Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

APPEARANCE REQUIRED: The parties are ordered to appear at the hearing in person, as discussed further below.

Defendant Riverside School, Inc. dba Brookfield School’s (“Defendant” or “Brookfield”) motion for protective order allowing for additional time to respond to written discovery is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant is admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4), which provides, “Unless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336650-CU-NP-GDS: Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc. 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 8C

include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions.

Background

Plaintiffs Tiffany McBryde, Hanee Peterman, and N.P., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Tiffany McBryde (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed this action on March 21, 2023. Plaintiffs allege that N.P., while a student at Brookfield, was subjected to harassment, discrimination, and bullying on the basis of her race and religion.

The operative First Amended Complaint includes 13 causes of action. On May 30, 2024, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend. The Court overruled the remainder of Defendant’s demurrer and denied its concurrently filed motion to strike. On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer.

On March 28, 2025, the Court referred this case to Trial Setting Process. Since May 27, 2025, trial in this matter has been set for July 6, 2026.

On November 24 and 25, 2024, Plaintiffs served Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set One and Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, the latter consisting of 56 document requests. Defendant served responses on February 4, 2025 and served supplemental responses on June 9, 2025.

Plaintiffs next served written discovery on March 26, 2026. This consisted of (1) Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions, Set One, with 78 requests; (2) Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set Two, with Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 related to the Requests for Admissions; and (3) Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, consisting of 93 requests. Additionally, between March 27 and April 3, 2026, Plaintiffs served nine deposition notices, which included three PMQ depositions with a total of 29 subjects for examination, as well as a total of 149 document requests.

Six of the depositions were unilaterally set by Plaintiffs for dates between May 1 and May 12, 2026, and it appears that these depositions had not been previously noticed. The remaining three depositions consist a PMQ deposition that was previously noticed for August 12, 2025 and January 23, 2026, a separate PMQ deposition that was previously noticed for August 12, 2025, and a subpoenaed third-party witness. The two PMQ depositions were re-noticed on April 3, 2026 for May 7 and May 8, 2026. (See White Decl., ¶ 5, Exh.

D.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Defendant’s responses were due on April 28, 2026. On April 27, 2026 at 11:55 a.m., Defendant’s counsel requested a two-week extension to May 12, 2026. At 2:39 p.m., Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that he could not agree to an extension beyond May 1, 2026 because the responses were needed before the PMQ deposition set for May 7 and May 8, and because expert disclosures were due on May 15, and responses on May 12 would not give Plaintiffs sufficient time “to absorb late discovery responses” and their effect on the expert disclosure. (White Decl., Exh.

D.) However, Plaintiffs’ counsel ultimately offered an extension to May 5, 2026, which Defendant accepted on April 28, 2026. (White Decl., Exh. D.) Plaintiffs’ counsel emphasized that the extension was “contingent upon Defendant providing complete, substantive responses to each of those written discovery requests and a complete document production.” (White Decl., Exh. D.)

On May 1, 2026, Defendant served responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions, Set One, Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Set Two, and Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two. The responses consisted solely of objections, including an objection on the basis that the requests were “unduly burdensome, oppressive and harassing given the number of requests, plaintiffs’ unreasonable deadline, and plaintiffs’ failure to meet and confer in good faith to reach an agreement on a reasonable deadline.” (See White Decl., ¶ 8; Parker Decl., ¶ 9, Exhs. E, F, & G.)

Also on May 1, 2026, at 7:19 p.m., Defendant’s counsel sent a meet and confer email in relation to moving for a protective order to give Defendant additional time to serve its written discovery responses. Defendant’s counsel asserted that Plaintiffs’ unwillingness to extend the deadline to respond beyond May 5 was unreasonable given the number of requests, the fact that the document requests sought ESI, the proximity to the trial date, and the service of several deposition notices shortly after the written discovery requests. Defendant’s counsel stated, “Given the volume of requests and the concurrent deposition schedule, we believe a protective order is necessary to prevent the undue burden and expense associated with this unreasonable discovery timeline.” (White Decl., Exh. E.) Defendant’s counsel proposed extending the deadline and discussing ESI issues.

Plaintiffs’ counsel responded to the May 1 email on Monday, May 4, at 5:16 p.m. Shortly before this, Defendant had served notice of an ex parte application to hear the present motion on an earlier date than the Court’s calendar otherwise had available. In responding to Defendant’s counsel’s email, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated he was willing to meet and confer on an ESI protocol and a narrowing of Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Plaintiffs’ counsel also proposed extending pre-trial deadlines to allow the parties to resolve discovery issues. (White Decl., Exh. E.)

