrigas defendants filed the instant demurrer and a concurrently filed motion to strike. The demurrer challenges the third cause of action for intentional misrepresentation and the fourth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e). Plaintiff opposes.

Meet and Confer

The parties met and conferred as required pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.41, but were unable to reach a resolution. (Declaration of Courtney M. Brown filed March 6, 2026, ¶ 3.)

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 430.30 & 430.70.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) A demurrer founded on section 430.10(e) which arises when an allegation essential to a cause of action is missing, is often referred to as a “general demurrer.” (McKenney v. Purepac Pharm. Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.) “Neither trial nor appellate courts should be distracted from the main issue, or rather, the only issue involved in a demurrer hearing, namely, whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” [Citation omitted.] (Ibid.)

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 16 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

When a plaintiff “has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory” it is error to sustain a demurrer. (Bush v. California Conservation Corps (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 194, 200.) When considering demurrers, courts give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and the parts in their context, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among parties. (Villafana v. County of San Diego (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1012, 1016-1017 [citations omitted].)

Discussion

Third Cause of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation

“The elements of intentional misrepresentation ‘are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.’ (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230–231 [162 Cal.Rptr.3d 864].).” (Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1245.)

Fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity for defendant to fully understand the nature of the charge. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.) Generally, such specificity requires pleading facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Ibid.) Less specificity, however, is required then the defendant “must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838; see also Committee On Children's Television, Inc. v.

General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217; Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158.) Further, a single representation is sufficient to support a fraud claim. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 854; Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1248.)

Intent and knowledge can be alleged generally. (5 Witkin, Cal. Proc., Pleading § 723 (6th ed. March 2026 update).) “Thus, where the representation is alleged to have been “falsely and fraudulently” made, it is impliedly alleged that the defendant knew it was untrue. (Spreckels v. Gorrill (1907) 152 C. 383, 387, 92 P. 1011; Cameron v. Evans Sec. Corp. (1931) 119 C.A. 164, 168, 6 P.2d 272.)” (Ibid.)

Since a demurrer “admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint,” a plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations “does not concern the reviewing court... The plaintiffs need only plead facts showing that they may be entitled to some relief.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604 superseded by statute on other grounds [internal quotations omitted].) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)

The FAC meets all the requirements for pleading intentional misrepresentation. It alleges that Cabrigas “orally represented to Plaintiff that the bottom floor of the Property was rented as a separate unit which is why a second kitchen was added on the bottom floor.” (FAC ¶ 13.) The

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 17 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ same paragraph alleges the ability to rent the bottom floor was important to plaintiff because she was buying the property as a rental property. (Id.) The FAC further alleges the real estate disclosure statement stated, “no room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs were made without necessary permits and that all room additions, structural modifications, and other alterations or repairs were in compliance with building codes” (FAC ¶ 14) and “[i]n reliance upon Cabrigas’ representations and the Real Estate Disclosure Statement, Plaintiff purchased the Property.” (FAC ¶ 15.)

Then on or around December 19, 2024, the City of San Bruno’s inspection “revealed numerous unpermitted renovations and hazards that were not disclosed in the Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement including, but not limited to: the back bedroom extension (downstairs) on the first floor was not permitted; the back Master Room (upstairs) was not permitted; the downstairs kitchen was not allowed; the backyard deck was built without a permit and is a hazard; the walls obstructing electrical outlets are not code-compliant and the washer and dryer downstairs were not code-compliant (collectively, the “Defects”).” (FAC ¶ 17.)

The FAC alleges knowledge. (See e.g. FAC ¶ 43.)

Applying the applicable law and viewing these allegations in conjunction with the ultimate facts alleged in the FAC paragraphs 30 through 35 of intentional acts by defendants, these allegations sufficiently alleges the existence of a misrepresentation by the Cabrigas defendants and their knowledge of its falsity with intent to induce reliance, that plaintiff did justifiably rely and purchased the subject property and her resultant damage. Accordingly, demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action – Negligent Misrepresentation

“The elements of negligent misrepresentation are: ‘(1) the misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.’ (Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 199.).” (Aton Center, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at 1245–1246.)

Plaintiff has stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation baased on the allegations in paragraphs 13 through 17 with the ultimate facts set forth in paragraphs 37 through 39 which allege the misrepresentation and disclosures made by the Cabrigas defendants regarding the condition of the Property were either “false, inaccurate, and misleading” or “made in a manner not warranted by the information that the Cabrigas defendants had at the time that the representations and disclosures were made even though they may have believed them to be true”; the Cabrigas Defendants intended that plaintiff would rely on the Cabrigas Defendants’ representations and disclosures and purchase of the Property and she did. (FAC ¶¶ 37-38) Plaintiff would not have done so, had she known the true facts (FAC ¶ 39) and she has suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the Cabrigas defendants’ negligent misrepresentations and concealment including, but not limited to, diminution in value of the Property, costs of repair and other consequential damages, lost rental income and costs. (FAC ¶ 40.) Accordingly, demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 18 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ The Cabrigas defendants shall file an answer within ten (10) days service of written notice of entry of order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g); Code Civ. Proc., § 472b.)

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the California Rules of Court.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 19 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 5 25-CIV-00474 HONGXIA XIAO VS. FERNANDO ACOSTA, ET AL.

HONGXIA XIAO STEVEN SOLOWAY FERNANDO ACOSTA ASHLEY N. KIM

DEFENDANTS ANNABELLE CABRIGAS HAZELTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE, AND THE ANNABELLE A. CABRIGAS FAMILY TRUST’S MOTION TO STRIKE PARAGRAPHS 22, 27, 34, 35, 47 AND PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 IN THE PRAYER FOR RELIEF OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF’S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD BY CONCEALMENT

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Annabelle Cabrigas Hazaelton, individually, and as trustee of the Annabelle A. Cabrigas Family Trust and the Annabelle A. Cabrigas Family Trust’s (collectively Cabrigas defendants) motion for an order striking paragraphs 22, 27, 34, 35, 47 in Plaintiff Hongxia Xiao’s first amended complaint (FAC) filed October 8, 2025, and paragraphs 2 and 3 in the prayer for relief and the fifth cause of action for fraud by concealment is DENIED IN ENTIRETY.

The Cabrigas defendants’ request for judicial notice filed March 6, 2026, of the following four exhibits is GRANTED. (Evid. Code. § 452, subd. (d).) - Ex. 1: Plaintiff Hongxia Xiao’s complaint; - Ex. 2: Plaintiff Hongxia Xiao’s first amended complaint; - Ex. 3: The Court’s September 29, 2025 order granting defendants Fernando Acosta, Kenny Angelica Miller and Full Spectrum Properties, Inc. dba Luxe Places International Realty’s motion to strike plaintiff’s prayers for punitive damages and general damages; and - Ex. 4: The Court’s September 29, 2025 order sustaining defendants Fernando Acosta, Kenny Angelica Miller and Full Spectrum Properties, Inc. dba Luxe Places International Realty's demurrer to Plaintiff's complaint.

“[C]ase law is quite clear that the court can take judicial notice of documents in the court file. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Heston v. Farmers Ins. Group (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 402, 413, 206 Cal.Rptr. 585 [briefs filed in court are subject to judicial notice].)” (Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504, 524.) That being said, “judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true; it means only that those findings of fact were made. [Citation.] ‘ “[N]either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding ....” ’ [Citation.].” (Barri v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437–438.)

A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437; Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.) A court may, upon motion or in its