CHRISTINE A. HALL, ET AL VS. SHUJUAN WU, ET AL

Defendants file a cross-complaint alleging that plaintiffs have harassed them since before they moved into their property, such as by calling the fire-department on defendants’ oyster barbeque to celebrate their new property in an ethnically targeted manner, by calling the police to ticket their visiting relative’s truck which the police declined to do, and by screaming at defendants’ toddler in their backyard, purportedly resulting in defendant Wu miscarrying another pregnancy. After two years of allegedly living in fear and harassment, defendants reported plaintiffs’ misconduct to the police. Defendants allege that transfer of title to plaintiff Christine

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Hall of the property in which plaintiffs reside was fraudulent, and that plaintiff Francis Hall has falsely claimed to be the owner of that property although he allegedly does not own any interest. Defendants further complain that plaintiffs slandered defendants to defendants’ family, compounding plaintiffs’ emotional harm to defendants.

Plaintiffs demur to each cause of action of the cross-complaint, asking that leave to amend be denied.

The first and second causes of action of the cross-complaint have been stricken (Minute Order, May 6, 2026), and therefore are not herein addressed further.

A. Legal Standards for Demurrer

“[I]t is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint [citation]; that the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court [citations]; and that plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief [citation].” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013 (John’s Grill), quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 (Alcorn).)

A court reviewing a demurrer accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint as well as those of which it may take judicial notice (John’s Grill, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1008, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318), but does not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (Aubry).) “

When a plaintiff “has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory,” it is error to sustain a demurrer. (Bush v. California Conservation Corps (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 194, 200, emphasis added.) Further: “the court is required to look at the existing pleading and hazard its best judgment whether behind the words of the pleading anything of legal substance lies, whether on further revision the pleading can honestly state a cause of action.” (Tovar v. S. Cal. Edison Co. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 606, 615 (Tovar).)

Uncertainty (section 430.10, subdivision (f)) is generally a difficult ground on which to sustain a demurrer:

Even though the complaint is in some respects uncertain, the courts often hold it good against demurrer on the theory that, “though not a model of pleading,” its allegations, liberally construed, are sufficient to apprise the defendant of the issues that he or she is to meet.

(3 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Plead. § 975 When Demurrer Will Be Overruled (2024) (citations omitted).)

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822, and citations therein.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, citations omitted.) A special demurrer for uncertainty should not be sustained when the allegations of the complaint “are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues” which must be met. (Bacon v. Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605, citations omitted.) Such a demurrer should be “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292, citations omitted.)

Finally, “it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967.) Although leave to amend is liberally allowed, such leave should not be granted where, in all probability, amendment would be futile. (Foroudi v. Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1001.) It is the burden of the party seeking leave to amend to show the possibility that amendment can cure the legal defects of the pleading. (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 687.)

B. The Demurrer is Sustained in Part and Overruled in Part

1. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Third Cause of Action

In their third cause of action, defendants allege that Christine Hall and Francis Hall falsely claimed to be the legal owners of their own residence at 1843 Sweetwood. (Crosscomplaint, ¶¶ 41-68.) Defendants allegedly live at 1839 Sweetwood. (Id., ¶ 51.)

The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.

(Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar), quotation and citations omitted.)

Even assuming, as the court must on a demurrer, that plaintiffs and “Roe 1” falsely claimed that Christine Hall and Francis Hall are the owners of 1843 Sweetwood, defendants have not alleged any facts indicating that they detrimentally relied on such false representations nor that the allegedly false representation caused defendants any injury, much less damages of $2 million.

Because this is plaintiffs’ first demurrer, the court grants defendants the opportunity to amend their cross-complaint. If defendants intend to amend this cause of action, however, they must plead facts explaining how they detrimentally relied on an allegedly inaccurate chain of title to the Halls’ residence, and the harm defendants allegedly suffered from that allegedly inaccurate chain of title.

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 2. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Fourth Cause of Action

The cross-complaint does not plead a conspiracy between plaintiffs to commit “abuse of process, malicious prosecution, fraud, and [to] inflict emotional distress” (IIED) on defendants. (Cross-complaint, ¶ 72.) As noted above, the abuse of process and malicious prosecution causes of action were previously stricken. Further, defendants have not pled fraud. Nor, as discussed below, have they pled IIED. Significantly,

Conspiracy is not a separate tort, but a form of vicarious liability by which one defendant can be held liable for the acts of another. To establish conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had knowledge of and agreed to both the objective and the course of action that resulted in the injury, that there was a wrongful act committed pursuant to that agreement, and that there was resulting damage.

(IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652, internal citations omitted.) To plead conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had knowledge of and agreed to both the objective and the course of action that resulted in the injury, that there was a wrongful act committed pursuant to that agreement, and that there was resulting damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.) A conspiracy requires evidence “that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it.” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333.)

Because defendants have not pled the underlying, substantive torts, and conspiracy is a mechanism for pleading secondary liability and not an independent cause of action, the conspiracy cause of action is dismissed without leave to amend.

3. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Fifth Cause of Action

“The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows: (1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273, citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.) “A defendant's conduct is considered to be outrageous if ‘it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” (Crouch v.

Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007 (Crouch) [13- year-old rape victim who had been drugged and raped by adult male employee stated a claim for IIED where she alleged that non-profit director, who was also her grandmother, screamed at and blamed victim], quoting Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051, cleaned up.) Liability for IIED does not extend to “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”’ (Ibid.)

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Defendants allege that plaintiffs made harassing complaints to the fire and police departments, respectively, about defendants’ barbeque; and about a relative’s truck. (Crosscomplaint, ¶¶ 9-11, 14-15, 70.) Defendants further allege that on one occasion, when their toddler was playing in the yard, plaintiff Christine Hall yelled “STOP.” (Id., ¶ 13.) Wu alleges that she had a miscarriage including as a result of this incident. (Ibid.)

Further, defendants allege that as a result of these purported acts by plaintiffs, they “couldn’t enjoy the backyard and house” (id., ¶ 9), “felt so scared” and “started to worry about their safety living next to people like this” (id., ¶ 12), and “have been suffering from emotional, physical, and mental anguish issues related to the ongoing harassment and intimidation” by plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Defendants have not pled facts demonstrating that plaintiffs’ behavior was so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Crouch, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) Although Wu contends that she suffered a miscarriage as a “result of the evil harassment” by plaintiffs (cross-complaint, ¶¶ 13, 82), she does not connect this undisputedly unfortunate event to extreme and outrageous conduct by plaintiffs. Rather, defendants allege that Christine Hall yelled “STOP” at defendants’ toddler while the child was playing in the backyard. (Id., ¶ 13.) Even if true, that does not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to state a claim for IIED.

4. The Demurrer is Overruled as to the Sixth Cause of Action

“The essence of the cause of action for trespass is an ‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another. Such invasions are characterized as intentional torts, regardless of the actor’s motivation.” (Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1480, citation omitted.) The cross-complaint alleges that plaintiffs entered and occupied defendants’ property without defendants’ consent, and that plaintiffs refused to leave when asked to do so. (Cross-complaint, ¶¶ 85-86.)

Although defendants do not allege when the purported trespass occurred, this allegation may be fleshed out through discovery.

5. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Seventh Cause of Action

Defendants allege that plaintiffs filed the instant action to extort money, property, or services from defendants. (Cross-complaint, ¶¶ 88, 90.) “Extortion is the obtaining of property or other consideration from another, with his or her consent ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 518.)” It is unclear whether California recognizes a civil cause of action for extortion. (See, e.g., Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 317, 333 [lawyer’s communication constituted criminal extortion]; Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1427.)

Defendants allege that plaintiffs demanded money, property, or services from them (crosscomplaint, ¶ 90), but also that defendant Wu “complied with the demands ... by responding to

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ cross-defendants’ frivolous lawsuit, based on their payment for cross-complainants’ filing fees and expenditure of legal fees and costs.” (Id., ¶ 92.) The allegations is unclear, however, it appears that defendants are alleging that they were extorted where they incurred fees and costs in connection with this lawsuit. That does not state a claim for extortion, but rather is an ordinary function of participating in litigation.

6. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Eighth Cause of Action

Defendants quiet title claim is unintelligible. It is unclear whether they are seeking to quiet title to their own property or to an alleged easement claimed by plaintiffs.

A quiet title claim requires the proponent to plead:

(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. .... In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any.

(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.

(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.

(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.

(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

Defendants allege that “[p]laintiffs claim to have an interest in their own residence and further claim to have an interest in an easement or property line dividing with Shu Wu and Huanhua Li’s residence.” (Cross-complaint, ¶ 95.) This allegation does not fulfill the requirements of the governing statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (a).) The crosscomplaint further alleges that plaintiffs’ title in their residence is fraudulent, and that defendants hold title to their residence, but the allegations do not make clear which are the adverse titles against which a determination is sought as to the insufficiently specified subject property. Further, no date is set forth as required. (Id., § 761.020, subd. (d).)

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 7. The Demurrer is Overruled as to the Ninth Cause of Action

Defendants allege that they seek a declaratory judgment as to the property lines between their property and plaintiffs’ property.

Any person interested under a written instrument, ... or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property ... may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring a[] ... cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

Here, an actual controversy between the parties is alleged “as to the property Boundaries [sic] dividing the two houses of 1839 Sweetwood Dr. and 1843 Sweetwood Dr.” (Crosscomplaint, ¶ 97.) Defendants state a claim where they seek a determination “as to where the property lines are located and as to the rightful title as to the two properties at issues.” (Id., ¶ 99.)

8. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Tenth Cause of Action

Defendants allege that plaintiffs have been harassing, annoying, and threatening them, and have refused to stop when asked. (Cross-complaint, ¶¶ 101-103.)

