Brandon Hilburn vs. Ford Motor Company

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LINE CASE NO. CASE TITLE TENTATIVE RULING 9:00 18CV326093 RE:1603 Cortez Trustees petition this court order a claims bar date. A petition and declaration of 1 Street, Milpitas, CA unresolved claims was filed on April 3, 2018. No claims have been filed. The petition to order a claims bar date is GRANTED. Court requests more information from counsel to set a date.

9:00 23CV425985 Kimberly Kullen vs. Defendant moves this court to stay proceedings pending appeal. Plaintiff filed this 2 Uber Technologies, complaint on November 9, 2023 alleging premises liability and public entity liability Inc. arising from injuries she sustained when a sign fell and struck her at the San Jose International Airport. Defendant petitioned this court to compel arbitration. In December of 2025, this court denied defendant’s petition. Defendant appealed this court’s decision. SB 365 allows this court the discretion to deny staying of proceedings pending an appellate ruling. Defendant does not meet its burden of showing how it will be prejudiced by continuing litigation in this matter. The court is more convinced that Plaintiff will be prejudiced by delaying a case that has been in court now for almost three years. Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

9:00 24CV444665 Wilson Catalan vs. See below. 3 Ford Motor Company, et.al.

9:00 24CV447032 Thanh Tran, et.al. vs. Off calendar.- 4 American Honda Motor Company

9:00 25CV458952 Carlos Perea vs. Defendant moves this court to dismiss case. Plaintiff has failed to respond to court 5 General Motors,LLC order from November 18, 2025 to produce documents. Plaintiff has not filed any objections to this motion. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Defendant’s request for attorney costs is GRANTED.

9:00 25CV461251 JP Morgan Chase See below. 6 Bank vs. Ryan Ourique

9:00 24CV453635 Brandon Hilburn vs. See below. 7 Ford Motor Company

9:01 20CV373187 Austin Erlich v. Defendant moves this court for exemption from wage garnishment. On January 13, 1 Wahid Shah 2026, this court denied defendant’s motion for exemption, but reduced monthly payment. On May 7. 2026, this court restored the original amount of wage garnishment without objection from the defendant. The issue of exemption is res judicata. Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

The scope of the Arbitration Agreement contained in the Cardmember Agreement covers Plaintiff’s claims. The Agreement provides: This arbitration agreement provides that all disputes between you and Chase must be resolved by BINDING ARBITRATION whenever you or we choose to submit or refer a dispute to arbitration . . . All claims or disputes between you and us about or relating to in any way to your account, any prior account, your Cardmember Agreement with us (including any future amendments), any prior Cardmember Agreement, or our relationship are referred to as “Claims” for purposes of this agreement to arbitrate.

Claims include, for example, claims or disputes arising from or relating in any way to transactions involving your account; any interest, charges, or fees assessed on your account; any service(s) or programs related to your account; any communications related to your account; any collection or credit reporting of your account. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff’s claim pertains to the credit card account held by Defendant. Plaintiff’s allegations are that Defendant has failed to make payments on the account and is now in default of $7,796.11. (Complaint at p. 3.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are covered by the scope of the Agreement. Plaintiff does not object to these arguments and has instead filed a “Limited nonopposition to motion to compel arbitration.” As the claimant in this action, Plaintiff may select either JAMS or AAA in accordance with the Agreement. (See Mtn. to Compel Arbitration, Ex. A.) For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Compel Arbitration. This action is hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4; 9 U.S.C. § 3.)

CONCLUSION The Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration. The Court will prepare the order.

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Case Name: Brandon Hilburn v. Ford Motor Company et al. Case No.: 24CV453635

This is a lemon law action. Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) moves for summary adjudication as to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement alleged in the complaint filed by plaintiff Brandon Hilburn (“Hilburn”).

I. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Hilburn requests that the court judicially notice five documents in support of his opposition to Ford’s motion for summary adjudication. (Hilburn’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication (“Hilburn RJN”), p. 2:8-22.) According to Hilburn, these are documents taken from the website of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”). (Id. at p. 2:2-7.)

