Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co.

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 03/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel IME in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

Defendants Penske Truck Leasing Co., LP and Jorge Eduardo Calderon’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to compel plaintiff Monica Torres-Mendoza (“Plaintiff”) to submit to three separate independent medical examinations (“IMEs”) is ruled upon as follows.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Court’s tentative ruling consolidating Torres- Mendoza v. Penske, et al. and Torres-Mendoza v. Richardson (adopted on March 29, 2024) filed on March 27, 2024 is granted.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of two Orders issued by other superior courts is denied. “The inclusion of additional evidentiary matter with the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case and if permitted, the other party should be given the opportunity to respond.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-38, citations omitted.)

Sur-Reply

The Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s “surreply.” There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure allowing for such a filing. An improperly filed surbrief may be disregarded by the Court. (City of Arcadia v. State Water Res. Control Bd., (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 156, 180, as modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 20, 2011).)

Overview

This action arises from two separate motor vehicle collisions. The first collision occurred on June 11, 2021, on I-80 near Richmond, California. Plaintiff was driving her vehicle when Mr. Calderon, who was driving a semi-truck owned by Penske, changed lanes and collided into Plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result, Plaintiff suffered lower back, neck, and head injuries. The second collision occurred on September 26, 2021, in Plaintiff’s apartment complex parking lot, when defendant Oshawn Desmond Andrew-Richardson accelerated out of the parking lot and collided into Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff contends the second collision further aggravated her back and neck injuries.

Plaintiff sued the driver involved in the second collision, Oshawn Desmond-Andrew Richardson, in a separate action on August 15, 2023, and the two cases were consolidated on March 29, 2024. (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1)

Defendants move to compel Plaintiff to submit to three IMEs: (1) an IME conducted by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Clement Jones, at his office in San Francisco; (2) a neurological IME conducted by a neurologist, Dr. Allen Bott, at his office in Oakland; and (3) and a

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neuropsychological IME conducted by a neuropsychologist, Dr. Howard Friedman, Ph.D., at his office in Walnut Creek. On February 26, 2025, Defendants served demands for IMEs with Dr. Jones (proposed for April 15), Dr. Bott (April 24), and Dr. Friedman (April 21). (Wild Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 15.)

Defendants contend they met and conferred with Plaintiff in good faith, but Plaintiff has refused to permit more than one physical examination (either orthopedic or neurological), has improperly insisted Defendants stipulate to provide the raw data if they want to proceed with a neuropsychological IME, and has imposed unreasonable conditions for the orthopedic IME. As to the conditions for the orthopedic IME, they include, among other things, that the examination be taken on behalf of all four defendants in this consolidated action; that Defendants waive the right to conduct a medical examination if it does not start within 15 minutes of the noticed start time; that Defendants are not permitted to audio record the examination; and Plaintiff will not be responsible for paying any cancellation fees if Plaintiff needs to reschedule.

Defendants contend Plaintiff is claiming separate and distinct injuries following two motor vehicle collisions (traumatic brain injury/post-concussive syndrome and injuries to her neck and back) and a single examination is insufficient to properly examine Plaintiff and prepare for trial.

Legal Standard

Civil discovery by physical and mental examination is governed by Code of Civil Procedure sections 2032.010 through 2032.650. (Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249, 258-59.) “As a general matter, a defendant may obtain a physical or mental examination of the plaintiff, in accordance with those provisions, if the plaintiff has placed his or her physical or mental condition in controversy.” (Id., citing Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2032.020(a), 2032.310).)

“If the defendant wants to obtain discovery by a mental examination (or by a physical examination other than that described in § 2032.220 et seq.), the defendant must obtain leave of court.” (Carpenter, supra, at 258-259, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.310(a)).) The motion for a mental examination “shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as well as the identity and the specialty, if any, of the person or persons who will perform the examination.” (Carpenter, supra, at 258-259, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.310(b)).)