On May 5, 2026, Defendant filed the aforementioned ex parte application as well as the present motion. Plaintiffs did not oppose the application, and it was granted on May 7, 2026.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336650-CU-NP-GDS: Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc. 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 8C

Additionally, the Court authorized the parties to file other discovery motions that had suggested as possibilities for hearing on June 3 and June 10, 2026. As of the date of this order, Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel deposition testimony and motions to compel further responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two and Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 for June 10, 2026. Plaintiffs have also filed a motion to continue the deadlines for expert witness disclosures and completion of fact and expert discovery, and that motion is also on calendar for June 10, 2026.

Via the present motion, Defendant seeks a protective order granting additional time to serve complete responses to Plaintiffs’ written discovery served on March 26, 2026. Defendant contends that the number and complexity of the interrogatories and requests, combined with the multiple depositions that were noticed at around the same time, rendered Defendant unable to provide complete responses within the statutory deadlines, and Plaintiff’s refusal to grant an extension of more than one week was unreasonable. Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs could have served the discovery and noticed the depositions earlier in this litigation and thus avoided the time constraint created by the impending trial date, and thus, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs’ basis for refusing to grant a longer extension was not justified.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not established good cause for a protective order, since Defendant has only contended that responding to the discovery within the statutory timeframe would be burdensome. Plaintiffs further contend that they served the subject discovery over three months before trial, well before the discovery cutoff in this case, and to the extent there is any proximity to the current trial date, Plaintiffs argue that this second round of written discovery was necessary only because Defendant did not provide complete information in response to the first round of discovery.

Plaintiffs also assert that they opted to pursue discovery via depositions before serving a second round of written discovery as a litigation strategy, and Plaintiffs note that they served PMQ deposition notices in August of 2025 and January of 2026, but Defendant refused to produce witnesses and then reneged on agreed upon dates in February. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, they have not been dilatory in pursuing discovery in this case.

In reply, Defendant emphasizes that the present time constraint is a creation of Plaintiffs’ own litigation strategy and failure to file motions to compel in relation to Defendant’s responses to the first round of discovery. Relatedly, Defendant also asserts that some of the document requests in Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, are duplicative of requests served with the first round of discovery and thus constitute an attempt to circumvent the time limit to file a motion to compel further responses.[1]

Discussion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336650-CU-NP-GDS: Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc. 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 8C

A party served with written discovery “may promptly move for a protective order.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.090(a) [interrogatories], 2031.060(a) [document requests]; 2033.080(a) [requests for admission].) The party seeking a protective order must make a showing of good cause. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.090(b), 2031.060(b), 2033.080(b).) If such a showing is made, then the Discovery Act authorizes the trial court to “make any order that justice requires to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Ibid.) The protective order statutes include nonexhaustive lists of matters that may be the subject of a protective order, including that the time to serve responses be extended. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.090(b)(3); 2031.060(b)(2); 2033.080(b)(3).)

“‘Oppression means the ultimate effect of the burden of responding to the discovery is ‘incommensurate with the result sought.’ In considering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court takes into account ‘the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.’” (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.)

“[A]s to the timeliness of [a] motion for a protective order, the promptness of the request turns on the facts.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 317.)

Upon consideration of the parties’ respective arguments, the Court finds as follows. Plaintiffs’ pursuit of discovery in this matter has been far from diligent and borders on dilatory. Plaintiffs did not serve their first round of written discovery until late November of 2024, over 20 months after filing the Complaint. While the pleadings were not settled for some of that time, such a procedural posture does not preclude Plaintiffs from pursuing discovery, and even so, the pleadings were resolved by June 10, 2024 when Defendant filed its Answer, yet another five months passed before the discovery was propounded.

It also appears that Plaintiffs did not notice any depositions until August of 2025 when they noticed what appears to be two PMQ depositions. By this time, the current trial date had been on calendar for two to three months. The dates for which these depositions were originally noticed is not clear, nor is the reason why they did not go forward on those dates. Plaintiffs assert, “Defendant refused to produce its witnesses on the noticed dates, reneged on its commitment to appear in February, and proposed May 2026 dates that Plaintiffs found inadequate in light of the impending trial.” (Opp.

