Jenna Garrett et al vs Ford Motor Company et al

Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle to Ford’s authorized repair facility for repairs. FORD and its representative failed to commence the service or repairs within a reasonable time and failed to repair the Subject Vehicle to conform to the applicable warranties. (Complaint ¶ 33)

Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 10, 2024, alleging causes of action for (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (5) Negligent Repair; and (6) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

Code. Civ. Proc. § 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

"The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings." (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)

Courts "liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party." (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence that is admissible under the rules of evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

"On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial." (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)

Further, "the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 840.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. First Cause of Action - Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d)

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act regulates warranty terms and imposes service and repair obligations on manufacturers who make express warranties. (Civ. Code § 1793.2)

“A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Act has the burden to prove that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).” (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

Citing Silvio v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1205, Ford’s position, is that all three elements are absent in Plaintiffs’ claims since the Subject Vehicle was never presented for a warranty repair for a nonconformity. (Motion at 11:11-26)

Ford submits supporting evidence establishing: • The Subject Vehicle was purchased on October 22, 2017, as new, with 240 miles on the odometer. (Garcia Decl. Ex. A.) • The warranties include a 3-year/36,000 miles “bumper-to-bumper” warranty and a 5-year/60,000 miles powertrain warranty. (Garcia Decl. Ex. C.) • The Subject Vehicle was presented for routine maintenance on June 28, 2018, February 18, 2019, August 2, 2019, December 2, 2019, and March 21, 2023. (Garcia Decl. Exhibits G-J) • The vehicle was presented for actual customer complaints only on August 22, 2023 (81,733 miles — engine light, rough idle, no-start) and November 15, 2024 (95,252 miles — check engine light, repair declined).

Both visits were well outside of warranty. (Garcia Decl. Exhibits M, N) • The only within-warranty presentations (excluding routine maintenance) were for Recall 19B37 on June 9, 2020, at 36,428 miles, for Power Control Module (“PCM”) reprogramming that was completed in three days, and Recall 22S43 on August 22, 2023, at 81,733 miles to replace bushing and cap. (Garcia Decl. Exhibits K, M; Kemnitz Decl. ¶¶ 11,12, 16) • The Subject Vehicle was not experiencing any conditions related to the powertrain control module when it was presented on June 9, 2020, for Recall 19B37. (Garcia Decl.

Exhibit K; Kemnitz Decl. ¶ 12)

Ford characterizes Recalls as proactive measures taken to address potential issues that may arise and do not reflect actual problems or nonconformities with the specific vehicle. Ford cites two federal district court decisions for this characterization. (Motion at 11:14-16) However, decisions by district courts have no binding effect on this Court’s determination.

Here, Plaintiffs specifically allege a “Transmission Defect” that included symptoms requiring reprogramming of the transmission control module ('TCM') and/or powertrain control module ('PCM'). (Complaint ¶ 53.) Ford’s Recall 19B37 directly implicates the very type of defect that is alleged in the complaint. Ford provides no evidence demonstrating what diagnostic procedures, if any, Heritage Ford performed before the recall service to determine whether the vehicle was experiencing symptoms related to the recall. The repair order itself is not included in Ford's evidence to demonstrate that the vehicle was asymptomatic.

Liberally construing the evidence in support of Plaintiffs, as the Court must, the Court can reasonably infer from the record that Recall 19B37 is counted as a warranty presentation. Nonetheless, this constitutes as one repair opportunity. Under Silvio, the manufacturer is not required to replace a vehicle or make restitution "if it has had only one opportunity to repair the vehicle." (Silvio, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1208.)

On this record, Ford has met its initial burden. The undisputed evidence shows no in-warranty presentation for a customer-reported nonconformity, and at most one proactive recall, which Ford was not given an opportunity to address a second time.

B. Second Cause of Action - Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b)

Civil Code § 1793.2(b) provides that when goods "do not conform with the applicable express warranties," service or repair "shall be commenced within a reasonable time" and "the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days." (Civ. Code § 1793.2(b).)

Ford argues: (1) the Subject Vehicle was never presented for a warranty-related nonconformity; and (2) even considering the Recall 19B37 visit, the Subject Vehicle was at the dealership for only three days at most. (Motion at 12:4-8)

The 30-day clock under § 1793.2(b) is triggered only when goods do not conform with the applicable express warranties. If no nonconformity was presented during warranty, there could be no violation of the 30-day repair obligation. Moreover, even assuming the recall triggered the provision, three days are well under 30. Plaintiffs allege the vehicle was not repaired within 30 days, (Complaint. ¶ 33) but the undisputed repair records show no service visit approaching that duration. (Garcia Decl. Exhibits G-N)

On this record, Ford has met its initial burden of showing warranty repairs were completed in compliance with Civil Code § 1793.2(b).

