MAUNG SOE NAING VS. DICKENS LIU, ET AL.

June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 35 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 15 26-CIV-02407 MAUNG SOE NAING VS. DICKENS LIU, ET AL.

MAUNG SOE NAING PRO SE DICKEN LIEU ILENE M HOCHSTEIN

DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TENTATIVE RULING:

The court rules on defendants’ demurrer as to the complaint as follows:

The court finds the parties did not satisfy the meet and confer requirement set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.41 because defense counsel did not even try to meet-and-confer. However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not a basis to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).) However, the court cautions the parties that they must comply with all meet-and-confer and other obligations of conducting litigation. The court notes as another example that plaintiff requested to continue this motion (which was referred to as a trial). However, plaintiff failed to serve the request on defendants as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1014 and thus, the court needed to deny the request.

Legal Standard

“ ‘[I]t is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint [citation]; that the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court [citations]; and that plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216.).’ ” (John's Grill, Inc. v.

The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.) The “ ‘demurrer tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, i.e., whether it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.’ (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227.)” (Villarroel v. Recology, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 762, 772.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v.

Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747) and whether the complaint sets “ ‘forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.’ ” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157 [Citation omitted].)

Uncertainty (section 430.10, subdivision (f)) is generally a difficult ground on which to sustain a demurrer:

June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 36 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Even though the complaint is in some respects uncertain, the courts often hold it good against demurrer on the theory that, “though not a model of pleading,” its allegations, liberally construed, are sufficient to apprise the defendant of the issues that he or she is to meet. (3 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Plead. § 975 When Demurrer Will Be Overruled (Mar. 2026 update) (citations omitted).)

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 (and citations therein).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 (Khoury) (citations omitted).) A special demurrer for uncertainty should not be sustained when the allegations of the complaint “are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues” which must be met. (Bacon v.

Wahrhaftig (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 (citations omitted).) Such a demurrer should be “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292 (Morris) (citations omitted).)

Discussion

Breach of Contract

The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach of the contract, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Coyote Aviation Corp. v. City of Redlands (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 955; Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 408.)

Although defendant claims that the complaint does not allege whether the contract is oral or written (Plaintiff’s Brief at 4), the box for an oral agreement is checked on the cause of action for breach of contract. Thus this argument fails. Also, contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the complaint alleges a breach, primarily that defendant refused to perform and damages of $200.000, loss of housing, relocation damages and costs. However, the cause of action for breach of contract leaves out the agreement’s essential terms. The court therefore sustains the demurrer to this cause of action leave to amend. While uncertainty is a disfavored grounds, the lack of the date of the breach is subject to special (but not general) demurrer. (Winn v. McCulloch Corp. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 663, 674.)

Common Counts

“[A] common count is proper whenever the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in a sum certain, or for the reasonable value of services, goods, etc., furnished.” (Kawasho Internat., U.S.A. Inc. v. Lakewood Pipe Service, Inc. (1983) 152 Cal.App.3d 785, 793, quoting 3 Witkin California Procedure, 2d edition, p. 2085.) Here, reading the complaint broadly, the cause of action for common counts alleges that defendants became indebted to plaintiff for $200,000 for work, labor or services rendered and money lent. These facts are

June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 37 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ sufficient to allege a cause of action for common counts. The court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action. Plaintiff also omits the date in this cause of action, but that fact is not an essential element of the cause of action. (Moya v. Northrup (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 276, 283 [it is not necessary in a common count to set forth the date when the defendant became indebted”].) The cause of action is not uncertain.

Fraud

The elements of a cause of action for fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation, which can be a false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure of a material fact; (2) knowledge of falsity or scienter; (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) actual and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) resulting damages. (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258.) Fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity for defendant to fully understand the nature of the charge. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.)

Generally, such specificity requires pleading facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Ibid.) Also, generally when pleading fraud against a corporate employer, the plaintiff must “allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

Less specificity, however, is required then the defendant “must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838; see also Committee On Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217.) Further, a single representation is sufficient to support a fraud claim. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 854; Alliance Mortgage Co. v.

Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1248.)

Intent and knowledge can be alleged generally. (5 Witkin, Cal. Proc., Pleading § 723 (6th ed. March 2026 update).) Further, as Witkin illustrates regarding justifiable reliance and causation, the standard for these elements is easy to meet. (Id. at § 727.)

Although plaintiff does not allege when the representations were made, the complaint read as a whole contains specific facts for defendants to understand the nature of the charges. Intent, knowledge, justifiable reliance and damages are sufficiently alleged. However, it is unclear if one defendant or two defendants made the representation because there are two claims for fraud, one which states that defendants made the representations and one which just refers to an unnamed defendant, which does not provide sufficient information to defendants for them to know who is charged with making the misrepresentation. Further, these inconsistent allegations make the complaint uncertain. Thus, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend to this cause of action.

June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 38 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. (Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 675, 697; Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616, 629.

The conduct must be “extreme and outrageous” such that it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by decent society and is of a nature that is especially calculated to cause mental distress. (Cross v. Bonded Adjustment Bureau (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 266, 283.) Here, the complaint alleges that at least one defendant promised plaintiff could remain in the property and he would be paid $200,000 for certain work he performed and defendants failed to perform, which are sufficient allegations of extreme and reckless conduct beyond the bounds of ordinary decency.

The allegations are not uncertain.

Harassment

Plaintiff attempts to assert a cause of action for harassment, but does not discuss this cause of action in this demurrer and the court is not aware of any legal basis (outside of the employment context, not applicable here) for a cause of action for harassment. Defendant discusses Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 and demonstrates that the section is for a temporary restraining order. Thus, the court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Utility Interference

Similarly to the claim for harassment, the cause of action for utility interference is not supported by a legal basis and it does not state a cognizable claim. Thus, the court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Unfair Competition

“California’s unfair competition law (UCL) ([Business & Professions Code] § 17200 et seq.) defines ‘unfair competition’ to mean and include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the false advertising law (§ 17500 et seq.)].’ (§ 17200.) The UCL's purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 110, 101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817.) [¶]The UCL’s scope is broad.

By defining unfair competition to include any “unlawful ... business act or practice” (§ 17200, italics added), the UCL permits violations of other laws to be treated as unfair competition that is independently actionable. (Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527.)” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) Fraudulent practices extend beyond those covered by the common law tort and include any practices that are likely to deceive members of the public. (Buller v.

Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981,

June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 39 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ 986.) The UCL may only be privately enforced “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.)

In support of this cause of action, plaintiff alleges unlawful conduct by defendants and fraud is unlawful. However, as stated above, he has not sufficiently alleged fraud. Further, he has not alleged facts sufficient to show a remedy. Private plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief and restitution, but not damages under the UCL. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.) Plaintiff does not seek restitution and his claim for an injunction is on the harassment claim. Further, the complaint is uncertain as it is unclear the business practices that underline this cause of action. The court thus sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Plaintiff has ten (10) days from service of written notice of entry of order file and serve a First Amended Complaint. (Cal. Ruled of Court, rule 3.1320(g); Code Civ. Proc., § 472b.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for defendants shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.