PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al.

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Jane Deacon’s (“Defendant” or “Deacon”) special motion to strike self-represented Plaintiff Joseph Marion Perez’s complaint is denied.

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

In this action, Plaintiff alleges causes of action against numerous defendants for intentional interference with economic relationship, trade libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and fraud. Only the fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the seventh cause of action for conspiracy are asserted against Defendant. Plaintiff, who formerly operated a construction company, alleges that the various defendants engaged in a scheme to harm his reputation and business operations.

He alleges that after he filed a mechanic’s lien in connection with work he performed for Mike Baddley, defendant Lopez began contacting Plaintiff’s clients and subcontractors and making false statements. (Comp. ¶ 29.) Defendant A. Lopez allegedly posted on Facebook that Plaintiff was bribing the Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”). (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bugayong spread false statements that Plaintiff was not paying contractors and was insolvent. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that Schaal left a voicemail for one of his clients falsely stating that Plaintiff “targeted minorities and churches”, had “over 70 victims” and was being “criminally investigated.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 35.)

Plaintiff alleges that Schaal, Lopez and Bugayoung recruited Plaintiff’s former clients and subcontractors to file complaint against Plaintiff with the CSLB. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff performed work for Schaal and Trujillo and the work was the subject of a civil lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that after the passing of his mother, Defendant A. Lopez conspired with Defendant Deacon to participate in the financial war by filing a probate action.

Defendant moves “for an order striking Plaintiff Joseph Marion Perez’s Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” (Notice, p. 2:3-4.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

The Court’s review of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-prong process. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.) First, Defendant must establish that the challenged causes of action arose from “an act in furtherance of [her] right of petition or free speech.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(1).) If Defendant meet that burden, then the second prong requires Plaintiffs to establish “that there is a probability that [Plaintiffs] will prevail on the claim.” (Id.) Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech and lacks even minimal merit is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.

Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820; citations omitted.) Thus, initially, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1046.) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1043.)

First Prong-Arising From Protected Speech

In determining whether Defendant met her burden, the Court considers not only the pleadings, but also the “supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts which the liability or defense is based.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(2).) ‘In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers the ‘pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79.) As noted by relevant authority, it is crucial to look past the allegations in the complaint and to consider affidavits in order to obtain the complete picture of the plaintiff’s claims. (Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 630.)

“A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1043.) Subdivision (e) provides: “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

CCP § 425.16(e)(1) and (e)(2) “encompass[] any cause of action against a person arising from any statement or writing made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

by, an official proceeding or body.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113.) “Thus statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require any showing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest.” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35.) “A claim for relief filed in [] court indisputably is a ‘statement or writing made before a.judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)).” (Navellier v.

Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90.) “[T]he constitutional right to petition includes the basis act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.’” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1115.) “[J]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1115 [citations omitted].) “Accordingly, although litigation may not have commenced, if a statement ‘concern[s] the subject matter of the dispute’ and is made ‘in anticipation of litigation ‘contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration’ then the statement may be petitioning activity protected by section 425.16.” (Bailey v.

Brewer (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 781, 789-790.) California courts “have looked to the litigation privilege as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (2) with respect to the first step of the two-step anti-SLAPP inquiry.” (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479.)

Defendant contends that the entire complaint against her arises from her right to initiate a judicial proceeding to remove Plaintiff as trustee of their parents’ trust. Defendant asserts the only allegation of Defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct is that Defendant initiated a probate action with the intent to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. (Mot. 11:19 – 12:2.)

The Court’s review of the complaint and Defendant’s request for judicial notice do not support Defendant’s argument that the complaint as to Defendant (much less the entirety of the complaint) is premised on Defendant’s act of filing a probate action against Plaintiff. The complaint is premised on activity by multiple defendants in connection with allegations that they disparaged Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s business through contacts with his clients. The complaint generally alleges the existence of a conspiracy among numerous defendants do to harm Plaintiff’s professional and personal life, including by disrupting relationships with Plaintiff’s clients and making disparaging remarks about Plaintiff’s business.

Although the complaint alleges Defendant commenced a probate action when Defendant joined the conspiracy, the critical distinction is whether the protected activity merely preceded or triggered the lawsuit, or whether it is the basis of the lawsuit. (City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1307; Clark v. Mazgani (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1287.) “The mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean that it arose from that activity.” (City of Cotati v.

Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-77.)

In Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, plaintiff beneficiaries alleged that the defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

had breached “statutory duties of loyalty and fair treatment by ‘wasting Trust assets’ on legal fees and costs to pursue the Petition to Modify, Petition to Appoint, Petition to Construe, and the mediation; and wrongfully forced the Gaynor beneficiaries to spend funds to oppose/defend these petitions and activities.” The Court recognized that filing probate petitions is protected activity but nonetheless found the complaint did not satisfy the first-prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because the litigation activity was merely the means by which the defendant was alleged to have carried out the alleged wrongful conduct. (Id., p. 880.)

Here, similarly, the filing of the probate petition is alleged to be the means by which Defendant is carrying out an unlawful plan to interfere with Plaintiff’s inheritance, to exhaust Plaintiff’s financial and emotional resources, and to force Plaintiff to abandon legal claims. (Complaint, ¶ 55.) The basis of the complaint is not that Defendant filed a probate petition, but rather that “Defendants [including Jane Deacon] formed a combination and entered into an agreement to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff.

The object of the conspiracy was to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation through a coordinated sophisticated campaign of defamation, slander, fraud, and interference.” (Complaint, ¶ 80.)

In addition, while Defendant argues that the only allegation against Deacon is based on her filing a probate petition, the complaint is not so limited. It is true that the complaint contains an allegation that Deacon filed a malicious probate petition regarding Plaintiff’s mother’s estate. (Complaint, ¶ 55.) Plaintiff alleges that the filing of the petition was an overt act committed in furtherance of the overall conspiracy set forth in the complaint. But this is not the basis of Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant.

Rather, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants”, which includes Deacon, “formed a combination and entered into an agreement to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff. The object of the conspiracy was to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation through a coordinated sophisticated campaign of defamation, slander, fraud, and interference.” (Comp., ¶ 80.) The complaint is not premised on Defendant’s petitioning activity.

The Court concludes that Defendant failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that the Complaint is premised on any conduct that fits within CCP § 425.16(e)(4).

In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendant failed to show that the Complaint arises from “any act in furtherance of [her] right of petition or free speech.” (CCP § 425.16(b)(1).) As a result, the Court does not reach the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis as to determine whether Plaintiff has shown that “there is a probability that [he] will prevail on the claim.” (Id.)

The Court notes that Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion is barred because they failed to timely answer the complaint and are in default. The Court’s file reflects that Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against Defendant was rejected on December 10, 2025.

Given the above, the Court need not and does not address any argument raised by Plaintiff that was not specifically addressed above.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 01/06/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 53

The Court need not rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections. Those objections would only be relevant if the Court considered Plaintiff’s evidence to determine whether he met his burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. However, the Court did not reach that step of the analysis because Defendant did not meet her burden to show that the Complaint arose from protected activity.

The Court did not consider Plaintiff’s final supplemental brief filed on December 30, 2025. The Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize a sur-reply or other post-reply supplemental briefing.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.