“To protect the plaintiff's privacy interests from unnecessary intrusion, the mental examination may be ordered only upon a showing of good cause.” (Carpenter, supra, at 258-259, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.320(a); Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840; Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422, 427-428).) Good cause requires the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter of the lawsuit and specific facts illustrating a need for the information and a lack of means for obtaining it elsewhere. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840.) Pursuant to Associated Brewers Distributing Co. v. Superior Court (1967)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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65 Cal.2d 583, good cause is also shown where facts demonstrate that discovery of the plaintiff's condition is necessary for effective trial preparation and/or to prevent surprise at trial.

Discussion

Defendants contend Plaintiff has directly placed her physical and neurological state at issue by way of her discovery responses, wherein Plaintiff claims that due to the accident, she suffers from “Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Brain Syndrome resulting in cognitive difficulties such as memory loss, loss of focus/concentration and reduced ability to process information,” as well as “Personality changes such as irritability and angry outbursts and mood swings,” “Anxiety,” “Headaches with light and noise sensitivity,” “Neck pain,” and “Back pain.” (Declaration of Kara L. Wild (“Wild Decl.” ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) In Plaintiff’s non-verified second amended responses from June 25, 2024, Plaintiff amended the response to state that she suffered injury to “Head/Post-Concussive Syndrome; Neck; Back.” (Wild Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 4.)

In her response to Defendants’ Form Interrogatory No. 6.3, Plaintiff claimed to suffer from “throbbing pain [in her head] that can develop into migraines” and “headaches once or twice a week that can last for hours.” (Wild Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) In her neck, Plaintiff described “a lot of pressure and stiffness,” while in her back, Plaintiff described: “The pain is aching and sharp and I feel a lot of pressure. I get a shooting pain in my left leg that goes to my ankle. The pain is constant and is exacerbated when I walk, twist, bend, or do something repetitive.” (Wild Decl. ¶ 2 Ex. 1.)

Plaintiff’s medical records also indicate she reported to Dr. Vivek Pai that she was having trouble concentrating and following simple instructions. (Wild Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 5.) Dr. Pai stated that “[i]f the patient was not able to fill out the headache questionnaire with simple questions, which are easy to understand, and the patient claims that she is not able to do so because of the accident, then I would suggest that through her lawyer, she be evaluated by a neuropsychologist to find out more about the issue and whether there is a psychological component playing in this.” (bold in original) (Id.) Plaintiff’s medical records further reference pain in her head, neck, and back, as well as Botox treatments for her migraines and undergoing physical therapy for her neck and back. (Wild Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, Exs. 5-7.)

At Plaintiff’s January 24, 2025 deposition, she testified she had been having trouble with her memory since the accidents, that it was a “tad off” and “I don’t remember things as good as I used to. I have to kind of process things a bit harder.” (Wild Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 8) Plaintiff also testified to having issues with pain in her head, neck, and back. With regard to her head, Plaintiff testified that she experienced headaches three times a week, and “severe” headaches approximately five times in a given month. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that her neck pain was better due to exercise, but that her back felt painful at least once a day, and that the pain could last all day. (Id.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Defendants assert the foregoing establishes that Plaintiff has placed in controversy her orthopedic, neurological, and neuropsychological conditions, which warrants separate examinations. Defendants assert the orthopedic IME is to examine Plaintiff’s alleged neck and back pain, the neurological IME is necessary to diagnose the causes of Plaintiff’s alleged cognitive deficiencies and claimed pain, and the neuropsychological IME would test Plaintiff’s level of cognition by way of clinical examination and administration of a series of tests. Defendants further detail their meet-and-confer efforts with Plaintiff, which the Court finds were sufficient prior to filing this motion.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that she has placed her physical and mental state at issue, but argues that Defendants can obtain the information they require through a single physical examination and there is no need to subject Plaintiff to additional testing when Defendants already have thousands of pages of her medical records and have taken her deposition.

