Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co.

On January 24, 2025, Defendants’ counsel learned during Plaintiff’s deposition that she still drives the 2015 Honda Civic. Thus, on February 28, 2025, Defendants served a Demand for Inspection of Plaintiff’s Vehicle at 103 Sunset Circle, Benicia, CA 94510 on April 10, 2025. The demand sought the following:

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 07/21/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Vehicle Inspection in Department 54

The vehicle shall be produced for physical inspection (including the interior, body and engine), photographing, measurement, 3D scanning, and downloading data from the vehicle, including its Event Data Recorder, Sensing and Diagnostic Module, airbag control module and any other module containing data relating to the incident (“DATA”). The inspection is non-destructive and will have no permanent effect on the performance of the vehicle. This inspection is without prejudice to later inspections.

(Wild Decl., Exh. 5, p. 2:9-14.)

On April 3, 2025, Defendants’ counsel asked Plaintiff’s counsel if the inspection would be going forward as scheduled in the demand. Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “Are you willing to stipulate to provide my office with a copy of anything and everything obtained from that vehicle within 24 hours?” (Wild Decl., Exh. 6, p. 5.) Defendants’ counsel responded, “Since our expert will be the one accessing the data, the data would be part of expert discovery, so we couldn’t share it as it would be premature.

However, your retained expert is free to attend the inspection.” (Wild Decl., Exh. 6, p. 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel asserted privacy concerns and contended that the inspection sought to force Plaintiff to retain an expert prematurely. Plaintiff’s counsel then reiterated that he would produce the vehicle if Defendants agreed to “produce all collected data to us within 24 hours of acquisition.” (Wild Decl., Exh. 6, p. 4.) Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he would not move off of this position and suggested Defendants file a motion if they would not stipulate.

The parties exchanged additional meet and confer emails but failed to reach a resolution.

Defendants contend that they have good cause to inspect Plaintiff’s vehicle because the data collected “will provide relevant information about both accidents, including the speed and acceleration, that will aid Defendants’ expert in forming his opinion of the cause and severity of the accidents at issue,” and will reveal whether Plaintiff has been involved in any other collisions. (Mot. MPA, pp. 4:28-5:2.) Defendants also argue that the method they intend to use to download data from the vehicle “generates a report based on the data retrieved and the user has no control over which data is collected,” and thus it is not possible for Defendants to limit the data retrieval to the two collisions in this case. (Mot.

MPA, p. 5:8-9.) Additionally, Defendants argue that they should not be required to provide the data they obtain from the vehicle to Plaintiff’s counsel, as it would amount to the premature disclosure of expert work product. Specifically, Defendants argue, “Plaintiff would be able to observe Defendants’ expert developing his opinion in real-time and piggy-back off both his findings and equipment.” (Mot. MPA, p. 6:16-17.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s objections, Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s assertion of privacy is disingenuous given that it was only raised after Defendants’ counsel declined to provide the data obtained from the inspection. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s privacy objections are not valid, since the data to be obtained from the vehicle “involves aspects of driving in public places,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 07/21/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Vehicle Inspection in Department 54

such as speed and braking, that would be readily observable to others,” or would be directly relevant to this case. (Mot. MPA, p. 8:23-24.) As to Plaintiff’s claim that the inspection will force Plaintiff to prematurely obtain an expert, Defendants note that trial in this matter is set for September 22, 2025, so the expert disclosure deadline is August 4, 2025. Finally, Defendants contend that Vehicle Code section 9951, a statute cited by Plaintiff during the parties’ meet and confer discussions, is not applicable.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the data to be obtained from the inspection is not expert work product, but is instead “factual information that is evidentiary in nature.” (Opp. MPA, p. 3:5-6.) Plaintiff also points out that Defendants claim their expert would have no control over which data is downloaded from the vehicle’s Event Data Recorder (“EDR”), which means the data is factual and not part of any expert opinion or impression. Plaintiff provides a brochure for the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval kit Defendants intend to use, which notes that the software “simply reads the information that is stored in the EDR of the vehicle and provides the crash information in the form of a CDR report.” (Fareed Decl., Exh.

D.) Plaintiff also argues that the data on the EDR is subject to privacy protections under Vehicle Code section 9951, and since the download of the data cannot be limited in time, the download threatens Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Plaintiff also argues that the EDR data is discoverable so should be provided to Plaintiff after the inspection. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith, but this argument is rejected, as the Court finds the meet and confer discussions described above satisfy the meet and confer requirement.[2]

Discussion

The Court notes that the parties seem to ignore or give only passing discussion of the basic threshold issue of Defendant’s right to inspect Plaintiff’s vehicle. A party may demand that another party “produce and permit the party making the demand to inspect and to photograph, test, or sample any tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.010(c).) Plaintiff’s vehicle clearly falls within this section. Additionally, since the inspection demand was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010, Plaintiff was obligated to serve a written response under section 2031.210 et seq.

The materials before the Court suggest Plaintiff never responded to the demand in accordance with section 2031.210 et seq., and never responded to the demand at all until Defendants’ counsel sought to confirm the inspection one week before the scheduled date. Thus, it appears Plaintiff failed to serve a timely response to the demand and thus has waived any objections. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300(a).) However, Defendants do not make this argument and do not move for an order compelling Plaintiff’s response.

