Zuri K. Colbert vs. Michelle Callilos (Head of DHHS/CPS County of Sacramento)

Plaintiffs now seek an order enjoining Defendants from engaging in the following acts, as stated

34-2021-00301184-CU-CR-GDS: Zuri K. Colbert vs. Michelle Callilos (Head of DHHS/CPS County of Sacramento) 01/22/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other for Permanant Injunction in Department 54

in Plaintiffs’ proposed order:

Continuing to defy court directive from 9/28/21 to examine Plaintiffs confidential records and file a motion if necessary with Plaintiffs participation and input then further bar County of Sacramento and Defendants with accessing, handling, and disseminating Plaintiffs, Zuri K. Colbert and Nafisah Timmons, confidential records in all County Departments without independent representation.

(Proposed Order, p. 2:10-14.)

Discussion

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo. It ‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.)

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. (White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 426(a)(2) [a preliminary injunction “may be granted . . . [w]hen it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to a party to the action].)

“‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’ cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.]” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent: “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) The showing must be strong enough to “support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant’s actions prior to a trial on the merits.' (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Ass’n v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.)

“If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 306, emphasis added.) The greater

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00301184-CU-CR-GDS: Zuri K. Colbert vs. Michelle Callilos (Head of DHHS/CPS County of Sacramento) 01/22/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other for Permanant Injunction in Department 54

the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.)

The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Courts will deny a preliminary injunction unless there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be successful in his or her assertion of rights. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) A preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury. Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. (Winter v. NRDC, Inc. (2008) 555 U.S. 7, 22.)

Here, Plaintiffs have not established any of the necessary elements to obtain a preliminary injunction, including the threshold irreparable injury element. The injunction Plaintiffs seek is a mandatory injunction, not prohibitory, as they are attempting to mandate that Defendants perform an affirmative act. “As our Supreme Court noted many years ago, ‘[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending the trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal.’” (Board of Supervisors v.

McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295, quoting Hagen v. Beth (1897) 118 Cal. 330, 331.) Plaintiffs contend that the inaccurate recordkeeping dates back to approximately 2004. (See Motion, p. 8.) It is difficult to envision an imminent and irreparable harm that could occur if Defendants do not examine their records of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have only provided abstract claims of potential harm, some of which has apparently already occurred, related to Plaintiff Colbert being wrongfully associated with a criminal with the same name.

Additionally, Plaintiffs have not connected their claims to the injunction sought. Plaintiffs’ 2AC does not appear to even seek injunctive relief. Again, while Plaintiffs generally refer to abstract constitutional rights that they contend have been violated, Plaintiffs fail to specifically explain how a public entity’s allegedly inaccurate recordkeeping infringes on any constitutional rights.

Perhaps more problematically for Plaintiffs, the September 28, 2021 “directive” from Judge Krueger was not a directive at all. The order Plaintiffs refer to is an order denying Plaintiffs’ ex parte application on the basis that no exigent circumstances supported the relief requested. Plaintiffs’ ex parte application was broadly similar to the present motion, as they sought an order mandating Defendants review their records for the alleged conflation between Plaintiff Colbert

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00301184-CU-CR-GDS: Zuri K. Colbert vs. Michelle Callilos (Head of DHHS/CPS County of Sacramento) 01/22/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other for Permanant Injunction in Department 54

and the person with a criminal record and the same name. In his order denying the ex parte application, Judge Krueger also stated, “County defendants are respectfully requested to examine records for confidential information and, if necessary, file a motion to seal.” (Order, 09/28/2021, p. 1.) This is not an order directing Defendants to actually do anything. It is merely a request. Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendants have not complied with Judge Krueger’s request. The fact that they have not filed a motion to seal does not mean they did not examine their records, as they could have done so and determined that a motion to seal was not necessary. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown Defendants violated any Court order, let alone that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)