The Court finds Defendants have established good cause for each of the IMEs given Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. There is no dispute that the specialties of an orthopedist, neurologist, and neuropsychologist are distinct or that each will examine a different area of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. While there may be slight overlap between the neurological IME and neuropsychological IME, the IMEs are sufficiently distinct to proceed. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to compel is GRANTED. The Court will now address the specific conditions Plaintiff seeks to impose on said IMEs.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.510 lays out the conditions for an IME. They include: the attorney for the examinee, or the attorney’s representative, being permitted to observe and record stenographically or by audio technology; the observer not participating in or disrupting the exam; the observer suspending the examination if in the observer’s judgment, the examiner becomes abusive to the examinee or undertakes to engage in unauthorized diagnostic tests and procedures; and the examiner suspending the examination if the observer begins to participate in or disrupt the examination. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.510.)

First, Plaintiff demands that any IME be taken on behalf of all four defendants in this consolidated action because the Code permits only one physical examination of the plaintiff in any case and it is unreasonable to subject her multiple IMEs by each defendant. Defendants clarify on reply that there are only three defendants – themselves and defendant Richardson.

Plaintiff’s demanded condition is rejected. Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.220 provides that “any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff.” “Under the wording of § 2032.220(a) (“any defendant”), each defendant apparently has the right to demand a separate physical examination of plaintiff; i.e., plaintiff arguably may be compelled to submit to as many examinations as there are codefendants.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024 update) ¶ 8:1522.) Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, also comments that “a protective order would clearly be appropriate to

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prevent repeated examinations when the injury issues are the same as to each defendant.” (Id. at ¶ 18:1523.) Plaintiff, however, has not moved for a protective order. Thus, the Court concludes that given the language of the statute, Plaintiff’s demand that any IME be taken on behalf of all defendants is not Code compliant and will not be imposed.

Plaintiff also asserts that section 2032.220(c) requires a demand to specify the time of the IME and, therefore, if the IME does not timely proceed within 15 minutes, she is entitled to leave and consider it to be a waiver of Defendants’ right to the IME. This condition is wholly unsupported by section 2032.220, and Plaintiff cites to no other legal authority justifying this purported condition. Plaintiff’s reason that she has children to take care of does not justify forcing Defendants to waive their statutory right if the IME does not start within 15 minutes. Accordingly, this condition will not be imposed.

Plaintiff demands to audio-record any IME. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff audio recording the neurological or orthopedic IME, only the neuropsychological testing portion of the neuropsychological IME. Defendants contend that audio recording the entire neuropsychological IME would raise legal, ethical, and contractual concerns. (Friedman Decl. ¶ 23.) Defendants argue that copyright, trade secret laws, and ethical standards in psychology specifically prohibit recording test administration procedures. (Friedman Decl. ¶ 18.)

Defendants insist that allowing such recordings could enable attorney coaching, compromise the validity of test outcomes and potentially lead to manipulated results. (Friedman Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) Defendants also dispute the presence of a third-party observer during the formal test procedures because “Neuropsychological test measures have not been standardized in the presence of an observer and are conducted under controlled circumstances devoid of third-party observers.” (Friedman Decl. ¶ 24.)

Section 2032.530 (Right of examiner and examinee to record mental examination; Presence of attorney and others) specifically permits Plaintiff to audio-record a mental IME, and provides “[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, or affect existing case law with respect to the presence of the attorney for the examinee or other persons during the examination by agreement or court order.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.530.) Defendants’ speculation about the potential negative consequences that could arise from audio-recording and the presence of a third-party, and concerns regarding potential violations of ethical standards are insufficient to override the clear statutory language that permits such recordings and presence of a third-party.

Indeed, nothing in Dr. Friedman’s declaration expresses that there would be a breach of any law or ethical standard if Plaintiff was permitted to audio-record the IME or have her attorney present as expressly permitted by section 2032.530.

Plaintiff’s condition that she should not be responsible for any cancellation fees if she has to reschedule is unsupported by any citation to statute or case law and is, therefore, rejected. The Court is not convinced that it would be unreasonable to impose cancellation fees upon a party who initiates the cancellation.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00324160-CU-PA-GDS: Monica Torres-Mendoza vs. Penske Truck Leasing Co. 03/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel IME in Department 54

Plaintiff seeks to require Defendants to provide a medical report to Plaintiff’s counsel, but it will not be construed as a demand pursuant to Code of Civil procedure sections 2032.610 or 2032.620. This condition is unsupported by the Code. There is no basis for exempting Plaintiff from the requirements set forth under sections 2032.610 and 2032.620 regarding making a demand for the report.

