PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al.

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

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TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Christopher Schaal’s and Lydia Trujillo’s special motion to strike selfrepresented Plaintiff Joseph Marion Perez’s complaint is denied.

Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

In this action, Plaintiff alleges causes of action against numerous defendants for intentional interference with economic relationship, trade libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and fraud. Plaintiff. Who formerly operated a construction company, alleges that the various defendants engaged in a scheme to harm his reputation and business operations. He alleges that after he filed a mechanic’s lien in connection with work he performed for Mike Baddley, defendant Lopez began contacting Plaintiff’s clients and subcontractors and making false statements. (Comp. ¶ 29.)

Defendant Lopez allegedly posted on Facebook that Plaintiff was bribing the Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”). (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bugayong spread false statements that Plaintiff was not paying contractors and was insolvent. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that Schaal left a voicemail for one of his clients falsely stating that Plaintiff “targeted minorities and churches”, had “over 70 victims” and was being “criminally investigated.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 35.) Plaintiff alleges that Schaal, Lopez and Bugayoung recruited Plaintiff’s former clients and subcontractors to file complaint against Plaintiff with the CSLB. (Id. ¶ 39.)

Plaintiff performed work for Schaal and Trujillo and the work was the subject of a civil lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Defendants moves to strike the complaint pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

The Court’s review of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-prong process. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.) First, Defendant must establish that the challenged causes of action arose from “an act in furtherance of [their] right of petition or free speech.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(1).) If Defendant meet that burden, then the second prong

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

requires Plaintiffs to establish “that there is a probability that [Plaintiffs] will prevail on the claim.” (Id.) Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech and lacks even minimal merit is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820; citations omitted.) Thus, initially, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1046.) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1043.)

First Prong-Arising From Protected Speech

In determining whether Defendants met their burden, the Court considers not only the pleadings, but also the “supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts which the liability or defense is based.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(2).) ‘In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers the ‘pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79.) As noted by relevant authority, it is crucial to look past the allegations in the complaint and to consider affidavits in order to obtain the complete picture of the plaintiff’s claims. (Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 630.)

“A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1043.) Subdivision (e) provides: “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(2) “encompass[] any cause of action against a person arising from any statement or writing made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, an official proceeding or body.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113.) “Thus statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require any showing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest.” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35.) “A claim for relief filed in [] court indisputably is a ‘statement or writing made before a.judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)).” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90.) “[T]he constitutional right to petition includes the basis act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.’” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1115.) “[J]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1115 [citations omitted].) “Accordingly, although litigation may not have commenced, if a statement ‘concern[s] the subject matter of the dispute’ and is made ‘in anticipation of litigation ‘contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration’ then the statement may be petitioning activity protected by section 425.16.” (Bailey v.

Brewer (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 781, 789-790.) California courts “have looked to the litigation privilege as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (2) with respect to the first step of the twostep anti-SLAPP inquiry.” (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479.)

Defendants contend that the entire complaint against them arises from their right to initiate judicial proceedings and their right to petition the CSLB. Defendants assert that the alleged disparaging statements “occurred while a 2022 civil litigation was pending” between themselves and Plaintiff and “were directly related to the subject matter of the construction disputed being litigated by the parties and which served the basis for” Defendant Schaal’s CLSB complaint. (Mot. 4:22-25.) Defendants argue that the complaint “is based entirely on the fact that Defendant Schaal filed a civil lawsuit against Perez; complained to the CSLB, a branch of the government, and testified at a CSLB administrative hearing.” (Mot. 5:6-8.)

The Court’s review of the complaint and Defendants’ request for judicial notice do not support Defendant’s argument that the complaint is premised on Defendants act of filing a lawsuit against Plaintiff in 2022 or Defendant Schaal’s filing of a CSLB complaint. To that end, the complaint contains no reference to any complaint with the CLSB filed by Defendant Schaal. Rather, the complaint contains allegations of CSLB complaints filed by other defendants and other individuals. (Comp. ¶¶ 34, 38, 40, 41, 42.) Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Schaal “actively recruited former clients and subcontractors to file baseless complaints against Plaintiff’s license to create the appearance of widespread wrongdoing.” (Id. ¶ 39.) While the Court recognizes that the complaint alleges that a “central tactic of the conspiracy was to weaponize the CLSB”, Plaintiff has not alleged

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

that Defendant Schaal filed a complaint with the CLSB, or otherwise purport to premise liability based upon Schaal filing a complaint. (Id.) The Court is also aware that the complaint alleges that during a public hearing in August 2024, Schaal “confessed to leaving a voicemail for one of Plaintiff’s clients, a pastor, stating that Plaintiff ‘targeted minorities and churches,’ had ‘over 70 victims,’ and was being ‘criminally investigated.’” (Id. ¶ 35.) But, allegations that Schaal made defamatory statements which preceded the filing of any administrative or civil action do not themselves become protected activity simply because Schaal is alleged to have admitted making those statements at a public hearing.

