Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

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Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Dr. Jeffrey A. Saladin, Dental Corporation dba Children’s Choice Pediatric Dental Care’s (“Defendant” or “Dr. Saladin”) motion for protective order is ruled upon as follows.

This is a premises liability action. Plaintiff Mayra Barrera (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she slipped on an unattended liquid spill at the Children’s Choice Pediatric Dental Care clinic on January 6, 2020, thereby causing injury.

On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendant with a notice of deposition for Defendant’s person most knowledgeable on several topics related to liability, including the clinic’s cleaning and maintenance policies and procedures, Defendant’s response to the subject incident, employee training policies, placement of “wet floor” signs, and prior slip-and-fall incidents, among other topics. On March 10, 2025, Defendant produced Kayla Brower as its person most knowledgeable (“PMK”) in response to the notice of deposition. However, prior to and during the deposition, Defendant’s counsel stated that Ms. Brower was being designated as the PMK for only some of the topics listed in the notice, and that Defendant would not be producing a witness

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 09/10/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order to Prevent Deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Saladin in Department 54

for the other topics. (See Farahi Decl., Exh. A.) Following Ms. Brower’s deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel expressed his intent to depose Dr. Saladin in his individual capacity. On or around May 9, 2025, Defendant’s counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendant objected to Plaintiff’s attempt to depose Dr. Saladin on the basis that Dr. Saladin did not witness the subject incident and thus “has no knowledge beyond what plaintiffs already know.” (Culley Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant’s counsel also noted that Plaintiff had already deposed Defendant’s PMK, and Dr. Saladin would not have any further information outside of the PMK’s knowledge. Thus, Defendant moves for a protective order to prevent Dr. Saladin’s deposition on the basis that it would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b).) The order may include a directive “[t]hat the deposition not be taken at all.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b)(1).)

Defendant cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.030, presumably subdivision (a)(1), which provides that a trial court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a method of discovery if it determines that “[t]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030(a)(1).) Defendant also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020, presumably subdivision (a), which provides, in part, “The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).)

Defendant’s motion fails to establish that either of these statutes applies. For one, there is no evidence that Plaintiff has taken an unreasonable number of depositions in this case or conducted an unreasonable amount of discovery into liability. Defendant merely asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that Dr. Saladin “has no knowledge beyond what plaintiffs already know.” (Culley Decl., ¶ 9.) Notably, there is no declaration from Dr. Saladin to affirm this assertion. Nor is there any evidence of what Plaintiff already knows.

Defendant submits Plaintiff’s PMK deposition notice seemingly to suggest that Plaintiff has already obtained comprehensive testimony on Defendant’s slip-and-fall related policies. (See Culley Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. A.) However, Defendant’s moving papers contain no excerpts from the deposition itself to show what information Plaintiff actually obtained during the deposition, and, as noted above, Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that Defendant did not produce a witness for all of the topics identified in the deposition notice.

More importantly, Defendant fails to explain how the fact that Plaintiff has already deposed a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 09/10/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order to Prevent Deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Saladin in Department 54

PMK precludes Plaintiff from deposing Dr. Saladin, who is apparently the owner of the clinic and a party to this action.[1] A party may take the deposition of another party as a matter of right. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.280(a).) It follows that a party who seeks a protective order preventing his deposition from taking place must make a significant showing of good cause, which Defendant has not made here. Further, even if Dr. Saladin’s testimony overlaps with Ms. Brower’s testimony, Plaintiff is not limited to questioning Dr. Saladin on topics beyond those identified in the PMK notice that resulted in Ms. Brower’s deposition. Again, Dr. Saladin appears to be a party, and Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery into any matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

Finally, Defendant raises several issues in reply that should have been raised in the initial moving papers. For one, the reply contains excerpts purportedly from Ms. Brower’s deposition. (See Reply, Exh. A.) The excerpts are not authenticated by a declaration, and the exhibit fails to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1116(a) or (c). Defendant also argues, for the first time in reply, that “Dr. Saladin, as the owner and principal dentist of the practice, has significant professional obligations that would be disrupted by a deposition.” (Reply, p. 3:7-8.) No evidence is submitted to support this assertion. Thus, the arguments raised in Defendant’s reply are rejected.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for protective order is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420(h). Sanctions are imposed against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,400.00, representing 6 hours at $400 per hour. (Farahi Decl., ¶¶ 9- 10.) Sanctions to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel by no later than September 24, 2025, and if not paid by that date, Plaintiff may prepare for the Court’s signature a formal order granting the sanctions, which may then be enforced as a separate judgment. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.)

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The Court is somewhat confused as to the precise nature of the parties in this case. The first amended complaint

identifies Dr. Saladin as one of three individuals doing business as Children’s Choice Pediatric Dental Care. Thus, Dr. Saladin is named in the first amended complaint in his individual capacity. However, the caption of Defendant’s moving papers identifies Defendant as Dr. Jeffrey A. Saladin, Dental Corporation dba Children’s Choice Pediatric Dental Care, erroneously sued as Jeffrey Saladin, an individual dba Pediatric Dental Care. This suggests that Defendant is a corporate entity separate from Dr. Saladin, the individual. However, Defendant’s memorandum of points and authorities identifies Defendant as “Jeffrey Saladin,” and Defendant’s counsel’s declaration states that she is counsel of record for Jeffrey Saladin. (See Culley Decl., ¶ 1.) Since the first amended complaint names Dr. Saladin as an individual, the Court assumes that Dr. Saladin is a defendant in this case.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311890-CU-PO-GDS: Mayra Barrera vs. Page Hudson 09/10/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order to Prevent Deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Saladin in Department 54