Next, Plaintiff insists that the medical examiner will be asked at deposition to estimate the percentage of their practice that is dedicated to defense medical examinations and the income received in the three prior years. Plaintiff contends she will also require production of documents that confirm said income. The Court will not dictate what may or may not be asked at a future expert deposition, nor will it set this as a precondition to permitting the IMEs, as it is not relevant to this motion and is a premature dispute.

Plaintiff then contends that Defendants should be ordered turn over the raw data obtained during a neuropsychological exam to her counsel. Plaintiff cites to Randy’s Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818, as support.

Defendants contend this is unreasonable and argue sharing the raw data with non-experts “compromises the integrity of validity measures and tests which can make the tests less reliable and prone to abuse.” Defendants assert that the decision in Randy’s Trucking, Inc. relied on only one expert’s declaration and since that decision, “a substantial number of neuropsychologists, constituting the broad neuropsychologist community, have come forth to discuss the importance of raw data handling.” (Motion at 12:10-11.)

In support of Defendants’ position, Dr. Friedman explains, in part:

“7. ‘Raw data’ are defined as the copies of the actual test protocols that may contain administration instructions as well as other sensitive and protected information, such as the test questions themselves.

10. Copyright and trade secrecy laws, the contractual purchase agreements for the tests themselves, as well as ethical requirements governing the practice of psychology, all expressly prohibit disclosing the raw data to anyone other than a licensed neuropsychologist. The tests used by neuropsychologists typically require years of time and considerable expense to develop and standardize. Because improper disclosure of test content and administration procedures has the potential to damage the clinical and scientific value of the instruments, this also poses a considerable threat to their commercial value. In purchasing the tests, I and other neuropsychologists have entered into a contractual obligation with the

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publisher in which we agree that we will protect the test material from being copied, recorded, or otherwise improperly disclosed or disseminated.

11. Not only would their commercial value be sharply diminished should the data contents become widely known, but the data and tests also can become subject to manipulation by interested parties. In the case of neuropsychological exams used for forensic purposes, this is of particular concern due to the potential for attorney “coaching” of clients, particularly with respect to specifically developed measures of performance validity designed to assess examinee effort and the extent to which the obtained data can be relied upon as an accurate representation of the examinee’s neuropsychological functioning.

12. Even if a protective order were in place, a protective order that still provides counsel with the entire raw dataset, including performance validity measures, does not provide enforcement against attorney coaching. Such inadequate protections will inevitably degrade the validity and usefulness of measures over time and eventually undermine the probative value of neuroosvchology in informing the trier of fact

14. In an effort to better educate the legal community and the Court with respect to these crucial issues, the neuropsychological community in California has come together to produce a declaration entitled “Collective Statement of lmportance of Protection of Psychological Test Materials as of November 10, 2024.” A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit 2.

15. As it is clear from these documents, it is the position of the field of neuropsychology, including myself, that defense-retained neuropsychologists should only be compelled to turn over raw data and audio recording of the testing to the plaintiffs retained neuropsychologist. Furthermore, these doctors attest that they would recuse themselves from a case rather than agreeing a priori to be retained on a case with the proposed “protective order” as suggested by the Plaintiff in the current matter that does not provide sufficient protection as required by my professional ethics as well as the copyright, trade secrecy, and contract laws by which l was bound when I purchased these tests.

25. Should this Court order that the raw data be produced directly to Plaintiff or her counsel, as opposed to her retained neuropsychologist for this matter, l will reluctantly have to recuse myself. The same would be true if the Court orders that

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a third party may be present for and record the psychometric testing portion of the examination.”

(Friedman Decl., ¶¶ 7-25.)