The statements attributed to Schaal which are the basis for liability in this action were not made in connection with “any statement or writing made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, an official proceeding or body.” (CCP § 425.16(e)(1)-(2).) In fact, Defendants’ own evidence reflects that the statements attributed to Schaal occurred prior to August 2024. (Heller Decl. ¶ 5 Exh. A.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration includes correspondence with Plaintiff’s former counsel discussing the alleged statements in connection with Plaintiff’s potential civil harassment complaint in June 2023. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleged that Schaal contacted his clients between December 2021 and 2022 in an effort to harm his reputation. (Comp. ¶ 46.) Any liability that would be attributed to Schaal would be based upon conduct that preceded the filing of any CLSB complaint, as opposed being based upon the act of filing a CSLB complaint. The critical distinction is whether the protected activity merely preceded or triggered the lawsuit, or whether it is the basis of the lawsuit. (City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1307; Clark v.

Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1287.) “The mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean that it arose from that activity.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-77.)

The same is true with respect to the fact that Defendants filed a civil lawsuit against Plaintiff. At most, the complaint refers to a “civil dispute” between Schaal and Plaintiff, but the complaint is not based upon the act of Defendants filing that action. As seen from Defendants’ request for judicial notice, Defendants filed a complaint against Plaintiff in May 2022 based on allegations that Plaintiff breached a construction contract. (RJN Exh. 1.) However, the complaint in this action is premised on allegations that Defendants made disparaging remarks about Plaintiff and his business to others. The complaint is not premised on Defendants’ petitioning activity.

In addition, while Defendants argue that the only allegation against Trujillo is based on her testifying at a deposition, the complaint is not so limited. It is true that the complaint contains an allegation that Trujillo provided false testimony at a deposition in Defendants’ civil action against Plaintiff. (Comp. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff alleges that the deposition testimony was an overt act committed in furtherance of the overall conspiracy set forth in the complaint. But this is not the basis of Plaintiff’s lawsuit

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

against Trujillo. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants”, which includes Trujillo, engaged in wrongful acts to disrupt Plaintiff’s relationships with his clients and made disparaging statements about Plaintiff’s business to third parties, and more. (Comp. ¶¶ 59, 64, 68, 72.) The complaint is not premised on Trujillo’s petitioning activity.

Defendants assert in reply that Plaintiff admits in opposition that the complaint is based on protected activity because he argues that Defendants’ lawsuit was a sham and that “Defendants” made bad faith complaints to the CLSB. However, while Plaintiff may have made these statements in his opposition, the complaint is not based on protected activity. Again, Defendants’ civil lawsuit against Plaintiff and any CLSB complaint made by Schaal (once again no CLSB complaint filed by Schaal is mentioned in the complaint) are not the acts upon which Plaintiff attempts to predicate liability.

The complaint is premised on activity by Defendants in connection with allegations that they disparaged Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s business through contacts with his clients. “To be subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, ‘the prior protected activity [must] supply elements of the challenged claim.’ (Ibid.) ‘[A] claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [citations omitted]” (Crossroads Investors, L.P. v.

Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 757, 776 [emphasis in original]) Neither Defendants’ lawsuit, nor any CLSB complaint filed by Defendants supply the elements of any claim Plaintiff has against Defendants and are not the wrongs complained of.

While Defendants may believe that the instant complaint was filed “in retaliation” for Defendants filing a civil action against Plaintiff, it is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because the complaint does not target the actual filing of the complaint or any other protected activity; rather, it targets conduct preceding the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff’s motivations are irrelevant for purposes of this motion. Unless there is a finding that the complaint arose out of Defendants’ petitioning activities, Plaintiff’s apparent motivations, even if “oppressive” cannot form the basis for any finding that the action is a SLAPP suit. (Kajima Eng. & Constr., Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 933.) As Kajima makes clear, Defendants are not without a remedy to the extent that they believe that the instant lawsuit was filed for an improper purpose. “If a [defendant] believes that a [complaint] has been filed for ‘an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,’ or that the claims against [them] are frivolous or lacking in evidentiary support, then it may move for sanctions, including attorneys fees or other expenses, to be awarded in the court’s discretion. (See § 128.7, subds. (b)-(d).)

The anti-SLAPP statute, however, is not the appropriate remedy.” (Id. at 934.)

The Court concludes that Defendants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 12/18/2025 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

the Complaint is premised on any conduct that fits within CCP § 425.16(e)(4).

In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendants failed to show that the Complaint arises from “any act in furtherance of [her] right of petition or free speech.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(1).) As a result, the Court does not reach the second prong of the anti- SLAPP analysis as to determine whether Plaintiff has shown that “there is a probability that [he] will prevail on the claim.” (Id.)

The Court notes that Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion is barred because they failed to timely answer the complaint and are in default. The Court’s file reflects that Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against Defendants was rejected on December 10, 2025.

Given the above, the Court need not and does not address any argument raised by Plaintiff that was not specifically addressed above.

The motion is denied.

The Court need not rule on Defendants’ evidentiary objections. Those objections would only be relevant if the Court considered Plaintiff’s evidence to determine whether he met his burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. However, the Court did not reach that step of the analysis because Defendants did not meet their burden to show that the Complaint arose from protected activity.

Consistent with its order of December 16, 2025, the Court did not consider Plaintiff’s sur-reply filed on December 11, 2025. The Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize a sur-reply.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.