At the same time, as explained below, the Court finds that (1) Defendants are entitled to inspect Plaintiff’s vehicle, including by downloading the EDR data, and (2) the EDR data is not work product, although expert photos, measurements, and 3D scans are. Thus, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Since

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 07/21/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Vehicle Inspection in Department 54

the EDR data is not work product, it is discoverable, and, for the sake of efficiency, the Court will order Defendants to provide Plaintiff with the EDR data report after the inspection.

Work Product

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties appear to conflate the precise nature of their dispute. During the meet and confer process, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Defendants to stipulate to provide him with “a copy of anything and everything” obtained at the inspection. (Wild Decl., Exh. 6, p. 5.) Based on the scope of the inspection demand, this would include not only the EDR data, but also any measurements, photographs, and 3D scan of the vehicle. However, Defendants’ opening brief focuses primarily on the EDR data and only occasionally mentions the other forms of data, while Plaintiff’s opposition brief discusses only the EDR data. This distinction is important because the EDR data is not expert work product, but the measurements, photographs, and 3D scan likely are.

“It has long been recognized that the work of an expert-consultant is protected by the attorney’s work product privilege.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 647, 654.) An expert’s work becomes discoverable once it is reasonably certain that the expert will provide opinion testimony in the case. (Id. at pp. 654-655.) Discovery of expert materials occurs with the simultaneous exchange of expert witness information, which occurs either 50 days before trial or 20 days after service of an expert disclosure demand, whichever is later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.230(b).)

“In California, an attorney’s work product is protected by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.010 et seq.)” (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 485.) Any writing “that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research” is subject to absolute work product protection and is not discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030(a).) Other forms of attorney work product are subject to qualified protection and becomes discoverable if “the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an injustice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030(b).)

Defendants have not shown that the EDR data from Plaintiff’s vehicle qualifies as either absolute or qualified work product. Defendants contend that the “strategy in determining what testing to perform on a subject vehicle goes directly to Defendants’ expert’s opinion and protected work product.” (Mot. MPA, p. 6:3-4.) But Defendants fail to explain how providing the EDR data to Plaintiff would reveal Defendants’ strategies. Moreover, Defendants have already revealed the testing they intend to perform on the vehicle for the purposes of retrieving the EDR data, namely, the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval system. Purely factual material is not work product. (Mack v. Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10.) Here, the EDR data is purely factual, as it is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 07/21/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Vehicle Inspection in Department 54

simply data related to collisions in which the vehicle has been involved. There is nothing strategic about the data itself, and since Defendants’ expert cannot limit the scope of the data downloaded, it follows that the strategies or impressions of Defendants’ counsel are not implicated by the data retrieval.

However, the Court finds that any measurements, photographs, and 3D scans conducted by Defendants’ expert at the inspection are subject to work product protection, as they could reveal strategic considerations. To the extent Plaintiff actually requests this information be provided after the inspection, the request is denied.

Privacy

A party seeking disclosure of private information must show a compelling interest “to justify ‘an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.’” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 556.) When a lesser privacy interests are involved, a compelling interest is not required. Instead, a balancing test is applied, “with the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information varying according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Ibid.)

As noted above, Plaintiff appears to have waived any privacy objections. Even so, Plaintiff cites Vehicle Code section 9951(c), which states that EDR data “may not be downloaded or otherwise retrieved by a person other than the registered owner of the motor vehicle,” subject to certain exceptions, including where the owner consents or “[i]n response to an order of a court having jurisdiction to issue the order.” (Veh. Code § 9951(c)(1), (2).) The Court is not persuaded that this statute overrides general discovery principles in civil cases such that Defendants are not permitted to download the EDR data from Plaintiff’s vehicle under normal discovery procedures.

The data is clearly relevant and discoverable, as Plaintiff herself argues. Plaintiff makes no showing that the EDR data will include any private information, particularly anything that could be considered “an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 556.) Thus, Plaintiff’s privacy argument is rejected.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall make her vehicle available for inspection by no later than August 4, 2025 or a later date agreed to by the parties in writing. Defendants shall provide Plaintiff with a copy of the EDR data report within 24 hours after the inspection.

The parties dueling sanctions requests are DENIED, as the Court finds the parties acted with substantial justification.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 07/21/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Vehicle Inspection in Department 54

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Plaintiff initially alleged that Penske owned the subject vehicle Calderon was driving and/or employed Calderon

at the time of the collision. However, on May 20, 2025, after this motion was filed, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint naming Defendant Milgard Manufacturing LLC (“Milgard”) as Doe 1. On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff dismissed Penske with prejudice. It appears that Milgard has essentially replaced Penske in this action, and Defendants contend that Milgard “has the same interest in moving forward with the vehicle inspection as Defendant Calderon.” (Reply MPA, fn. 1.) For the purposes of this ruling, the Court’s references to “Defendants” includes Calderon, Milgard, and Penske. [2] Both sides also spend time arguing about the fact that Plaintiff’s previously requested the EDR data from

Defendants’ vehicle during discovery. The Court does not find this issue relevant and thus does not address it further.