Case law has held that there is no statutory authority precluding a court from ordering disclosure of written test questions used in connection with an IME. (Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249, 271.) As is the case here, there is no showing how “providing a copy of the test questions, after an examination and by court order, would violate copyright law in every instance.” (Id. at 273.) It is true that Carpenter did not ultimately reach the issue of whether ethical or professional concerns prohibit the release of testing material. “Because we are remanding the matter for the trial court to decide the issue anew, the court may consider at that time the parties’ arguments regarding the examiner’s ethical and professional obligations.” (Carpenter, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at 275.)

Randy’s Trucking considered the issue which Carpenter did not specifically address. In Randy’s Trucking, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to compel the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination, but denied its request to limit transmission of the raw test data, test materials, copyrighted publications, or documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Instead, it ordered defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer the information to plaintiff’s attorney, subject to a protective order. (Randy’s Trucking, Inc., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 824.) The protective order provided:

“Plaintiff’s counsel, defense counsel and all experts, consultants and employees of the respective firms shall maintain the security of all raw data, test materials and other medically private information obtained during the examination. However, such raw data, test materials and other medically private information may be disclosed to plaintiff’s counsel, defense counsel and all experts, consultants and employees of the respective firms for use in this case. Such materials and data may also be shown to the trier of fact at the time of trial, or such other time as may be necessary for the adjudication of the above-captioned matter. These materials may be used for no other purpose, may not be disseminated to any other party and the parties shall take all reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of the above-identified materials.”

(Id., at 828.)

The protective order also required the parties to “destroy the above-identified materials at the cessation of this case, in accordance with the provisions of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.” (Ibid.)

The defendants in Randy’s Trucking moved for reconsideration on the ground that their retained

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expert had recused herself from the case, and they had spoken with two experts who refused to do the exam under the court’s existing order. (Id. at 828-829.) The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal denied defendants’ petition for writ of mandate, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Id., at 825.)

In its analysis, the court noted that “[t]here is no statutory authority, . . . precluding a trial court from ordering the disclosure of test materials or test data when ordering a mental examination” and “given the trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters, it retains the discretion to order the production of such materials.” (Id., at 834, 837 citing Carpenter, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at 249.) It also found that the defendants had not demonstrated that the need to protect the doctor from violating her ethical and professional obligations outweighed plaintiffs’ need for the materials. (Id., at 837.) The doctor explained the problems with allowing a third-party observer (“TPO”) and the recording of the examination, including:

(1) compromising the validity of future neuropsychological test results; (2) potential misuse and misinterpretation of tests by untrained TPOs “who have no compelling interest in protection of copyrighted test content”; (3) potential conflicts with the APA Ethical Standards and “several key principles in the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology of the American Psychological Association (2013)”; (4) the increased likelihood test content and instructions would be disseminated which “raises the risk that motivated parties will coach and prepare examinees for testing in advance, specifically to influence test results”; and (5) “ ‘[l]awyers involved in brain injury litigation routinely coach their clients how to approach neuropsychological testing to their advantage.’ “

(Id.)

The court found this insufficient because the doctor

did not explain why a protective order would not ameliorate those dangers. She also did not explain why her ethical obligations would be violated if a court ordered her to disclose the raw data and audio recording to plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order. Dr. Victor identified numerous standards in the APA Ethical Standards by number which she claimed could be violated if TPO were allowed, but Dr. Victor did not explain the potential violations and the APA Ethical Standards were not submitted to the trial court.

(Id. at 837-838.)

On the other hand, the Court explained that “[w]ithout the raw data and audio recording, plaintiffs cannot effectively scrutinize the way the data was collected, determine if there are

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discrepancies, and cross-examine the neuropsychologist on the basis and reasons for the neuropsychologist’s opinion.” (Id., at 838.) It added that “while defendants assert plaintiffs’ attorneys could not interpret the test materials, they would not necessarily be required to do so to use the materials for purposes of cross-examination, since disclosure of these materials may help to protect against abuse and disputes over what transpired during the examination.” (Ibid.) The Court also agreed with plaintiffs that it was insufficient to submit the raw data and audio recordings to plaintiffs’ retained expert because “[plaintiffs] should not be forced to retain an expert to gain access to these materials and even if they do retain one, that expert can only assist the attorney in preparing for cross-examination; to prepare and conduct an effective crossexamination, ‘the attorney must themselves possess more than a second-hand understanding of the information being scrutinized.’” (Ibid.)

