Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

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34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

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Tentative Ruling:

Defendant General Motors LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment is ruled upon as follows:

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Evidence Objections Plaintiffs advance evidentiary objections to Defendant’s evidence. None of the objections are to evidence that is material to the court’s disposition of this matter. The court therefore need not rule on them. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

Background

On or about April 25, 2018, Plaintiffs Kevin Gerhardt and Performance Trailers, Inc., (“Plaintiffs”) purchased a 2016 Chevrolet Silverado 1500, VIN 3GCUKREC2GG334281 (“Subject Vehicle”). (Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 5.) The TAC alleges that Defendant issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty covering the Vehicle, which was provided to the original and any subsequent owners of the vehicle during the warranty period. (TAC, ¶ 9)

Plaintiffs allege that the Subject Vehicle developed various alleged “defects” during the warranty period, including a defective 6L80 six-speed automatic transmission that slips, surges, bucks, hesitates, and shifts harshly, presenting a safety hazard. (TAC ¶¶ 15-16, 30.)

The operative TAC alleges four causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (3) fraudulent concealment; and (4) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). (TAC, Generally.)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint based on “(i) on Count I (Breach of Express Warranty(s) under California Commercial Code § 2-313) because Defendant was not the seller of the subject vehicle that Plaintiffs bought used from a third-party dealership and Plaintiffs were not in privity of contract with GM; (ii) on Count II because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss” or “MMWA”) claim without any

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

viable state law causes of action, of which there are none here; (iii) on Count III (Fraudulent Concealment) because the information that DEFENDANT allegedly failed to disclose was publicly available; and (iv) on Count IV because Plaintiffs cannot establish a transactional relationship as required by the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”).” (Defendant’s Not. Of Mot.)

Defendant did not move in the alternative for summary adjudication.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The papers filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781).

Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims fail because: (1) Plaintiffs lack privity with Defendant; (2) their Magnuson-Moss claim lacks a viable state-law

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

warranty claim; (3) the allegedly concealed information was public; and (4) Plaintiffs lack the transactional relationship required under the CLRA.

First Cause of Action – Breach of Express Warranty

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for a breach of express warranty pursuant to Commercial Code section 2313.

Commercial Code section 2313 states:

(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:

(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.

(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.

(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.

(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.

“The essential elements of a cause of action under the California Uniform Commercial Code for breach of an express warranty to repair defects are (1) an express warranty (Com. Code, § 2313) to repair defects given in connection with the sale of goods; (2) the existence of a defect covered by the warranty; (3) the buyer’s notice to the seller of such a defect within a reasonable time after its discovery (ibid. § 2607, subd. (3)(A)); (4) the seller’s failure to repair the defect in compliance with the warranty; and (5) resulting damages (ibid. §§ 2714, 2715; Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 145; see also Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1333-1334.)

Here, citing to Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, Defendant contends the cause of action fails as a matter of law because it was not the “seller” of the Subject Vehicle and had no contractual privity with Plaintiffs. (Moving MPA at 4:20 – 5:18.) Defendant points to the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle used from a dealership, Kuni.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

(UMF ¶¶ 1-2, [undisputed].)

In Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1196, the court stated:

“The Commercial Code’s express warranty provisions are limited to warranties given by the seller directly to the buyer. (Davis [v. Nissan North America (2024)], 100 Cal.App.5th [825], 838, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 517, review granted[1]; Cal. U. Com. Code, §§ 2313, subd. (1)(a) & 2103, subd. (1)(d).) Moreover, “the warranty sections ... are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.” (Official Comments on Cal.

U. Com. Code, Deering’s Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code (2024 ed.) foll. § 2313, italics added.) In other words, while express warranties apply under the Commercial Code only to a seller in privity with the buyer, the buyer may sue a third- party manufacturer for breach of an express warranty in the absence of privity. (Davis, at pp. 838–839, 319 Cal.Rptr.3d 517.)”

(Ballesteros, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1216-1217.)

Similarly, the appellate court explained in Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 that:

However, Ford’s respondent’s brief admits, “Used car owners that obtain their vehicles via private sales and who comply with the warranty terms may seek to enforce the express warranty against the manufacturer by bringing an action under the Commercial Code based on breach of express warranty. Such an action does not require that the plaintiff purchase the vehicle from a retail seller.” Ford is correct that the Act was meant to supplement, not supersede, the provisions of the Commercial Code. (§ 1790.3; Park City Services, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 295, 301–302, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

(Dagher, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928.)

Defendant has shown it was not the direct seller for the sale of the Vehicle to Plaintiffs. However, the claim is not founded on a warranty created by the selling dealer. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant provided an express written warranty (TAC, ¶¶ 6, 8-9, 85.) As observed above, the law distinguishes a seller’s express warranty from a manufacturer’s own written warranty. The Commercial Code does not disturb non-UCC case law allowing a buyer to sue a manufacturer for breach of express warranty even in the absence of privity, and such a warranty “arise[s] independently of a contract of sale between the parties. (Davis v.

Nissan North America (2024), 100 Cal.App.5th 825 838.) Because the claim rests on Defendant’s warranty, Defendant’s evidence that it was not the selling dealer and had no direct contact with Plaintiffs is insufficient to uphold its burden on summary judgment. Moreover, Defendant’s moving papers

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00281778-CU-BC-GDS: Kevin Gerhardt vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 09/10/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16C

fail to present evidence showing that the warranty had expired, was inapplicable to subsequent purchasers, or was effectively disclaimed. The Court does not reach arguments Defendant did not raise.

The Court finds Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden to demonstrate that the first cause of action fails as a matter of law. Thus, the burden never shifted to Plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of material fact. (See Code. Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

Defendant’s summary judgment of the first cause of action is DENIED.

The failure to dispose of all causes of action necessarily precludes summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted where it is shown that the “action has no merit” and summary judgment lies only where the opponent has no case at all. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215.) Because Defendant has failed to satisfy its initial burden as to the first cause of action, the motion for summary judgment must be denied in its entirety.

As noted, Defendant did not move for summary adjudication, and therefore, this Court need not consider the merits of contentions pertaining to the remainder of the causes of action

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

[1] dismissed and remanded under California Rules of Court, rule 8.528(b)(1).