The court acknowledges that Courts of Appeal have judicially noticed a government website. (See Shaw v. People ex rel. Chiang (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 577, 606, fn. 10 [taking judicial notice of the California Department of Transportation’s website], overruled on other grounds by County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates (2018) 6 Cal.5th 196, 214, fn. 4.) However, while the court can take judicial notice of the existence of a government website, it cannot accept the website’s contents as true. (See Ragland v.

U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 193 (Ragland) [“Ragland’s request for judicial notice requires us (with one exception) to take judicial notice of, and accept as true, the contents of those exhibits. While we may take judicial notice of the existence of the audit report, Web sites, and blogs, we may not accept their contents as true. . . . Although the audit report is a government document, we may not judicially notice the truth of its contents.”], internal citation omitted; Jolley v.

Chase Home Finance LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 889 [“[W]e know of no ‘official web site’ provision for judicial notice in California.”], internal citation omitted; Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519 [affirming denial of request to take notice of the truth of the contents of web site pages of the American Coal Foundation and the U.S. Department of Energy]; Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 737 [refusing to take judicial notice of information on the California Board of Registered Nursing web site]; Ragland, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 194 [noting that “[t]he contents of web sites and blogs are plainly subject to interpretation and for that reason not subject to judicial notice”], internal citation and quotation marks omitted.)

As such, the court will grant judicial notice of the existence of Exhibits 1 through 5 to Hilburn’s request. However, the court declines to judicially notice the truth of the contents of these exhibits.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

Legal Standard

On a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. . . . The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R.

Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72, internal citations omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850.) A “party cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact.” (Christina C. v.

County of Orange (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1378, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

B. Motion for Summary Adjudication

Ford moves for summary adjudication as to the complaint’s sixth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. “The elements of fraudulent concealment are: (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.” (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 341, 348 (Burch), internal citation omitted.)

Ford argues that Hilburn cannot prove the necessary elements of the complaint’s sixth cause of action because “there is no evidence that: (1) the Subject Vehicle was manufactured with a ‘Transmission Defect;’ and, (2) Ford knew of this ‘defect’ and concealed the ‘defect,’ inducing Plaintiff into purchase [sic] the Subject Vehicle.” (Notice of Motion for Summary Adjudication, p. 1:8-12.) Ford directs the court to Hilburn’s responses to discovery propounded by Ford. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication (“MPA”), pp. 2:22-4:13, 6:18-7:20.)

“[A] moving defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift the burden of proof pursuant to section 437c, subdivision [(p)(1)]. Once the burden shifts as a result of the factually devoid discovery responses, the plaintiff must set forth the specific facts which prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.)

Ford directs the court to Hilburn’s responses to three special interrogatories. (See Declaration of Katherine P. Vilchez in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication (“Vilchez Decl.”), Ex. C at pp. 19:3-22:9.) In response to a special interrogatory requesting that Hilburn state all facts supporting the allegations underlying the complaint’s sixth cause of action, Hilburn responded that such information “may be found in the complaint and documents produced in connection with Plaintiff’s responses” to Ford’s requests for production. (Id. at p. 19:22-20:3.)

In response to a special interrogatory requesting that Hilburn identify all persons with knowledge of facts supporting the complaint’s fraud allegations, Hilburn identified himself, Ford, and Ford’s “agents, representatives, and employees.” (Id. at pp. 20:26-21:6.) In response to a special interrogatory requesting that Hilburn identify all documents supporting the complaint’s fraud allegations, Hilburn referred Ford to documents Hilburn produced in response to Ford’s requests for production. (Id. at pp. 21:28-29:7.)

Ford also directs the court to documents Hilburn produced in response to Ford’s requests for production. (Vilchez Decl., Ex. D.) These documents include a retail installment sale contract, a transfer and reassignment form, a deficiency waiver addendum, a maintenance plan application, pre-contract disclosure, and invoices from a maintenance center, among others. (Ibid.)

