Motion for Summary Judgment
the above-captioned matter, and ordered Defendants to submit a properly completed Order Appointing Referee (ADR-110) within five days. (See ROA 187). Defendants submitted the Order on 5/15/26, and accordingly, all disputes relating to the depositions in this matter are now before Judge Hurwitz.
Because Plaintiff moves for sanctions arising out of counsel’s conduct during depositions, including improper objections and coaching, such matter is within the scope of the discovery referee.
Plaintiff shall give notice.
3 Ortiz v. Ford Defendant Ford Motor Company moves for summary judgment on the Motor Company Complaint filed by Plaintiff Isabel Ortiz. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
A defendant seeking summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion and burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to negate the plaintiff’s claim. It may do this by demonstrating the claim has no merit, that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of the claim, or that the defendant has a complete defense entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-51.)
On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff was involved in a three-vehicle collision on the 5 freeway. (Defendant’s Material Fact (“DMF”) 1.) Plaintiff was driving a 2010 Mercury Milan (the “Milan”) and did not come to a complete stop and rear ended another car. (DMF 2.) The Milan was dismantled on November 16, 2022, almost two years before this lawsuit was filed. (DMF 11.)
Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against Ford for “motor vehicle” and “products liability.” The Complaint asserts a cause of action for general negligence, but Ford is not listed as a defendant in that cause of action. Instead, that cause of action is only directed towards Lawrence Patrick Eng and Angela Jane Ivlcintosh, both of whom have been dismissed as defendants by Plaintiff. (ROAs 2, 39.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for “motor vehicle” does not allege how Defendant was negligent. (ROA 2 at p. 4.) The form Complaint states, “The defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons and the reasons for the liability are ... Ford Motor Company,” but no statement is given as to the reasons for the liability. (Ibid.)
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
The Court will construe the claim as one for general negligence. To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant owed a legal duty to him or her, the defendant breached that duty, and the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1145.) “The elements of a strict products liability cause of action are a defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.” (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)
As to Ford, Plaintiff’s Judicial Council form Complaint only alleges that Plaintiff was injured due to the “battery energy control module and
powertrain control module.” (DMF 15.) In discovery, Plaintiff claims her Milan was subject to a safety recall Ford issued on December 18, 2019 for certain 2006-2010 Ford Fusion, Mercury Milan, and other vehicles. (DMF 16.) The recall identified a defect in certain ABS Hydraulic Control Unit valves that may not close properly due to a reaction with brake fluid containing specific corrosion-preventative additives, potentially compromising the vehicle’s braking performance. (DMF 17.)
In September 2022 (after the accident took place), Ford sent a letter to customers that an update to the software for the Battery Energy Control Module and Powertrain Control Module needed to be performed on the Milan. (DMF 19.) Plaintiff contends this indicates that Ford “acknowledged potential issues with these modules after the crash.” (DMF 20.) Plaintiff is referring to Safety Recall 19S54, reporting that a valve in the hydraulic control unit of the anti-lock braking system may become stuck open, increasing the risk of a crash. (DMF 21-23.)
This Recall did not apply to Plaintiff’s Milan. (DMF 25-29.) The Recall was limited to certain vehicles manufactured between February 22, 2006 and July 15, 2009, but Plaintiff’s Milan was manufactured on March 9, 2010, outside the parameters of the Recall. (Ibid.) The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s website shows that there were no outstanding recalls for Plaintiff’s Milan. (DMF 29.)
Plaintiff disputes Material Facts 25-29 with a few claims. First, Plaintiff states, “Plaintiff deposition at pg.
47. Plaintiff testified that the vehicle brake system “wasn’t function [sic] properly” on date of accident which led to accident.” (ROA 84.) Plaintiff’s reliance on her deposition testimony is problematic because Plaintiff did not authenticate her deposition testimony. Instead, she simply attached excerpts from her deposition transcript to her opposition to the summary judgment motion. Further, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on page 47 does not provide any evidence to dispute DMF 25-29.
