MEGAN BERRY SWADELL VS. UN HUI OONEE, MD

This filing is miscaptioned, confusing and clearly in error. It could not be a notice of a writ actually having been filed, and also a request seeking additional time to file the very same writ. In any event, the substance of the filing contained zero notice of an actual writ filing. Instead, Defendant sought an extension of time to file a writ petition, which was promptly denied on April 27, 2026. Regardless, in the absence of any actual writ petition being filed and stay from an appellate court, nor any stay by this trial court, the above deadline remained in full effect, i.e. “Defendant is to file and serve its responsive pleading within five court days, i.e. by 12:00 p.m. on April 24, 2026.” (Minute Order, April 17, 2026.)

June 12, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar

HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________

Generally, after a motion to quash service of process has been denied,

the defendant, within 10 days after service upon him or her of a written notice of entry of an order of the court denying his or her motion . . . and before pleading, may petition an appropriate reviewing court for a writ of mandate to require the trial court to enter its order quashing the service of summons or staying or dismissing the action. The defendant shall file or enter his or her responsive pleading in the trial court within the time prescribed by subdivision (b) unless, on or before the last day of the defendant's time to plead, he or she serves upon the adverse party and files with the trial court a notice that he or she has petitioned for a writ of mandate. The service and filing of the notice shall extend the defendant's time to plead until 10 days after service upon him or her of a written notice of the final judgment in the mandate proceeding.

CCP § 418.10 subd. (c).

However, Defendant fails to provide any authority that Section 418.10(c) which would apply generally to all civil cases, has the same timeframe in an unlawful detainer context which has a much shorter deadline to respond to a summons. Nor is there any authority provided that the Court could not order a specific deadline to file a responsive pleading. Finally, as discussed below, the record does not reflect that Defendant did timely file an actual writ of mandate, and thus Section 418.10(c) is not even applicable.

Section 418.10 also then provides:

(d) No default may be entered against the defendant before expiration of his or her time to plead. (e) A defendant or cross-defendant may make a motion under this section and simultaneously answer, demur or move to strike the complaint or cross-complaint. Id., subd. (d) & (e).

Defendant argues without authority, that by filing the notice of intent to file a writ of mandate, her deadline to file a responsive pleading was extended to 10 days after the final judgment in the writ proceeding. However, Section 418.10(c) plainly requires that the writ of mandate must indeed be filed and that notice of the filing be filed with the Court, and none of that timely occurred. Defendant’s notice of intent essentially had no legal effect. Indeed, the only thing in the Court Registry on the actual filing of any writ, is the Court of Appeals Order filed on May 8, 2026 reflecting a one sentence ruling: “The request for stay and petition for writ of mandate are denied.” Id.

Defendant argues that she never received notice of the order denying the motion to quash. However, the Court mailed notice to the parties on April 21, 2026. (See Affidavit of Service of Order Denying Motion to Quash, filed April 21, 2026.) More importantly, as noted above, Defendant appeared at the actual hearing, she had received the tentative, desired to contest it though not in a timely fashion, and therefore Defendant was on actual notice of the specific deadline to file and serve a responsive pleading, to wit: “by 12:00 p.m. on April 24, 2026.” (Minute Order, April 17, 2026.)

Default was then entered against Plaintiff even later on April 28, 2026, thus Defendant had several days past the Court imposed deadline to have filed a responsive pleading. Notably, this is eleven days after the hearing on April 17, 2026 (where Defendant had actual notice of her deadline to plead), is past the Court imposed deadline of April 24, 2026 to plead, and is also past the ten day period referred to in CCP Section 418.10 to the extent it even applies and had it not been shortened by the Court.

June 12, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar

HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________

Defendant has also conceded that possession is now moot, as she has already vacated the premises. (Oppo., at p. 12; Nam Decl., ¶¶ 22, 23.) On a practical level, this means the unlawful detainer Judgment for possession can no longer be enforced, i.e. Plaintiff already has regained possession.

Notably, Defendant admits being aware of this unlawful detainer action as early as February 2, 2026. Nam. Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant admits that she “actively litigated this matter from the outset.” Mtn. MPA, pg. 3, line 7. Defendant then brought three consecutive motions to quash, the first was denied procedurally, the second granted, and the third was denied as noted above. See, Minute Orders of February 27, 2026, March 6, 2026 and April 17, 2026.

Defendant, though self-represented, has acknowledged in this case and before this Court, that she is a licensed California attorney. Plaintiff identifies her as such, under State Bar No. 321543. Opposition, pg. 2, line 6. Thus, Defendant is presumed to know that at any time when filing any one of her three consecutive motions to quash, she could have easily “simultaneously answer, demur or move to strike the complaint” (CCP Section 418.10(e)) which would have prevented the taking of the very default she now challenges. Especially prudent, when Defendant admits that “from the earliest stages of the litigation, Plaintiff repeatedly threatened and attempted to obtain default despite Defendant’s active participation.” Mtn. MPA, pg. 3, lines 10-11.

Finally, though Defendant also sought general relief under CCP Section 473, Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities does not even substantively argue the merits under Section 473. Defendant’s Reply Brief does make some argument for this as an alternative. Reply, pg. 5, lines 19 to pg. 6, line 2. Nevertheless, based on this record, Defendant fails to carry the burden to demonstrate any excusable neglect for such relief.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to set aside default is DENIED.

Any party who contests a tentative ruling must email Dept20@sanmateocourt.org with a copy to all other parties by 4:00 p.m. stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, Counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the CRC. Please note that Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv) states in part “prevailing party on a tentative ruling is required to prepare a proposed order REPEATING VERBATIM the tentative ruling” (emphasis added). The order should be filed or e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the Court.