Defendants’ argument that requiring Dr. Friedman to produce the raw data, etc., would violate California Board of Psychology regulation 1396 is unavailing. As noted by the Randy’s Trucking court, this regulation “does not address a psychologist’s duty when a court order requires an attorney’s access to psychological tests or devices, particularly subject to a protective order that requires the parties to safeguard the use of the tests or devices. Put another way, the regulation does not prohibit a psychologist from producing tests or devices when ordered by a court subject to a protective order.” (Randy’s Trucking, Inc, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 839.)

Defendants also insist that the 264 psychologists who signed the Collective Statement each state they would recuse themselves from a case rather than release raw data to a non-psychologist, even subject to a protective order. Additionally, Dr. Friedman declared he will recuse himself from this case if the Court orders raw data be produced to Plaintiff or her counsel. However, Dr. Friedman’s declaration makes no affirmative statement that he will recuse himself in this case if ordered to produce the raw data to counsel subject to a protective order. Defendants also make no showing that they have attempted to contact other neuropsychologists, and that those experts would refuse to conduct an examination and produce the raw data, etc., to counsel subject to a protective order.

Defendants raise a concern that protective orders are insufficient to guarantee test security. The court in Carpenter, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at 274, however, determined that a protective order was adequate to protect against copyright concerns in relation to providing copies of neuropsychological tests. (Id. at 274.) Defendants also suggest that attorneys that have knowledge of the tests will prepare their next clients for evaluation. The Court, however, does not presume that its orders, including protective orders, will be violated. Nor is the Court persuaded by Defendants’ speculation in such regard. In fact, the most sensitive materials imaginable in all varieties of ligation in all courts throughout this state are secured by courtimposed protective orders. There is no exception to be made here.

Finally, Plaintiff requests that any IME should be labeled “adversarial” and limited to past and current symptoms and medical issues related to the injuries at issue in this case only. In addition,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Plaintiff requests that the Court impose a limit ordering the examiner to only asks questions about factual matters at issue in this case. The Court declines to set these limitations as there is no need to place any label on an IME and Plaintiff’s counsel can object during the examination if any questioning purportedly exceeds the matters that Plaintiff has placed at issue.

Conclusion

The Court finds good cause to order the IMEs. Defendants’ motion for an order compelling the IMEs of Plaintiff is, therefore, GRANTED, subject to a protective order.

The Parties shall meet and confer forthwith and submit a protective order consistent with Randy’s Trucking. Dr. Friedman shall provide the raw data from the testing to Plaintiff’s counsel within a reasonable time after the examination. However, the raw data and testing material shall be subject to the protective order. Should Dr. Friedman recuse himself from this matter, the parties are ordered to meet-and-confer regarding substituting in a new neuropsychologist to conduct the IME.

The orthopedic IME shall be conducted by Dr. Clement Jones, M.D. at his office in San Francisco. The neurological IME shall be conducted by neurologist, Dr. Bott at his office in Oakland. The neuropsychological IME shall be conducted by neuropsychologist, Dr. Friedman at his office in Walnut Creek.

The parties are ordered to meet and confer on a mutually agreeable date for the IMEs to take place, but they shall take place no later than May 6, 2025.

The manner, procedures, scope, nature, and conditions of the IMEs are as described in Defendants’ Demands for IME served on February 26, 2025.

Plaintiff may audio-record the IMEs.

Each IME shall not exceed eight hours of examination time and will consist of the tests as described in Defendants’ Demands for IME served on February 26, 2025, none of which were objected to. The IMEs shall allow for reasonable rest and lunch breaks.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Defendants are directed to contact Plaintiff and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If Defendants are unable to contact Plaintiff prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.