C. Third Cause of Action - Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3)

Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3) requires manufacturers to "[m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period." (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(a)(3).)

Ford argues that neither the vehicle repair orders nor Plaintiffs’ document production provide any evidence it failed to make service literature and replacement parts available to authorized service and repair facilities. (Motion at 12:9-11) Ford cites the Garcia Declaration Exhibits F, G-N, (repair orders and document production) as supporting this negative fact.

Ford has shifted the burden by pointing to the absence of evidence. The repair orders do not refer to any instance where a repair was delayed or incomplete due to unavailability of parts or literature. Plaintiffs’ 38-page document production similarly contains no such evidence. (Garcia Decl. Exhibit F)

On this record, Ford has met its initial burden by demonstrating Plaintiffs cannot show evidentiary support for their claim.

D. Fourth Cause of Action – Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (CIV. CODE, § 1791.1; § 1794; § 1795.5)

The implied warranty of merchantability requires that goods "[a]re fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." (Civ. Code, § 1791.1(a)(2).) The duration of the implied warranty of merchantability "shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods" but "in no event shall such implied warranty have a duration of less than 60 days nor more than one year following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer." (Civ. Code, § 1791.1(c).)

Ford's argument for summary judgment on the implied warranty claim rests on the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs did not present the vehicle for any concern other than routine maintenance until June 9, 2020, approximately 2.5 years after the October 22, 2017, purchase.

A breach of implied warranty does not necessarily require presentation to a repair facility. The implied warranty is breached if the vehicle was sold with a latent defect rendering it unfit for ordinary use, even if the defect did not manifest symptoms until later. Plaintiffs allege the vehicle was sold with "one or more latent defect(s)" and was "not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." (Complaint. ¶ 43.)

However, a latent defect existing at sale does not establish the vehicle was unmerchantable during the first year unless that defect manifested in a way that made the vehicle unfit for ordinary use during that period. The fact that Plaintiffs continued to drive the vehicle and presented it only for routine maintenance during the first year strongly suggests the vehicle was functioning for its ordinary purpose—transportation—during the implied warranty period.

Without evidence showing the vehicle failed to perform its ordinary function during the statutory period, Plaintiffs cannot establish a breach of implied warranty. On this record Ford has met its initial burden by demonstrating that no service needs arose during the one-year period, thereby negating the merchantability element.

E. Sixth Cause of Action – Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment)

"'[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.' [Citation]." (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 868.)

Ford argues that Plaintiffs' discovery responses are factually devoid, providing no facts, persons, or documents to support the fraud claim. In response to Ford's Special Interrogatory No. 13 requesting all facts supporting the fraudulent concealment cause of action, Plaintiffs responded only by referring to "Plaintiff's Complaint and the Subject Vehicle's repair history," stating they require deposition testimony and documents from Ford's person most knowledgeable, and citing Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230. Similarly, Interrogatory No. 14 requesting identification of all persons with knowledge elicited only generic references to "Defendant; Defendant's agents, representatives, and employees" without naming any specific individuals. ((Motion at 14:7-15:3; Garcia Decl. Exhibits D & E)

Additionally, Plaintiffs' 38-page document production contains only the sales contract, vehicle registration, repair orders, insurance declarations, and a Kelley Blue Book pricing report. None of these documents provide evidence that Ford had pre-sale knowledge of transmission defects in the specific vehicle or in 2017 Ford Escapes generally, or that Ford concealed such knowledge from Plaintiffs. The repair orders show post-sale service history but do not demonstrate Ford's pre-sale knowledge or concealment. (Garcia Decl. Exhibits F-N)

The complaint alleges Ford knew the 6-speed transmission had defects causing hesitation, harsh shifting, jerking, shuddering, and other symptoms, and that Ford acquired this knowledge through pre-production testing, early consumer complaints, aggregate warranty data, and other internal sources not available to consumers. (Complaint ¶¶ 53 -54) However, Plaintiffs have not identified any documents, witnesses, or specific facts supporting these allegations beyond the conclusory statements in the complaint itself.

Under California law, a moving defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift the burden, using them as evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence. Once the burden shifts as a result of the factually devoid discovery responses, Plaintiffs must set forth the specific facts which prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (See, Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) Plaintiffs have failed to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Ford’s motion for summary judgment against the complaint is GRANTED.

Date: July 31, 2026

Hon. Panteha E. Saban Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

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