Plaintiff also points to a discovery response to dispute Material Facts 25- 29: “Pursuant to Plaintiff Response to Special Interrogatory pg. 3, the brake defect may be related to the recall issued by Ford on December 18, 2019 pertaining to certain vehicles, including Milan vehicles.” However, Plaintiff has not provided, let alone authenticated, the interrogatory responses she references. Further, Plaintiff may not use her own discovery responses to oppose summary judgment. (See Great American Ins. Cos. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 445, 450 [party cannot use his own discovery responses to oppose summary judgment].) Plaintiff has not provided any admissible evidence to dispute Material Facts 25-29.
Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.
4 NiMO Holdings, Judgment Debtors’ motion to tax the Memorandum of Costs After LLC v. All Home Judgment on the ground that it was filed after the judgment was fully Lending, Inc. satisfied is DENIED.
The motion to tax the August 2023 abstract-of-judgment costs in the amount of $473.00 is GRANTED.
The motion to tax attorney’s fees is DEFERRED pending resolution of Judgment Creditor’s separately noticed motion for attorney’s fees.
The Court takes judicial notice of Judgment Creditor’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and supporting Declaration of Sharon Oh-Kubisch, filed on 02/09/2026. (RJN, Ex. 1; Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) A. Relevant Facts
On 4/17/2023, default judgment was entered. (ROA 23.) Notice of Entry of Judgment was subsequently filed on 04/20/2023. (ROA 29.) Thereafter, on 04/28/2023, Judgment Creditor filed a Memorandum of Costs After Judgment. (ROA 31.)
On 07/20/2023, an amended judgment was entered. (ROA 80.)
On 08/16/2023, Judgment Debtors entered into a written Stipulation to pay the judgment through monthly installment payments of $3,000 per month for the first 12 months and $4,000 per month for the next twelve months. (Motion, Declaration of Mike Ahmari, ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) The Stipulation also required post-judgment interest to accrue until the final settlement payment was made. (Ibid.)
On 08/01/2024, Judgment Debtors received an email from Plaintiff’s counsel, containing an Excel spreadsheet showing first-year payments totaling $36,000, interest owed of $6,034.71, and a remaining balance of $52,857.89. (Id., ¶ 5, Exh. 2.)
On 03/13/2025, Plaintiff’s attorney sent Judgment Debtors an email stating that he owed $18,923.57 in attorneys’ fees. (Id., ¶ 6, Exh. 3.)
On 04/24/2025, Judgment Debtors’ attorney sent an email disputing Judgment Creditor’s claim for attorneys’ fees on the ground that Judgment Debtors never agreed to pay additional attorneys’ fees of approximately $19,000. (Id., ¶ 7, Exh. 4.)
On 08/20/2025, Judgment Creditor’s attorney sent an email containing a payment schedule stating that Judgment Debtors owed $21,942.47 in attorneys’ fees. (Id., ¶ 8, Exh. 5.)
On 10/16/2025, Judgment Creditor’s attorney sent an email claiming that Judgment Debtors owed $22,334.67 in attorneys’ fees. (Id., ¶ 9, Exh. 6.)
On 12/05/2025, Judgment Creditor’s attorney sent an email claiming Judgment Debtors owed $9,109.61 in principal and interest, and $22,334.67 in attorneys’ fees. (Id., ¶ 9, Exh. 7.)
On 12/08/2025, Judgment Debtor Mike Ahmari personally delivered to Plaintiff’s administrator, a check in the amount of $9,109.61. (Id., ¶ 10, Exh. 8.) The memo section of the check stated: “Payment in full 30- 0323-0137967 [sic].” (Ibid.) Bank records show that Judgment Creditor negotiated the check on 12/09/2025. (Ibid.)
On 12/15/2025, Judgment Debtors’ attorney sent an email stating the Stipulation did not provide for attorneys’ fees, and that the 12/05/2025
9