MPA, p. 7:17-19.) Despite the proximity of the trial date, there is no indication of any significant urgency by Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs never filed a motion to compel the depositions. Similarly, Plaintiffs cannot blame Defendant for serving inadequate responses to Plaintiffs’ initial round of discovery as the reason for why Plaintiffs needed to serve the second round when Plaintiffs never filed a motion to compel in relation to the first round, and Plaintiffs had ample time to serve the second round earlier while the current trial date was on calendar.

There is little-to-no evidence to suggest that Defendant’s conduct during discovery forced Plaintiffs to conduct what amounts to the bulk of their discovery in this case in the three-and-a-half months before trial after the case had been

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336650-CU-NP-GDS: Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc. 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 8C

pending for three years.

At the same time, Plaintiffs served the second round of discovery and noticed the depositions well within the time limits provided by the Discovery Act, and Plaintiffs were not mandated to agree to an extension for Defendant to serve responses. Moreover, despite being served with the written discovery on March 26, 2026, and the deposition notices within the next week, Defendant did not ask for an extension to respond to the written discovery until April 27, 2026, the day before responses were due.

The Discovery Act requires a party in receipt of written discovery to “promptly” move for a protective order, and although Plaintiffs do not argue that the motion is untimely, the Court believes that the issue could have been raised earlier, as Defendant’s inability to provide complete responses within the statutory deadline would have been apparent once the requests were served, and certainly by the time the depositions were noticed. It is also notable that, although this motion was filed on May 5, 2026, there is no indication from the opposition or reply that Defendant has taken any steps to provide substantive responses.

This suggests that Defendant is seeking a protective order in part to avoid providing discovery. Indeed, the Court observes that Defendant’s moving papers seek only an extension of the deadline to serve responses, while the reply asks the Court to strike the requests beyond the first 35 for each set and allow Plaintiff one week to respond to the remainder.

With these factors in mind, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as follows. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ lack of diligence, as well as the volume of requests and depositions Plaintiffs have pursued since March 26, 2026, warrants relief for Defendant in the form of additional time to serve substantive, Code-compliant responses to all of the written discovery at issue in this motion, with Defendant’s right to serve individualized objections to the requests preserved.

However, this remedy risks a windfall to Defendant in that it leaves Plaintiffs with insufficient time to review the responses, determine whether further responses are needed, adequately meet and confer, file motions to compel, and have those motions heard before the trial date and applicable discovery cutoffs, even if the cutoff dates are extended as requested by Plaintiffs’ motion on calendar on June 10. The Court also observes that there are additional motions on calendar on June 10, as well as a motion to quash subpoena on June 24, a motion to compel related to a deposition on September 14, and a motion for judgment on the pleadings on December 9, the latter two being after the current July 6, 2026 trial date.

The Court finds this schedule unworkable. It is apparent that the parties have significant matters to tend to, both with respect to discovery and to dispositive motions, that raise questions about whether this case will be ready for trial on July 6, 2026.

Thus, the parties are ORDERED TO APPEAR in person on June 1, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C. The parties shall be prepared to discuss the issues presented in this motion and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336650-CU-NP-GDS: Tiffany Mcbryde vs. Riverside School, Inc. 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 8C

the appropriate deadline for Defendant to serve substantive responses, as well as potential deadlines to file motions to compel in relation to those responses, the current status of discovery in general in this case, and why the Court should not vacate the current July 6, 2026 trial date in light of these matters.

[1] Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel willfully violated California Rules of Court rule 3.724(8), which

provides that by “no later than 30 days before the date set for the initial case management conference, the parties must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, to consider each of the issues identified in rule 3.727 and, in addition, to consider the following: (8) Any issues relating to the discovery of electronically stored information,” with the rule providing a list of issues to be discussed. (Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.724(8).) Defendant did not raise rule 3.724(8) in its opening brief, but Plaintiffs mentioned the rule in their opposition and argued that the rule “encourages early discussion of ESI but does not condition the validity of discovery requests on such a discussion and does not make its absence a ground for a protective order excusing production.” (Opp.

MPA, p. 6:21-23.) Defendant contends in reply that Plaintiffs represented on their CMC statement that there were no ESI issues in this case and failed to meet and confer on ESI issues at any time, and Defendant argues that these factors, combined with Plaintiffs’ argument that rule 3.724(8) only “encourages” meeting and conferring on ESI, show that the violation was willful. Thus, Defendant suggests that the Court could sanction Plaintiffs under California Rules of Court rule 2.30(b). The Court does not believe that sanctions are warranted here.

Defendant’s argument is acknowledged, and the Court finds it relevant to the overall question of whether Plaintiffs have pursued discovery diligently in this matter.