Motion in Limine; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
To start, the Court recognizes that "A Judicial Council form complaint may be subject to demurrer." (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1483.) That court also noted "In some cases, merely checking a box on a Judicial Council form complaint will be sufficient. In other cases, such as this one, where specific allegations need be alleged, the form complaint is like a partially completed painting. It is up to the pleader to add the details that complete the picture." (Id. at 1486.)
The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach of that duty; (3) and harm to the plaintiff caused by the breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)
Here, the Court agrees that the allegations of the complaint that Defendant owned the cow that was in the road that was struck by Plaintiff's vehicle are sufficient to allege causes of action for negligence. Further, the Court agrees that "[a]ll that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action." (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
Further, "demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond." (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, citing Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) In addition, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty "because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Finally, the Court agrees that the general negligence claim, at least at the pleading stage, has a broader scope than the motor vehicle negligence claim and therefore the claims are not wholly duplicative. Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer.
(2) Motion to Strike - Authority and Analysis
Any party may file a timely notice of a motion to strike the whole or any part of a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 435, subd. (b).) The motion may seek to strike any "irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading" or any part of the pleading "not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436.) Irrelevant allegations include allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim, allegations that are not pertinent to or supported by the claim and demands for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 431.10, subds. (b), (c).)
The Court, for the same reasons noted above, denies the motion to strike the second cause of action as duplicative or that the allegations are insufficient, noting the finding above on demurrer with respect to the sufficiency of the pleading. The Court, therefore, orders Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.
Re: Schuler, Dillon vs. Schuler, Terry Case No.: PCU329769 Date: June 30, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 19 - The Honorable Russell P. Burke Motions: Motion in Limine; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) Tentative Rulings: The motion in limine is denied without prejudice. The anti-SLAPP motion is denied.
Dillon Schuler filed a motion in limine and an anti-SLAPP motion.
Motion in Limine
By way of the first motion, Dillon seeks "an order excluding any testimony, evidence, or reference to ...: Any expunged, dismissed, or sealed cases involving [Dillon]"; "Any past criminal history, allegations of criminal conduct, or 'prior bad acts' not directly relevant to this wrongful termination suit"; and "Any personal information, social media activity, or financial records irrelevant to work performance or employment claims." Dillon asserts "[t]his is a wrongful termination case" and that the categories of evidence identified in his motion should be excluded because they are "irrelevant" to such a case, and "prejudicial" in the context of the issues therein raised.
It is somewhat clear, as Dillon indicates, that a termination event is one thing at issue in his suit, but the scope of the complaint, generally, is uncertain. The allegations are difficult to follow; it is not easy to conclude Dillon's suit is just "a wrongful termination case." There is, in any event, more at issue in this case than what is pled just in Dillon's complaint (whatever its scope might be). Though not mentioned by Dillon, defendant Terry Schuler has filed a cross-complaint, and, in it, he alleges Dillon "physically attacked" him "[i]n 2025," and, based on that allegation, he asserts an assault and battery claim (and he also asserts other, different claims).
Given the issues raised by the cross-complaint, the court is disinclined to determine, at this stage, that the categories of evidence presented in Diller's motion would necessarily be "irrelevant" to the issues ultimately to be determined at trial, or that all such categories of evidence are unduly "prejudicial." As a general practice, this court typically addresses in limine motions closer to trial when the parties are further along in trial preparation efforts. (See TCSC Local Rule 608, 611; see also Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1593 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 361] ["In limine motions are designed to facilitate the management of a case, generally by deciding difficult evidentiary issues in advance of trial."].)
Accordingly, the court denies the motion without prejudice to Dillon re-raising these or other objections, closer to trial, in a subsequent motion to exclude specific evidence that Terry intends to, or that Dillon believes Terry intends to, have admitted at trial. Also, this motion is denied without prejudice to any objection Dillon might raise to evidence Terry seeks to admit during trial.
Anti-SLAPP Motion
Dillon also filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Dillon's motion states that he moves to strike Terry Schuler's entire cross-complaint. On review of the whole of the motion, however, it's clear Dillon only expressly targets Terry's assault and battery claim. Dillon maintains the cross-complaint "is a retalitory [sic] SLAPP suit." By this, Dillon means that Terry sued him for assault and battery in retaliation for his having sued Terry. Whether Terry sued Dillon for assault and battery in retaliation for his suit, however, is irrelevant. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 74 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695]; id., p. 77.)
Dillon is required, instead, to make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action--in this case, the assault and battery claim--"is one 'arising from' protected activity." (Id., at p. 76, citing Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Where, as here, Dillon asserts a lawsuit as the subject protected petitioning activity, he must specifically show that that petitioning activity "supplies one or more elements" of Terry's assault and battery claim. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 444 P.3d 706].)
Dillon fails to make such showing, and it is obvious why he cannot. Terry's assault and battery claim is not based on Dillon's suit, but on allegations that Dillon "physically attacked" him. Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP motion is denied.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.
Visalia-County Civic Center Honorable Bret D. Hillman and Nathan D. Ide Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 30, 2026 and July 1, 2026, that allow for posting: Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc. Case Number | Case Name | Type | Status | Comments | VPR049252 | In the Matter of Ehrlich, Gerhard | Accounting Hearing and Attorney's Fees | Appearance Required | Documents in order | VPR053212 | In the Matter of Navarrete, Margaret | Petition for Order Confirming Sale of Real Property | Appearance Required | Documents in order | | VPR054097 | In the Matter of Gonzalez, Raul A.
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