Concerning injunctions, the law provides that:

“Harassment” is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

Defendants have not alleged facts showing that they were threatened with violence or a credible threat of violence. They have alleged that the plaintiffs called the fire department over a suspected gas leak when defendants were having a barbecue in their backyard between May and September 2022; that in November 2022, plaintiffs called the police to ticket a commercial truck belonging to defendants’ visiting relative; and that in March 2024, Christine Hall yelled at defendants’ toddler. (Cross-complaint, ¶¶ 9-12.) These three events over a two-year period do not state a claim for harassment.

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 9. The Demurrer is Sustained Without Leave to Amend as to the Eleventh Cause of Action

A private citizen can only be liable for a civil rights violation pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 when acting under color of law. (Choate v. County of Orange (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 320 (Choate).) In Choate, the trial court had granted a nonsuit as to two defendants who were off-duty deputies acting as civilians rather than police officers regarding a fight, “finding they acted for personal reasons as private citizens and not under color of law.” (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 335, n.14.)

Here, although the cross-complaint alleges that “cross-defendants were acting or falsely purporting to act in the performance of their official duties” there are no allegations that plaintiffs had any “official duties.” (Cross-complaint, ¶ 108.) Unless defendants can allege facts demonstrating that plaintiffs had any “official duties” that they violated, the court will not grant leave to amend.

10. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Twelfth Cause of Action

The cross-complaint alleges that plaintiffs conspired to violate defendants’ civil rights under Title 42, United States Code, section 1985(3).

If two or more persons in any State ... conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

(42 U.S.C. § 1985, subd. (3).)

Defendants allege that “Cross-defendants’ actions were intended to prevent state authorities from securing equal protection.” (Cross-complaint, ¶ 115.) Defendants’ allegations are vague and unintelligible and do not identify what actions plaintiffs allegedly took that supposedly violated Section 1985. Any amendment of this cause of action must clarify the allegations.

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 11. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Causes of Action

Despite quoting a federal case for the assertion that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “was intended to combat organized crime, not to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to every tort plaintiff” (Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-operative Assn. (9th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2d 783, 786), defendants seek to assert RICO claims against plaintiffs. Defendants RICO causes of action simply incorporate the preceding allegations of the cross-complaint, which generally sound in tort, without meeting any of the standards for pleading a RICO cause of action. Defendants cannot simply label ordinary torts as RICO predicates. (Globe Internat., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 393, 396-97.)

Defendants have not pled the elements of a civil RICO claim. (Gervase v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1232 (Gervase) [“The elements of a civil RICO cause of action have been variously stated and in fact differ according to the type of prohibited activity alleged. In general, however, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff's business or property by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with an enterprise which affects interstate commerce.”].)

The cross-complaint does not alleged any facts indicating that plaintiffs engaged in any RICO predicate acts, nor a “pattern of racketeering activity.” (See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5), 1962.) “For an act or omission to qualify as racketeering activity, it must be included in the list of activities set forth in title 18, United States Code section 1961, subdivision (1). While that list is lengthy, it does not include every criminal or civil wrong a person or entity might commit and excluded actions, no matter how grievous, cannot qualify as racketeering activity within the meaning of RICO.” (Gervase, supra, at p. 1232; see also id. at pp. 1232-1233 [discussing the required to plead a pattern of racketeering activity].)

12. The Demurrer is Sustained Without Leave to Amend as to the Fifteenth Cause of Action

Defendants claim a prescriptive easement in some portion of the adjoining. “First, the two broad elements required to create a prescriptive easement are (1) an adverse use for (2) the fiveyear prescriptive period.” (Zimmer v. Dykstra (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 422, 430 (citing Civ. Code, § 1007, & Code Civ. Proc., § 321).) The cross-complaint alleges defendants’ “adverse use of the easement for about 1 year preceding the commencement of this action.” (Cross-complaint, ¶ 131.) Because defendants claimed to have moved into their property adjoining plaintiffs’ in 2022 (id., ¶¶ 9-10) and filed their lawsuit in 2024, they cannot plead an element of this cause of action. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 321 [“occupation of the property by any other person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for five years before the commencement of the action.”].)

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 13. The Demurrer is Sustained with Leave to Amend as to the Sixteenth Cause of Action

The bulk of this cause of action reproduces text from Civil Code, section 845, subdivisions (a)-(c).

The statute refers either to an agreement between the parties as owners of an easement, or in the absence of such agreement, to the sharing of costs of maintaining the easement among the parties in proportion to its use by each. (Civ. Code, § 845, subd. (b).) However, defendants do not allege that any agreement exists between the parties. Thus, to the extent to which this cause of action is for specific performance of any agreement, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Further, while the label of the cause of action refers to the installation of a fence, the nature of the easement is not sufficiently alleged. Neither is its use by each of the parties alleged, nor the nature of its required maintenance, nor the costs of such maintenance. Thus, to the extent to which this cause of action seeks an order compelling plaintiffs to pay their share of installing a fence mentioned in the heading of the cause of action, it again fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Where the court has given defendants leave to amend the above causes of actin, they are ORDERED to file an amended cross-complaint within ten (10) days of notice of entry of this Order.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, plaintiffs’ counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.