Having reviewed the discovery responses and evidence described above, the court is inclined to agree with Ford that Hilburn’s discovery responses are “factually devoid” such that an “absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred.” The complaint alleges that Ford committed fraud by allowing a 2020 Mustang to be sold to Hilburn without disclosing that the vehicle and “its 6-speed Transmission were defective and susceptible to sudden and premature failure.” (Complaint, ¶ 52.) However, the various documents produced by Hilburn and relied on in answering Ford’s discovery responses do not establish that Ford intentionally concealed or suppressed a material fact. (See Burch, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)

Moreover, the court notes that Hilburn does not respond to Ford’s argument or evidentiary showing in his opposition. (Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”), p. 5:1-3 [“Defendant’s challenge to the Sixth Cause of Action fails because triable issues of material fact exist, including as to Defendant’s fraudulently inducing Plaintiff to purchase the Vehicle through its concealment of the transmission defects at issue.”].)

The burden shifts to Hilburn to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. To demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to whether Ford had knowledge of any transmission defect, Hilburn relies upon documents that he has requested that the court judicially notice. (Opposition, pp. 7:10-9:5.) While the court has judicially noticed the existence of these documents, it has not noticed the truth of these documents’ contents. Hilburn, however, relies on the contents of these documents to support his argument that Ford had knowledge of the alleged transmission defect.

For example, Ford notes that a technical service bulletin shows that “some 2018 Mustang vehicles equipped . . . with a manual transmission may exhibit an inability or difficulty to shift the vehicle into second gear . . . this TSB demonstrates that Ford was aware of second-gear shifting defects . . .” (Opposition, p. 8:1-9.) Similarly, Hilburn discusses the NHTSA’s purported investigation into consumer complaints “about the inability to shift gears in 2011-2012 Ford Mustangs equipped with a six-speed manual transmission . . .” (Id. at p. 7:17- 27.)

While a court can “take judicial notice of the existence of . . . Web sites . . . [it cannot] accept their contents as true. . . .” (Ragland, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 193, internal citation omitted.)

Therefore, the court finds that Hilburn has failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Moreover, the court is inclined to agree with Ford on reply that even if the court considered the materials discussed above, Hilburn would still not have demonstrated a triable issue of material fact. (Ford’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3:3-22.) The four technical service bulletins submitted by Hilburn concern the following vehicles: the 2018 Ford Mustang, 2018-2019 Ford Mustangs, and 2015-2019 Ford Mustangs. (Hilburn RJN, Ex. 2 at p. 1; Ex. 3 at p. 1; Ex. 4 at p. 1; Ex. 5 at p. 1.)

The NHTSA report concerns the “2011-2012 Ford Mustang manual transmission.” (Id., Ex. at p. 1.) The complaint, however, alleges that Hilburn entered into a warranty contract with Ford regarding a 2020 Ford Mustang. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Given this, it does not appear to the court that the documents Hilburn requests judicial notice of apply to the vehicle that is the subject of Hilburn’s complaint.

Counsel for Hilburn has provided a declaration stating: that (1) the consumer complaints subject to the NHTSA’s investigation were “equipped with a six-speed manual transmission that on information and belief was the predecessor six-speed transmission to the transmission used in the 2020 Mustang model . . .”; and (2) Ford was aware of “second-gear shifting defects in the manual transmission installed in 2018 Mustangs—the same transmission family used in the 2020 Subject Vehicle . . .” (Declaration of Benjamin Fuchs in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Fuchs Declaration” or “Fuchs Decl.”), ¶¶ 6-7.)

Ford objects to these statements on hearsay and foundation grounds, among other reasons. First, declarations “based on information and belief are insufficient to satisfy the burden of either the moving or opposing party on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication.” (Lopez v. University Partners (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124, internal citations omitted.) Second, the Fuchs Declaration directs the court to no evidence indicating that Ford’s 2018 and 2020 Mustangs are of the “same transmission family” and Fuchs otherwise does not provide a sufficient factual foundation for this statement in his declaration.

The court SUSTAINS Ford’s second and third evidentiary objections. The court declines to rule on Ford’s remaining evidentiary objections, which are not material to the outcome of this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q) [“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.”].)

III. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to the complaint’s sixth cause of action.

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